That means salaries aren't really tied to any concrete business metric, but to extrinsics - how much managerial time would have to be spent replacing people, how much empire-building the line manager is trying to do, how much you want to stop your competitors having access to the "best" talent. In other words, they're going to be arbitrary, to all intents and purposes.
You'll also find that stored-value cards for things like transport are increasingly common and often the only way to get the best-value fares. However, the card will likely have limited geographical scope (eg the London Oyster Card), so if you're travelling widely you'll need a bunch of them or pay higher fares.
While these schemes may make life easier/cheaper for locals, they can make life for visitors increasingly complicated.
Mind you, these supposedly transnational card networks have always been rather parochial. A lot of years ago I came across an ATM in Germany with a handwritten signed attached saying "Nur Deutschen Eurokarten"...
And as you say, it doesn't flow from politicians, per se. You only have to look at the unproven, but plausible reports of the security services pursuit of Prime Minister Harold Wilson to realise that elected politicians too may be the target if they are suspected by the establishment of deviating too far from the status quo.
However, as it has been pointed out before, for reasons that are not immediately clear, Venice is not commonly known as "the Manchester of the South"...
... for all Congress knows. There are two meanings to the word "oversight" and Congress seems to have picked the wrong one...
Bro' / 'mo - not sure there's much difference in these metrosexual times...
>other people will solve them
Other people are solving the real problem of address exhaustion, just not in the way that the IETF intended.
Even the IPv6 enthusiasts accepted that adoption would have to be widespread before the regional registries started running out of IPv4 addresses if it were going to work as a solution. That hasn't happened and it's now just too late - don't forget this started 22 years ago when most of the host systems were still under the control of education and government institutions and migration could have occurred much faster than it could now.
The thing that still irks me is that there'd been a very similar and very public (though much less protracted) attempt to deal with similar address limitations in DECnet that had failed miserably and the IETF chose to turn a deaf ear to those experiences which have simply been repeated on a larger scale with IPv6.
The problem of address exhaustion remains. IPv6 is no longer the solution, it's time came and went. A different group of "other people" are now attempting to keep the Internet roughly connected, but I'm afraid end-to-end connectivity is gone because the solution that offered it has failed the acceptance test.
And more than that, it isn't at all obvious that retaliation will solve the problem you're experiencing. Indeed, the resources devoted to it will diminish the resources available for solving the domestic problem.
More seriously, critical infrastructure needs to have a safe manual mode of operation (even if you have to deploy personnel that normally wouldn't be present). If it doesn't your defence has already failed.
As a furriner, this is the part I always find hilarious.
If an enlightened citizenry were ever going to use their weapons to overthrow the overbearing state, there have been plenty of occasions over the last 50 years where you could construct an argument for justification.
And yet it never happens. And why not? Because the people who believe in the weaponisation of civil society have been right behind every form of oppression from slavery through to the Patriot Act.
The US government would be mad to deprive the gun nuts of their guns - they do their work for them.
It was a big worry for the British government that in the event of a nuclear strike the people they needed to maintain the fiction of continuing authority would actually prefer to be at home dying with their families rather than assisting the remnants of the state.
So, for example, there was a secret list of telephone engineers (all, at the time, government employees) who would be kidnapped at gunpoint in the event of a nuclear emergency and forced into their nearest bunker to maintain the telecommunications equipment.
"For your own good", indeed.
>I almost can't believe we're talking about effective encryption being illegal
Then you must be very young.
Back in the days of telegrams, many countries had strict regulations regarding the readability of messages sent. The US wouldn't allow the export of software which permitted encryption with (symmetric) key lengths longer than 40 bits until 1996 when the limit was raised to 56 bits by the Wassenaar agreement. PGP was eventually determined to be legally exported from the US as a result of a court decision that source code printed on paper was protected as free speech (you couldn't legally at that point export the source code in electronic form, only as printing on paper). The late 1990s saw many governments agonising about encryption and although the commercial imperative was clear (in particular for electronic financial transactions), because of its military origins it was regarded as a hostile technology - there are endless proposals from various countries for key escrow systems (eg "Clipper Chip"). A proposed encryption system for the UK National Health Service was considered that included key escrow, presumably because it would otherwise be difficult for medical information to be obtained without a court order.
The last few years, in which encryption has been freely available (but little used), are very much the exception in the history of cryptography.
... but I guess a paper entitled "Indians Invented Nothing" might not be selected for presentation.