Comment Users often know more about phishing than trainers (Score 1) 151
I've worked at a number of companies. They all had phishing training that was at best useless, and often completely counter productive.
One company sent an invite to a mandatory off-site (only a city block away, but still) security training seminar to everyone in the company. The invite was sent from the training vendor, with no advance notice, and demanded employees register for the event using their company ID and password. Employees received an unexpected email from an unknown third party, demanding their corporate login credentials, and naturally reported it to IT. IT instructed HR to reprimand users for refusing to sign up for the mandatory training.
When users asked how they were supposed to know that this email was legit, IT said it was obviously legitimate because "it has the corporate logo on the letterhead". Boy, it's a good thing that scammers can't fake letterheads, that's all I can say.
Another company's IT sent out a test phishing scam to see who clicked on the link. Of course, they sent it internally using valid Exchange credentials, and the link was to an internal company server's 10.0.x.y IP address. Tech savvy users were confused why a scammer would link to an internal server, and many reported it to the corporate security head office as a breach of the internal network.
At a third company, management's emails to staff violated the phishing rules so routinely that when one employee left, at his new company, he almost fell for their phishing test, because "$COMPANY1 trained me to think that suspicious looking emails are probably legit ".
I saw one security head report to management that there was no point in doing phishing education amongst employees, because so many emails from management, IT, and HR violated the rules for proper communication that employees were continually guessing what was and what wasn't legitimate.
When users get emails with all the signs of a scam - bad grammar, mis-spelled words (including the name of the company), links to external sites, demands for corporate login credentials, threatened punishment for refusing to provide credentials - that later turn out to be legitimate IT/HR communication. When the company doesn't reprimand IT/HR for breaking email rules, but instead reprimands employees for ignoring these suspicious emails, of course they're going to not going to find phishing training effective.
If corporate communications don't follow phishing rules, why should the employees?