Besides, I certainly don't need to go to the freezer section to buy unhealthy, fatty food. Some of my favorite homemade meals, such as traditional Mexican enchiladas, are bad enough for me.
I think there's definitely something about gamertags that impacts the way people respond to you. I remember when playing Gears or War or Halo there seemed to be an unspoken policy of avoiding being on the team of someone with an all-lowercase name, because it at least seemed to often be the case that such a person was a young kid or a newer player. Of course, looks are deceptive. There are many good players who use all-lowercase gamertags. But even if we cognitively know that our assumptions are faulty, that does not stop us from unconsciously acting upon them before we think about it. (Hence Pascal says that human reason is subject to imagination: you could put the world's smartest philosopher on a secure plank hanging over a cliff, and even though he knows that he won't fall, he will probably still be afraid of it.)
The only name change I paid for on Xbox Live was to make my gamertag more interesting and less newbish, so that other experienced players would be less likely to avoid being on my team. You can say that one's skill should speak for itself, but you have to win a game first in order for your skill to speak, and in team-based matches a set of bad teammates can easily make you look like a newb.
So most of them will choose names that give the impression of a callow youth trying to grossly overcompensate for their (obvious) inadequacies. Not only are these individuals easy to spot, their choices are more likely to make them targets for scorn and derision rather than convey the impression they are better than they really are.
I agree. The mark of many newb gamertags will often be that he or she chooses a name that he or she *thinks* is intimidating. It would be better to imitate very closely gamertags of players who *are* intimidating, when these have some distinctive character. I opted for something in the middle, which would not look like it was trying to be too clever but would not immediately appear to be newbish.
Not that I think this criticism applies to what Jhon said, but a great inconsistency lies in the fact that many of us cannot help but believe that our lives are worth something, that the people we love should not simply die, but still we profess a nihilistic materialism that cannot of itself ground the value of human life. The question we have to ask then is whether our striving toward improvements in medical science is merely for the sake of showing off the wonders of technology, or whether we really believe that people should live longer. If we answer the latter, are we not implying that life is morally superior to death, that technology is not wrong if it makes us more than another cog in the evolutionary system?
I have read theological attempts to claim that human death is justifiable simply in view of evolution and the cycle of life. They argue that even if we die horrible deaths, at least we are doing good by feeding the worms that eat our bodies. But who can actually profess this view in all honesty apart from depression or mere cynicism? How many of us can really say, "At least the poor worms will have something to eat"?
That aside, I do agree with Jhon that the moral value of extending life is not necessarily the same at that of living forever. Nevertheless, we should not consider death valuable in itself simply because it is a mechanism of evolution. Technology, even if it violates the usual flow of nature, is not thereby something immoral or destructive. We are technological beings and the products of evolution, and the kind of nature-freedom dualism that makes people to think that technology and nature are incompatible simply doesn't make sense.
2. We would have no concept of the 'real' world that was not given by this world to us, so we could hardly even suppose that such a world existed. To even hypothesize such a world is almost certainly to reproduce our own world in slightly different terms, and project it onto a mysterious "other." E.g.: Star Trek, women from other planets just happen to be different colors. Hence the idea of a world that is not so mathematically predictable is dependent from the beginning upon our experience of this world and its mathematical characteristics (notwithstanding the complaints that math is not quite so clear-cut as portrayed).
3. This is just a kind of Idealism which, instead of seeing the world of ideas as being more mathematically simplistic, sees it as less. Yet this view is not for that reason any less Idealism.