Hey, we can't have Indians knowing about sex!

Wait. How many of them are there again?

If I can be forgiven for porting my response here:

The InfoWorld article linked to is remarkable and revealing, in particular, to me, because I have seen this exact scenario in multiple work settings. The people with actual networking knowledge and talent control access so that the employees with "just enough knowledge to be dangerous" don't BREAK THE SYSTEM.

That's not ego or theory. I've seen it happen so many times I couldn't count: technicians who think they know what they're doing but don't adequately research their ideas (or study enough in general) are prone to wreaking all sorts of havoc on the network. This Childs fellow may well be controlling or even arrogant. But what if -- just humor the notion -- in his work environment he was actually right? That had he shared access with the less competent admins with which he may have been surrounded, the San Fran government would have had a far less stable, secure network.

I don't know, but given what I've seen, it's quite plausible. Not his call to make, I'd agree. But then, it seems that for some time, his direct superior didn't insist otherwise. Bad call, of course -- but not Childs' fault.

I'm starting to suspect his arrest and being charged were ridiculously hasty and unnecessary. Conceivably the outcome of his immediate superior(s) running an exaggerated "renegade" story up the chain of command, as much out of interpersonal distaste for Childs as actual concern over his reluctance to give up a password on demand.

Perhaps the new gap-filler for managerial incompetence: employee prosecution.