So getting a program to work right with SELinux takes a RHCE? And elevated access so you can drop the context rule in the right secure place?
As one of the other posters noted here, the problem isn't configuring SELinux right on one system. The problem is that configuring it right is done differently on each user's different system - so you either have to write the configuration 3+ times (RPM, DEB, and pick some other common format, then listen to Linux users gripe about how you didn't support THEIR package format), or you have to write some sort of complicated setuid-root shell script that does the right thing. And to install this silly game (which doesn't require root), you have to be root! Remember how Windows got into a lot of trouble about how you had to be Administrator to install anything? But when it's SELinux with the same requirement, we are supposed to call this a good thing?
SELinux is a wonderful system - IF you can enumerate all permissions needed by all software that will ever be installed on the system. Which is true only for toy OSes or base OS installs or for people who have solved the halting problem. And that's why any non-trivial software immediately suggests turning off SELinux - the defaults are too restrictive for real-world software (JIT is only allowed for Java / Browsers / other things the SELinux rule authors have seen before), and you need to really know the system well to properly alter the configuration while still maintaining security. The point is, installing new pieces of "normal" software is a major piece of functionality for the OS, which means the OS needs to handle this itself and configuring security is not something that should be foisted upon the software being installed. Really fancy software - e.g. database servers and such - may need to carry a security configuration with it. But come on - a game needs security configuration ?!?!
(And before the Linux people skewer me for saying Windows is better - Linux is perfectly fine. It's SELinux that is