How about the entirely unnecessary, bigoted coercion and force used against them by society to incarcerate them, which they wouldn't have to suffer if they were addicted to something mainstream, i.e. alcohol or tobacco?
Having your life ruined merely for being different is something which should attract sympathy from anyone.
The first question is not actually how you can create such a culture, but whether it's actually a good thing in the first place. You seriously need to evaluate this. One of the primary means of being secure is not trusting others. But trusting others is an incredibly useful tool to get things done, and it may be worth taking the security hit. Stand on a crowded railway platform, and you're trusting so many people, each of whom could push you off and kill you so easily, without even thinking about it. Without trust, society itself would be impossible.
So for example, if everyone believed they were immune to the security risk of terrorism, this would very obviously be such a good thing for society. There have been security economic analyses done of various security measures recommended by security guys, thinking their users to be fools who just wouldn't listen, which established that the users who ignored them were actually completely right, that the cost of implementing these measures was hundreds of times greater than the benefit of preventing the attacks they were effective against.
A security professional who thinks doing things securely must always be a priority just because that's his field, instead of taking the time to gain a more holistic understanding of the situation, deserves to be ignored.
And moreover, since Judit Polgar was capable of becoming a world championship candidate, it's proven that women can compete with men at the top.
The problem is that chess, or at least, serious chess seems to be an almost exclusively male pastime, for reasons I can only guess at. This leads to there being very few women in the top ranks of the game, simply because there are very few women at all ranks of the game, which creates the perception that they can't compete. So people organise separate tournaments for girls because that's what you do in sport. And so girls learning chess only have a tiny pool of other people to practice against, so they don't get the broad range of experience that the boys do, and they imagine becoming women's world champion rather than world champion so they don't get the ambition boys do, and so the regular stream of Judit Polgars which we need to break this idea is suppressed.
Segregation is a disaster for women's chess, but it creates a self-propagating vicious circle. It is its own explanation.
I think the problem the author has is that he wants to believe that there is a singular notion of "best chess player". In reality, there are multiple notions of the best chess player. Ratings measure more the ability to stay consistent throughout your career and never let your form dip, tournament wins measure more your ability to take points off weaker players and shift our mindset rapidly to deal with the next style which comes along... and the world championship measures more your ability to present an impregnable wall of defensive ability and be unbeatable.
These are all very valuable things to have, and wanting to take one of them away just because your mind isn't flexible enough to cope with them all existing simultaneously is selfish.
What do you have against AES? The US government doesn't pick bad algorithms for itself to use as a matter of principle or anything, suspicion is only really warranted on algorithms which contain data which claims or appears to be random, but could have been specially chosen to have some property. (If you want people to trust your magic numbers, you generate them by doing something like taking the hash of the square root of 2.) The difference between AES and Twofish is that AES got more positive comments from around the world during the AES selection process, and fewer negative comments. Twofish is still a well-respected algorithm which will protect your data, but AES is generally regarded as slightly superior, and this is why NIST recommend it.
There's no need for a replacement for Dual_EC_DRBG, because it was only one of several recommended choices, and was both slow and suspicious, so nobody was using it anyway. Hash-based PRNGs seem to be faring best at the moment, though something which everyone can call good is still yet to really emerge.
The main crypto algorithm which is both trusted and now under suspicion is ECDSA/ECDH, where people have tended to use curves recommended by NIST, which have data in which we can't verify the generation of. It's not clear just how dangerous this is, whether this data could actually hold any malicious secrets or not, but it can certainly be solved just by generating our own curves, or using curves from organisations we trust more.