It's clear you don't know where to begin criticizing it. DVDs do it (very poorly) and Blu-Ray do it (less poorly).
You identify two systems as examples of your new "security" feature, but both of them have been laughably compromised. Neither scheme lasted more than a year in the wild, and with a PC security standard you'd need to manage a bit more than that.
A similar system would be trivial. As would be putting the PRIVATE KEYS on the mass produced hardware (encrypted and signed, of course). You do know how PKI works, don't you? You don't send someone your private key for them to authenticate you. You encrypt their public key with your private key and send that encrypted PRIVATE KEY derivative. So, burn that encrypted key into the USB device as part of the driver.
I bolded the part that is problematic. How does one burn a key into the device as part of a driver, exactly? With security, the devil is in the details, and your proposed system sounds no better than similar systems which have failed in the past.
That you are too dumb to understand an idea doesn't mean the idea is dumb.
Nice ad hominem, but maybe you should have provided a substantive argument instead.
I believe your explanation rather than my intelligence is at fault here. You identify two systems as functional examples of your new "security" feature---neither of which is effective in practice. AACS has been compromised repeatedly, which shows that simply revoking the exposed keys and hoping new equipment fares better is not an effective strategy.
Can you explain, clearly, how your system differs in such a way as to render it immune to similar attacks? If not, then there is absolutely no reason to take your proposal seriously.