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Comment Re:This time... (Score 1) 89

No, they're assuming the majority of consumers will be too lazy or too cheap to buy a device to defeat the latest attempt at copy protection. Kind of like the manufactures of this year's new version of Teflon pans assume people wont remember that the previous 20 versions of Teflon all flaked off withing a few years, due to the fundamental physical principle that if nothing sticks to it, then it doesn't stick to the pan! And yet they're still making money selling the "new and improved!" Teflon pans!

Comment Truth is an affirmative defense to defamation (Score 1) 141

Meaning that if Bleeping Computer wins the lawsuit, the Streisand Effect means Enigma loses a lot more business than if they had just ignored the review. I, for one, have never heard of Bleeping Computer and would never have read the review in the first place. Of course, I've never heard of Enigma and would never have bought their software in the first place; most antimalware software seems like a scam to me anyway. Microsoft provides Windows Defender for free; why would I want to PAY for anitvirus?

Comment Re:Prevents MTM hardware attacks (Score 1) 280

The lightning cable is chipped; I suspect Apple is putting a chip in every component so it can identify it. And of course the additional cost of these custom components is passed on to the consumer; that's why iPhones cost $700. I don't mind that as much as the fact that Apple is the highest-priced flash memory vendor in the world AND you have to buy all your flash memory pre-installed.

Comment A few considerations: (Score 1) 280

In Apple's defense, it does seem reasonably plausible that the biometric sensor widget built into the 'home' button(and quite possibly the cable connecting the home button to the logic board) is a 'trusted' element of the system, in the 'the integrity of the system depends on this part performing as expected and not being malicious' sense of 'trusted'. So, I can see why it would be impossible or prohibitively difficult to keep the biometric authentication feature secure while also allowing random people to swap random hardware in to that part of the system.

However, what is a lot less clear is why(especially when many iDevices, including current-model ones, simply lack this feature entirely) 'security' demands that the entire phone be bricked, rather than just the biometric features flushing any private storage associated with them and leaving the phone usable as though it were a model without that feature. This might involve wiping all locally stored data, if the device encryption keys are tangled up with the biometric authentication feature's private storage; but it should still be able to function as though you had just restored it to defaults.

This also raises the question of whether, with the correct incentives, it is possible to induce authorized repair services to introduce malicious components when doing these repairs, and whether doing so would allow you to extract highly sensitive information. Since Apple-blessed repairs can apparently fix home buttons without destroying the handset, and since Apple's line is that tampering threatens the integrity of the authentication system, this seems like a natural place to try to get your malicious part introduced: much more likely that an authorized repair outfit exists in your jurisdiction than that Apple Inc. does; many more low-level techs you could potentially lean on; and home button repairs are a pretty common service request...

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