False. Your confusion lies in the fact that you believe this will do good for the Cuban people, as if somehow magically a place with no free market and a government that has historically given it's people dirt will all of a sudden benefit from these relations. This money will go to the Cuban communist regime, not the people that are suffering that need it. That is where there is truly no logic and severely detached from reality.
Even if 1% of that money gets to the people (and, pragmatically speaking, more of it will for sure), then they are going to be better off.
More importantly, if it prompts economic reforms along the lines of what most other communist countries did - the closest example here probably being Vietnam - the people are going to be vastly better off even if the authoritarian political system remains in place.
Either way, while we can only guess what will happen without sanctions, we know full well what happens with the sanctions: absolutely nothing. So what exactly is their purpose then?
Also, even if it was for revenge, would you really blame someone who feels that way?
Blame them for feeling that way, no (well, it depends on who they were before Castro; if it's one of Batista's cronies, or the members of the top ruling elite supporting him, I'd say they can suck it and go cry in a corner; I have no sympathy for people robbing others under gunpoint when they get robbed themselves in a similar fashion). But I will blame them for letting that emotion guide their political decisions, and especially for pushing the same onto others.
Oh, as for my comfy chair. I was born in a communist country. Don't try that "you rich American asshole can't understand" on me.
They can have whatever rules they want about who connects to their network and what they do on it; but 'there must be rules' is a pretty thin justification for tearing down the usual rules of precedence for part 15 devices and the ISM band. It's also a recipe for setting off a nice little arms race, which is about the last thing you want happening on a slice of spectrum that only remains useful if the devices on it manage to cooperate a bit.
Unfortunately, the vast majority of Americans do not agree with you. They don't want to see anything intellectually stimulating, and they are not bored by characters with practically no limitations.
Then include the fact that most systems for retrieving them are so awful that somebody using an email client 25 years ago would assume that you were fucking with them, and it's just icing on the cake.
Into Darkness on the other hand, is shit. JJ Abrams is shit. Therefore, whoever's replacing him has a low bar to overcome.
I agree about JJ, but I think they've managed to do even worse here. The director of the Fast-n-Furious movies? Are they fucking kidding? This is even worse than hiring Michael Bay to make a movie.
Star Trek is dead.
The proof of concept is probably a big hairy bundle of prototype that would get you arrested if you brought it to an airport; but a slightly more polished variant could be squirreled away in quite a few places. The volume and power required to implement an entire single-purpose attacker device is already fairly small, getting into "eh, probably just one of those EMI ferrite things" territory, and not going to get any larger; plus the options available in either embedding the attacker device in the case of a legitimate device or modifying a legitimate device's firmware.
The truly paranoid user might not be vulnerable; but few users are paranoid enough to qualify.
That said, aren't all non-connected tokens(like the Symantec one you link to) going to have the same fundamental limitation that you need to know enough to clone the token in order to authenticate the token? In the case of the Symantec offering, it appears that the model is "Company B needs to pass every auth request to Company A for processing". It's Symantec: Neutral Trusted Party, rather than Bank A vs. Bank B; but same basic system.
The nice thing about smartcards (and USB dongles or contactless systems that implement equivalent functions) is that, while they do need a communication channel, they can perform a proof of identity(via public/private keypair) without ever needing to expose their private key, and without the remote host needing to know anything except the public key. The extra channel is a huge pain in the ass, compared to the time-based ones(which really are a cute trick, even if RSA are awful to deal with), especially if users expect to log in on something where you can't just install a card reader; but something with access to keypair auth is fundamentally better suited to multi-institution verification.
I really wish that we'd just bitten the bullet 10 years ago and actually rolled out a CAC-style keypair/smartcard system, with accompanying hardware and software ecosystem) in a big way. Trying to add it on after the fact is pretty hopeless; but if baked in it's a pretty cheap interface, and more capable than the disconnected tokens by a fair margin. Ah well.