Summary: your characterization of the situation on the ground in Ukraine is not correct. Additionally, the reason why Ukraine wants no part of the Russian model of government and economy is listed. Details below.
Leonid Ivashov, a former Soviet and Russian general, penned an essay before the invasion, as the world got wind of Russia's intention. His observations were prescient. Remarkable that this gentlemen predicted nearly exactly what would happen, while Putin believed in a 3 day operation. Putin was able to snatch Crimea without effort or bloodshed, and he thought he could do the same with the whole of Ukraine (kind of like Trump believing he could snatch Iran, because Venezuela was easy):
The use of military force against Ukraine will, first of all, call into question Russia’s very existence as a state. Second, it will turn Russians and Ukrainians into mortal enemies. Third, thousands (tens of thousands) of young, healthy people will die on both sides, which will naturally have an effect on the future demographic situation in our dying countries. On the battlefield field – if there is a battle – Russian troops will face not just Ukrainian soldiers, many of whom will be [ethnically] Russian, but also NATO troops and equipment, while NATO member states will be obligated to declare war against Russia. Turkish President Recep [Tayyip] Erdogan has been clear about whose side Turkey will be on. And we can assume that Turkey’s two field armies and its fleet will be ordered to “liberate” the Crimea and Sevastopol and, possibly, to invade the Caucasus. In addition, there is no doubt that Russia will be added to the category of countries that pose a threat to peace and international security, subjected to the most severe sanctions, transformed into a pariah in the eyes of the international community and probably lose the status of an independent state. There is no way that the president, the government and the Defense Ministry do not understand these consequences.
The Center For Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) goes into depth, as of July 2026, examining the Russian incursion into Ukraine:
But much of the analysis on Russia’s battlefield performance has been anecdotal. This study examines several indicators of Russia’s battlefield performance compiled by CSIS ...
First, Russian battlefield costs continue to mount, with as many as 450,000 battlefield deaths and 1.4 million casualties between February 2022 and June 2026. These rates are astounding. Russian fatalities in Ukraine are more than four times greater than all U.S. fatalities in all wars combined since World War II, and more than nine times greater than all Soviet and Russian fatalities in all wars combined since World War II.
In addition, Russia’s monthly casualty rates of over 30,000 per month in 2026 have likely exceeded Russia’s recruitment rates of roughly 27,000 new recruits per month. The Russia-Ukraine casualty rate has likely risen to nearly 8:1 in the first half of 2026, up from between 2:1 and 3:1 for much of the war, in large part due to Ukraine’s use of drones—including AI-enabled drones—as part of its aggressive air interdiction campaign.
Second, Russia’s ground offensive has largely stalled, with an average rate of advance of approximately 50 meters per day around Kostiantynivka, 70 meters per day around Pokrovsk, and 90 meters per day around Sloviansk. These are among the slowest rates of advance in any war over the last century.
Third, Russia’s territorial control in Ukraine shrank in the spring of 2026. Russian forces lost more ground than they captured in both April and May, a net loss of roughly 400 square kilometers and their first monthly net losses since August 2024—yet another sign of Russia’s military struggles.
The rest of this analysis is divided into five sections. ...
What you feel is best, is of course your opinion, no right or wrong to it. However, note Ivashov's characterization:
Naturally, in order for Ukraine to remain a friendly neighbor for Russia, Russia would have had to demonstrate the attractiveness of its state model and system of government. But Russia never became a friendly neighbor; its model of development and foreign policy mechanism for international cooperation repelled almost all its neighbors and beyond. Russia’s appropriation of the Crimea and Sevastopol, and their nonrecognition as Russian by the international community (meaning that the majority of countries in the world still believe they belong to Ukraine) are convincing proof of the failure of Russian foreign policy and the unattractiveness of its domestic policy. Attempts to use ultimatums and the threat of force to make [others] “fall in love with” Russia and its leaders are pointless and extremely dangerous.
It is obvious why Ukraine wanted to avoid being reconquered by its former colonial master, and sought independence, freedom and prosperity with the European model of government and economy.