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Comment Re:Wow ... (Score 1) 220

I wonder how well securing luggage with a firearm actually helps though.

They did not change the rule regarding putting the "steal me" firearm tag on the inside of the luggage without reason and the same penalties applied back then. I assume the smart thieves broke the luggage open after seeing the tag, stole the firearm, and put the luggage back. Certainly that happens with high value personal items now, so why would this be different from firearms except for the penalties? This would apply to handguns but not long guns though.

Offhand I do not know of any incidents where packing a firearm for extra security created a more thorough response when the luggage was reported stolen but my sample size is low. I would still do it if possible.

Comment Re:To What Medium (Score 1) 62

The ROM's on early-80's consoles are still, on the whole, perfectly readable (as evidenced by MAME), and they don't even TRY to use error correcting codes to ensure resiliency.

Not if they are Mostek mask ROMs with the 2763 pinout. In test equipment and arcade machine those all seem to be failing. Anti-fuse programmable logic from that era is also failing. The fuses seem to be "regrowing".

Comment Re:Should work fine (Score 1) 120

Let's take this a step further - Apple added MAC address randomization [] to ios 8. Android can't be far behind, so what, exactly, is this going to do other than result in more home invasions on known false pretenses?

I fail to see a downside for law enforcement.

Comment Re:Is this all just a false flag? (Score 1) 306

If the FBI really wants access, they could get an NSL issued, forcing apple to comply by compromising their own system..and they couldn't tell their customers about it.

Maybe they did and the issue is begin litigated. Because of the secrecy of a NSL, we will not know until the case is decided and maybe not even then.

A warrant is different in that you cannot contest it; instead you contest the admissibility of evidence which has nothing to do with Apple. The warrant has already been reviewed by a judge without opposition.

Comment Re:Companies Will Lose (Score 1) 306

The government can change the rules (laws), has unlimited funds, and extended litigation provides employment. How much would Apple have to gain or lose to compromise their system? How much more than the 10 million dollars RSA accepted?

Or the government could give the same treatment to Apple that they gave to Quest. Maybe Tim Cook could have the same cell Joseph Nacchio had.

Comment Re:Rationalization (Score 1) 306

Sure, just like:

1. Law enforcement agencies use civil assets forfeiture to fund their operations.
2. Prosecutors withhold exculpatory evidence by either indifference or by reviewing evidence to see if it is exculpatory first in their opinion.
3. Law enforcement beating confessions out of suspects or intelligence agencies using extraordinary rendition to do the same thing without interference from the courts.
4. Law enforcement using unreliable confidential informants to generate probable cause for warrants.
5. Law enforcement using drug sniffing dogs to generate probable cause for searches.
6. Intelligence agencies passing along information gained without a warrant to law enforcement who then use parallel construction to keep the court from reviewing the initial search. Law enforcement does the same thing with cellular interception devices.

If intelligence agencies and law enforcement think end to end user encryption is such a problem, then get a law passed making it unlawful and requiring features for law enforcement access. Bring it out into the open for debate instead of violating the constitution with the result of diminishing other rights. Their cause is virtuous and they can be trusted, right?

Comment Re:Well, they COULD also encrypt for the FBI... (Score 1) 306

The key is to strike some sort of balance. If the FBI has a court-issued warrant saying they can eavesdrop in real-time on a text conversation between two people's phones, then there's really not much room for one to argue that their privacy rights should override the warrant. Being able to eavesdrop in on conversations over a communications network after a warrant has been granted has been a well-established legal process for close to a century.

What is not established is that a warrant is sufficient to compel Apple to do anything other than turn over what they have access to which is the ciphertext. For that, the FBI needs a law or maybe an order based on the All Writs Act.

As far as balance, there is no balance when law enforcement including the NSA and FBI systematically lie to Congress and the court about surveillance.

Comment Re:In real time? (Score 1) 306

Since the United States Supreme Court has ruled that "limited times" includes any duration which can be specified, any brute force attack may be conducted within a "limited time".

The government should get to it and stop complaining. It will only take a "limited time" to decrypt the ciphertext.

"Don't tell me I'm burning the candle at both ends -- tell me where to get more wax!!"