The lens has everything to do with capturing enough light to make a useful image within that short shutter time. I keep my f1.4 prime 50mm on my Pentax, because it does such a nice job without a flash much of the time.

Much of that lower half would also disagree about which half they're in. Similarly, we are *all* above average drivers, right?

Rome is burning.

The government doesn't like it when others infringe on its territory. I'd be much more impressed if the US gov took as much interest in its own illegal snooping.

Fine, get one of those little sponges from Staples. Or, if you feel like making a statement, provide whatever DNA sample moistens the stamp in a way which matches your preferred sentiment. Your typical recipient won't know, but you've told the Powers That Be just how weird you really are. It doesn't have to be yours either, if you have alternative means to acquire said sample.

Authentication of the parties at each end is one issue, but only one of them. What I mean is that most protocols should be encrypted by default, rather than by exception. Let us take the web for example.

• When you make a request, your browser first telegraphs its intentions by doing a DNS lookup of the desired host.

• Once an IP address is determined, your browser makes a request, usually in plaintext.

• The typical, non-SSL connection trusts the domain registrars and DNS hosts that the identified address matches the actual site.

• The user provides plaintext (usually) credentials, on the iffy chance that the site even requires any.

• The response is also unencrypted, so the entire process is totally in the clear as a general case.

Like the AC said, it's the Stasi's wet dream. You have gone and told your ISP, the web host, and every snoopy-assed dog in between exactly what your on-line identity is, who you're talking to, what was said by each, and probably the credentials you used to log in.

Without getting into the hassles of key management for crypto, let us compare this to a simple (-ish) SSL session:

• You have still leaked your DNS request. In the typical case, your ISP knows what hostname you're looking for in your browser request.

• Your browser makes at least some attempt at verifying the identity of the web site. Yes, SSL has issues with knowing who to trust, but the alternative sucks donkey balls in comparison. Your common-use, current browsers will squawk for most dodgy attempts, and getting around this requires more subterfuge than the average bear.

• Your communications with the end host are encrypted. What ever you asked for, and receive, as well as any login credentials, are hidden from prying third parties. Your ISP knows little but the hostname, unless you have installed browser certs which let them perform a MITM attack.

Not perfect, but better, yes? Now multiply this across other common protocols. Email (both ways), chat, file transfers. It's a great start.

While not surprising that it happens, it is vital that it be exposed for the power grab that it is. The problem is that the new forms of communication lack even the weak forms of protection afforded to old modes. For instance, telephone wiretaps require warrants, and postal mail is illegal to intercept by default as well. Compare that with the internet, where there are no legal prohibitions against snarfing the whole works, and great compulsion to do so.

There are multiple answers, of course, to make this process as difficult as possible. Social cohesion helps, as shown by the misery that the #TellVicEverything Twitter meme caused for Vic Toews' (Wullerton spit here) staffers. Encrypt everything, whether it needs it or not, and let the bastards sort out themselves what's important to them. Improved peer to peer protocols and the like could help blend traffic together, and make it harder to tell where the useful metadata is too, which email and other headers keep plaintext now. If you can't even tell who is communicating with whom, the challenge of where to serve the lawsuits makes it much more difficult to proceed. Finally, those who care the most about privacy, including the criminals themselves, will find off-line ways to communicate. The real bogey-men aren't dumb enough to throw everything out on the net to be archived, they'll go back to old, tried and true spycraft techniques.

One of the two flying Lancasters left came to Winnipeg a while back. I wasn't quite in the right spot for a close-up flyover, but was still close enough for the initial approach and a couple of pics coming in over the local Air Command. The sound is indeed awesome, and you can totally see the Spitfire profile in the engine pods. The local air museum had a very busy display for a little while there, and my son and I got to go through the plane. Awesome!

At that point, why bother with the scanner?

I refuse to believe, until I see some pics to back up the anecdotal evidence.