How much are the emails of your competitor's best salesmen worth to you? What if they were scanned to forward only those between him and his customers? What if you got alerts when a new prospect emailed? There is so much profitable data in email if only you fully monetize it! (and resell it through a Business Intelligence '3rd party' so you can claim to be the victim when caught!)

Facilitating scanning for any purpose by '3rd parties' is still on the table too.

Thus they'll have the pictures from drivers license photos. They'll make it mandatory for exercising your constitutionally guaranteed rights(* exclusions apply, complaints accepted in 'free speech' zones only) - so press passes, licenses of all types (esp. for guns) will require it.

Paying for it is a problem too. That's why we had design the Occulus -- so nerds would pay us to put that headband on.

The problem is the management structure leading to internal billing sounding like a good idea! Flat rate the costs unless they're really significant and you can't gauge who the users are. Make the flat rate based on 'reserved' units. i.e. a portion of the resources have 'priority' access for a dept. based on the amount the dept. allocated to the budget. They are still shared, but the sponsoring dept. has priority access. Infrequent users use the 'free' equipment or any 'reserved' unit not currently in use. Frequent users can fund additional 'sponsored' units if they need more. While imperfect, it's better than treating each bit of equipment like a rent-way rental.

The AC's idea of an RFID timeclock in the room is great if you must internally bill. A crude measure of usage should work if your office politics aren't toxic. If you really have problems with equipment abuse, you can use a webcam and review it only if there is unreported damage. Review the footage only with a managers approval with public knowledge every time it happens (with penalties for snooping) and you'll make junior NSA drama less likely.

Still, internal billing is very expensive operationally.

The one the governmental actors target? We know they want to discredit bitcoin. Why not make the effort profitable too? Stealing bitcoin discredits bitcoin while providing 'clean' funds for covert operations. Win-Win!

The folks who created Stuxnet could do this without a doubt. Why is anyone assuming this is being done by 'criminals'?

Exactly. The French were terribly led. Command was not granted based on ability, and they are a post child for the terrible consequences of doing that.

At work a secretary played a Celine Deon CD on her PC, infecting it with one of the Sony root-kits just as I was making purchasing decision. I'm sure you're shocked to learn I placed Sony in the 'Hell No!' list.

Should the Sony Vaio division use their severance pay to hire hits on the Sony media division execs? They excluded Sony from consideration from a bit more than $100k of purchases I made...

Like Cointelpro, they'll just rename and reshuffle the programs while still doing exactly what they want. You can't reveal they're back at it without committing a felony after all...

How? They didn't have any to lose.

Nope, my HP server used a different trick. The raid array reports a discharged ram battery after a certain date, forcing the array to stop write back caching. Swapping array controllers and batteries showed that the motherboard firmware not the raid controller is the source of the problem.

A friend had one of those HP laptops. The wireless NIC failed first. HP support lied and said it was a Windows issue and she'd have to pay. They played the 'Windows problem' card again when it started locking up with video corruption. Once it failed completely just as the warranty expired they stalled for a few weeks then told her it's out of warranty so sorry!

I found reports showing that her failure was characteristic of HP's Nvidia problem, and that HP had instructed its support folks to lie. We called back and didn't get results without demonstrating a willingness to sue for fraud. HP of course, sent a replacement with the same hardware defect.

As for the current actions, I've not got full purchasing authority for our IT department in the server room. We've got 7 HP servers now. There won't be another. I can go with Supermicro or another white box.

Could that be why Iraq and Afghanistan aren't on this list of banned countries? Outrage!

If your files and backups have been transparently encrypted for 6 months to a year that will not help you one bit. The key was on a malware server, and only copied to ram so your backup has no copy of the key. Your backups and off line disks newer than a year (or as long as the ransom folks care to wait) are all encrypted.

In the enterprise, incremental datastore backups as with PHDvirtual would save pre-infection data as long as your backup retention is long enough but the damage would still be severe. Using a transparent driver is really deadly. Hot spares and such would just be hit along with the primary systems.

So what if the ransomware targets existing encrypted backups? Target companies that must encrypt for secure off site backups (HIPAA), swap out the key and hold it for ransom when they need to do disaster recovery. (Say, because your malware wiped the production servers...)

Today they'll use location data to see if you're part of anything those in political power oppose. If you are you'll be on the IRS audit list, the 'pull out of line' TSA list (if not on the no-fly list), and the 'pre-approval always denied' healthcare list. Why should anyone worry if you have nothing to hide?