reliable logging, minimizing attack surface, and avoiding SPOFs
systemd's logging is more reliable not less.
As far as SPOFs the move to PaaS makes systems far more redundant not less. Each node is unimportant.
As for minimizing attack surface containerization and virtualization are how that's accomplished. Fundamentally that idea is being rejected in favor of dedicated security systems.
That's why I'm so anxiously waiting for the result of Ian's GR
It doesn't really matter. Ian doesn't have a solution for the problem.
Application programmer B creates a systemd dependency in application C.
Debian package maintainer D considers this a bug in the package.
B tells D to go pound sand.
Now what? Obviously if there is interest in init.d package maintainers can create scripts and add them to the package if it is no big deal, that is if the developer isn't using systemd features. Maintainers can't force upstream to do stuff they don't want to do. The example that changed people's mind was brasero. Once brasero decided to use a chain of dependencies to detect when someone inserted a CD (i.e. no user interaction) what is Debian going to do about it?
If large numbers of people from upstream are committed to systemd (and increasingly they are) Debian can't do anything about it. The opposition from systemd (in so far as it actually exists) is coming from old school admins not developers. Distributions are about wrapping software as it exists or making minor changes.