First of all, you can tell a LOT from this particular data point.

That aside, what are you insinuating? That a group widely and routinely chastised as espousing a "liberal" and/or "leftist" agenda by conservatives, opposed the now-cancelled US Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) program, and is opposed to nuclear weapons in general, is executing a propaganda campaign to make North Korea look more primitive than it really is when it comes to its rocket programs?

Are you serious?

After a veritable comedy of errors, North Korea finally has a successful launch, can't even get or keep the satellite launched from it into a stable orbit, and now an anti-nuclear advocacy group is really a secret US propaganda campaign to inappropriately embarrass the North Koreans, who are really more advanced in rocketry than all of their misadventures would indicate? The same North Koreans who just announced they have uncovered a unicorn lair?

Really? I mean...really?

Please â" I would love to hear how this is "propaganda", and how the DPRK is really a capable member of the space and nuclear clubs. To what possible end? Even IF it were true, why/how would that be a good thing?

Or is this one of those topsy-turvy bizarro-world lines of reasoning where anything and everything that is in ANY way opposed to anything related to any US or Western interest is automatically true and pure, but anything that originates from the US or West, in any way, shape, or form is always "propaganda"?

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/20/opinion/hamass-illegitimacy.html

How are you replacing the trees that had to be removed?

The California Science Center Foundation is investing approximately $2 million to replace 400 trees removed along the route with over 1,000 trees. These replacement trees are between 10 and 14 feet in height -- about the same size as most of the trees they will be removing. A minimum of two years of free maintenance will also be provided. Within five years the community along route will have an even greener and more beautiful tree canopy.

The "you" to which I was referring in my post is the royal or general "you", for what it's worth, not you personally.

I'm also not saying that the only overwhelming deterrent is our nuclear deterrent, but it's part of our deterrent capability.

Things which are simply not covered by test ban treaties are not "getting around" test bans. When you say "getting around", you make it seem as if it is somehow a shameful, underhanded, dirty trick to "get around" a treaty. Is using supercomputers to simulate nuclear detonations also "getting around" test bans? If not, why not? If so -- are you serious? Because that's why the DOE National Laboratories have some of the most powerful supercomputers in the world -- and which can be, and are, used for all other manner of science.

US stockpile stewardship activities do not run counter to the letter, spirit, nor intent of any treaty relevant to nuclear weapons.

I'm also not making a defense of MAD, but can you explain why we should not maintain the integrity of the weapons we do have, while China is arming with nuclear weapons when we are disarming? It's fine to wax philosophic about how there are more than enough nuclear weapons on Earth to destroy it, but the idea isn't to destroy it -- it's to have enough weapons distributed on enough platforms in enough places so that it's clear that even a surprise first strike cannot hope to disable our strategic forces. The best deterrent is one that never needs to be used.

NIF has three missions:

- National security (stockpile stewardship
- Basic fusion science
- Understanding the origins of the basic building blocks of the universe

That's it.

I hate to break it you you, but much of what we do in basic science research is dual-use. It can be used for military applications, or purely scientific applications. Doing stockpile stewardship without nuclear tests is not "getting around" nuclear test ban treaties. It's maintaining the integrity of our increasingly smaller nuclear stockpile as a credible deterrent.

This overwhelming deterrent capability is part of the reason why the world has seen no major global conflict for seven decades, and has had the longest period of peace without global conflict for over five centuries. Tens of millions of people died in WWI and WWII.

We maintain a credible deterrent so it's clear that no one can ever strike us first without the certainty of themselves also being destroyed -- and if our principles and ideals and those of our allies are something you care about, then that should be important to you.

The world is changing, and some might say that the general "cyber" and information threats will more important than nuclear. China certainly seems to think so. Then again, China is also building out its nuclear weapons capabilities and stockpiles as the rest of the world, including the US, disarms. No worries, right? Delivery systems that can rain down nuclear warheads on targets anywhere in the world is just for "peaceful regional defense", right?

A world where the US doesn't maintain an overwhelming deterrent to forces which espouse principles and ideals counter to those of freedom and liberal democracy is not a pretty place.

(Note to people who think that the US is what's wrong with the world: you are sorely in need of historical perspective -- or, any perspective. The US is not perfect, but the US and West has done far more for the benefit of human life and humanity, on the whole, than any other nation, especially those with Communist, Socialist, or totalitarian systems of government. Wake up.)

This is incorrect.

The University of Wisconsin-Madison Nuclear Reactor was one of six NRC-designated Research and Test Reactors to use highly-enriched uranium. Wisconsin's was enriched to 70%, and some research reactors use U-235 enriched to 90%.

[...] since 1978, out of concern that the uranium might be turned into bomb fuel, the Department of Energy has spent millions of dollars to develop lower-grade fuel and convert scores of reactors to run on it. As of July 30, according to the Government Accountability Office (formerly the General Accounting Office), 39 of 105 research reactors worldwide had converted or were in the process. But the six campus reactors in this country are not among them.

[...]

Power reactors in this country use uranium fuel in which the proportion of U-235 has been raised to 3 to 5 percent, which is low-enriched fuel. Anything over 20 percent is considered highly enriched. Bombs are generally over 90 percent. Some research reactors run on fuel enriched to over 90 percent; Wisconsin's is 70 percent, and the quantity is probably a little less than is needed for a bomb.

Ref: http://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/15/us/uranium-reactors-on-campus-raise-security-concerns.html?pagewanted=all

You can still see the characteristic and beautiful Cherenkov radiation at the research reactor at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. I've seen it a number of times.

Up until recently, it contained 1400 pounds of highly-enriched (weapons grade) U-235 in 58-pound bundles. It is in a building across from a 7-level parking ramp and an 80,000-person football stadium.

There are a number of such "Research and Test Reactors" around the US.

A 2005 ABC News report found:

- "No guards. No metal detectors. Bags were brought into the reactor room. Doors to the building are open during the day, and no IDs are required for entry."

- "The building was undergoing major renovation, and construction workers, large trucks and building materials surrounded the rear exterior."

- "The university Web site includes a 'virtual tour' and detailed photos, descriptions and diagrams of the reactor, the fuel elements and the control room. The reactor manager informed the Fellows that tours had to be scheduled three weeks in advance and that a locked door with a window view of the reactor was the closest they could get. But a friendly professor told the Fellows about a basement entry to the reactor room, where a reactor operator opened the door and let the Fellows photograph the reactor from the doorway. Two other operators allowed the Fellows to come inside carrying their tote bags, and briefly take photographs about 15 feet from the reactor's base. No campus security ever approached the Fellows."

An 2004 New York Times report found:

- "[UWNR's] fuel is weapons-grade uranium. If it were stolen, experts say, it could give terrorists or criminals a major head start on an atomic bomb."

- "[...] out of concern that the uranium might be turned into bomb fuel, the Department of Energy has spent millions of dollars to develop lower-grade fuel and convert scores of reactors to run on it. [...] But the six campus reactors in this country are not among them."

- "Campus reactors have far less security than places where the government keeps bomb-grade uranium, and they may have foreign students of unknown political sympathies."

- "[...] the fuel now in the campus reactors is dangerously radioactive, making it hard to handle. [...] however, that highly enriched uranium was an easier fuel from which to build a bomb than is plutonium."

- "The reactor operators are paid $10.50 an hour. They recently got a raise to that level [...] because someone discovered that campus file clerks were paid more than the reactor operators.

- "[...] the current fuel load will last about 108 years at current rates of use."

"The truck is the real threat. You want to make sure the truck stays away 250 feet minimum." - Ronald Timm, Former Department of Energy security analyst

Here, the primary entrance to a major parking ramp is about 50 feet away.

Also, it's not like it's really a mystery what he saw at BNL. There have only been so many reactors there in the last 60 years. It's odd, beautiful, and I suppose comparatively rare for a person to see, but it's not a big deal.

A couple of things:

1. I thought your Google manifesto was very good (I know it's a work in progress).
2. I think you're reading WAY too much into certain things.

There is no grand conspiracy at play to "prevent people from running their own servers". There are many normal things on even client systems that can be described as a "server" such that the distinction is almost meaningless. Yes, there are plenty of traditional "server" and cloud services which many people use. The reason that Google has such language in the TOS isn't to do things like break the fundamental promise of the Internet or to enable government surveillance; it's because Google doesn't want people running businesses on 100 Mbps connections out of their homes. The promise of Google Fiber is predicated on the assumption that it's going to be consumer-type use; consumption, educational use, interaction with content, etc.

We all might be able to say that no one can predict what kinds of legitimate, high-bandwidth outbound services someone might be able to dream up from a home setting; Google is saying, "Don't set up the next slashdot or a cloud virtualization business from your house." The net neutrality argument is interesting, and I have to say I agree with the essence of everything you wrote on that subject.

Back to the other issues. I'm a little disappointed you called so many of my responses straw men; they're not in any respect.

I have not seen any serious calls for "backdoors" in secure protocols. You're completely misunderstanding what even the FBI wants: you're imagining a scenario where "the Man" has a secret backdoor to any running system, encryption, or secure protocol, anywhere. That is not only false, it actually would be gravely detrimental to our own security: we -- individuals, the civilian sector, the government, the military -- rely on the security of these protocols. It's similar to the belief among some that NSA has a "secret backdoor" in AES, even though AES is well-understood, and we use various levels of AES to protect everything up to the most sensitive classified information. If AES has a backdoor -- ANY backdoor -- it is useless to us.

What the FBI "wants" is the ability to lawfully wiretap communications that occur on the internet just as easily as it's been able to with, e.g., something like landline telephones. Telephone companies have implemented equipment and procedures which let law enforcement say, "We have a warrant, and we need to tap phone number XXX-XXX-XXXX in realtime," and the telecom operator needs to provide that capability in a timely fashion. Not a log of past activity, not days or weeks later -- realtime. This is a long-established practice.

The proposed CALEA modifications are intended to extend that capability to major internet communications providers. The Yahoos, the GMails, the Facebooks. So that instead of phone number XXX-XX-XXXX, a law enforcement entity has a clearly established procedure for obtaining a realtime "tap", as it were, on a person's private Twitter activity, Facebook activity, Yahoo email account, or similar. Again, this is using the same standards for probable cause and warrants which have been applied to communications for decades.

This doesn't mean "the FBI" wants a "backdoor" in ssh, ssl, or any other protocol. It's not even a "backdoor". If anything, it is a FRONT door: a formal set of procedures, and the systems and processes in place at internet and communications providers to handle it, which allows for the same kind of lawful "taps" on internet/digital communications.

So, what's "lawful"?

Why should law enforcement not have a capability to intercept communications with a warrant? Why is "the Internet" different? Because it's not just a thing, but also an idea which allows the free global exchange of ideas? Sure, but why does the body of law on our own society not apply to "the Internet"? Why should the FBI or any other law enforcement entity with a properly-obtained warrant not be able to have a mechanism to tap a person's communications in the same way they have been able to tap POTS phones? That's the crux of the issue. The fact is that the law already supports the interception of ANY communications with a warrant; the purpose of any enhancements to CALEA would be to make it actually happen in a useful and timely fashion.

Now, you can make it political if you must, but this is really mundane communications search and seizure activity, and as long as it happens within the letter and spirit of BOTH the Constitution and the law, there is absolutely no reason why digital communications are afforded any special status.

Now, YOU, as a person, may choose to use encryption. That is your choice. You may choose to use Tor, you may choose to use other methods to hide or obfuscate your communications. You may choose to communicate with anyone in the world. That's the beauty of this thing we've all built. But we still have our own social contract, our own body of laws, responsibilities which temper our rights.

You know, why don't you just email Vint Cerf and see what he thinks about the core of your net neutrality question wrt Google Fiber? He just might respond.

The answer is simple: in our country and system of government, the military fundamentally, and as a matter of law, answers to civilian authorities.

The military doesn't need to have day-to-day "control", but we need to have the capability, when attacked militarily, to defend ourselves militarily -- including in the "cyber" realm.

The mistake people make is believing it's a binary either/or; either civilian or military. The fact is that our information capabilities are so critical that they need appropriate levels of protection. The notion that civil authorities can defend systems from a cyber attack is a fine notion, but not realistic if we are under a coordinated cyber attack from a nation-state explicit seeking to cripple us. If a foreign military is bombing civilian targets within our own borders, is not the purpose of our military to protect us? Sure, civil first responders will be involved, too, but I think most would expect a military response. We as a nation are so used to the military being something we use in foreign lands and faraway places that the concept of our military being here to defend ourselves at home is a concept that is, well -- foreign.

There can certainly be (and already are) public-private partnerships, civilian-military cooperation, etc. This also doesn't mean that secure systems and protocols should be "backdoored" for the government, but it might mean having some combination of infrastructure, equipment, accesses, standards, partnerships, rules, and similar in place at civilian facilities.

I think the problem people have is that we can see planes, tanks, and soldiers -- we are worried we can't "see" what "the government" is doing, as is the case in the digital realm. But what we can "see" is the law and a robust system of oversight. Yes, history tells us that there have been abuses. There no doubt will be again. It is a system made up of humans and all of their requisite imperfections.

But we shouldn't throw the baby out with the bathwater -- just because we know we can't do something perfectly doesn't mean we shouldn't do it. Does the benefit outweigh the risks? Some believe that giving any military or intelligence service ANY control over defense of systems and networks represents too big a risk -- I would ask those people to get a broader perspective.

Hope this answers at least part of your question; this is just my own view.

This might be more true in the uniformed services (though I've certainly worked with a pretty diverse array of people and ideas; perhaps not as diverse as our society at large, but diverse nonetheless) and a lot of direct federal government employment at some of the intelligence agencies, but it's definitely not true of contractors. What you're describing is true in agencies that have a very established and rigid culture, like has been developed for a lot of the federal law enforcement positions (such as FBI). I've seen my share of combinations of eccentric, gay, pierced, odd, tattooed, interesting folks with clearances working for DOD/IC contractors.

The biggest issue with a clearance is getting your foot in the door because you have a special skill set. Many go the military route -- they already have a clearance, and it's any easy choice when they go to the civilian or contractor side. It's a big investment to hire someone who is uncleared, start paying them, and wait a year while their clearance investigation is in process. It's definitely akin to the whole, "they won't hire without experience, but how will I get experience if no one will hire me?" Persistence, mainly.

The repeal of DADT will go the furthest to changing the broader culture, I think. But you know what? I've met very few people, save perhaps some young kids who don't yet know any better, who really cares. And if any of the senior or middle leadership personally cares, they don't show it. This is a non-issue for the military. I'm also glad to see ROTC being welcomed back to institutions like Yale. It was the right thing to do.

And as was noted there are plenty of ways to perform service to your country and those around you without serving in the military!

If a system administrator misconfigures a router and damages our information infrastructure, is that any less relevant than someone sticking C4 to the side of a power transmission tower to cause a similar amount of damage?

One word:

Intent.

Intent matters. That's why we punish people who kill someone or cause property damage, etc., intentionally, and don't punish those who do the same things, but don't do so intentionally (and also don't do so because of negligence or reckless disregard). It's the same result: someone is dead, property is destroyed, etc., no?

(Ahh, the gray area -- negligence. What if that network admin can be proven "negligent"? Well, I'm not a lawyer, but the general answer is still intent.)

So, intent matters. We care when someone is actively and purposefully trying to do us harm. That's also the simple answer to the question of why we prosecuted a "war on terror", and why we don't have a war on ladders, a war on lightning, a war on car accidents, or any manner of other things that can kill people. Those things are accidents. Sure, sometimes there is negligence peppered in, and there is immeasurable complexity beyond how I've distilled it down here.

But what of cyber -- when we talk of something like "neglecting" to secure a router (secure how? by whose standards? by what measure?), and it is compromised and real, quantifiable damage is caused, who is at fault: the admin, or the attacker? There are two general camps here: those who believe that the admin and/or router vendor is at fault, and those who believe the attacker is at fault. The truth usually lies somewhere in between, but on the friendly side it's less about "fault" and more about responsibility.

If you leave your house unlocked, and someone comes in and burns it down, is that your "fault"? There are all sorts of ways to argue this, but the bottom line is that while you might have a responsibility to protect your property in a sensible manner given your circumstances, it's still the attacker who is solidly at fault, and subject to punishment.

When it comes to cyber war it's a complex landscape. Civilian, academic, financial, critical infrastructure, government, and military systems are all interconnected. What's the difference between cyber war, cyber espionage, cyber crime, cyber terrorism, hacktivism, or simple malicious hacking? We as a society rely on these systems. We want to be protected, but we don't trust the government to do it. Perhaps that will always be a shortcoming of free and open society in this and other realms; the benefits of open society certainly outweigh the risks. But that also puts us at a distinct disadvantage to those who wish to attack us, whatever their motivation and affiliation.

As for how we trust the military? By learning what the capabilities, techniques, and threat landscape looks like. Sure, some information is classified or so arcane as to be boring, but it's all out there. How can we trust the military to properly execute any military action -- to maintain air superiority, to drop a bomb, or to capture a city? Because, politics and personal feelings on any particular issue aside, these things are well-understood concepts. Cyber might not yet be as well-understood, but even for all the obfuscation, confusion, and hype, it's a realm that also has rules and can be understood.

Militaries have been deceiving their adversaries for literally millennia. Cyber is new, but it is no different. Yes, it is powerful, and a single person or small group can create havoc far disproportionate to their manpower. But we've had many significant force multipliers over the course of warfare. We develop new tactics, new intelligence methods, new techniques, new capabilities.

If an adversary attacked a US civilian asset militarily, is it not the job of our military apparatus to protect us...? It seems we have gotten to a point where people believe it is laughable to "trust" the US government or the military, when there is egregious oppression, suffering, and death at the hands of repressive governments elsewhere in the world. Some people say the government has forgotten the Constitution. I'd say that, with the aid of the echo chamber that is the internet, many people have utterly lost their perspective. The irony, I suppose, is that adversaries will take advantage of that, too...

Attribution.

Disclaimer: I am a Navy Information Warfare Officer.

First, it's important to note that the White House didn't confirm the suspected source. It was anonymous officials who said this appeared to originate "from China" -- take that as you will.

As you point out, an attack may appear to come from a particular (set of) IP address(es), network(s), or source(s). An attack may have a certain profile, or share a profile with other attacks. An attack may have an assumed motivation based on its target. The attacker(s) may even wish to make it appear that the attack is originating elsewhere.

Even if the "source" is established, is it a nation-state? Hacktivists? Nationalist hackers acting on behalf of government or at the government's explicit or implicit direction? Transnational actors? None of the above?

No one wants to "start a war" with China, but the error in balancing the cyber threat against the "hype" is assuming that all threats are bogus, or must be the result of hawks looking for neverending war, excuses to begin/escalate the next "Cold War", and similar. The threat from China is very real, long-established, and well-understood for anyone who cares to look. It has been discussed thoroughly, even for the Chinese, in their own strategic literature, and there are very public examples of China's offensive cyber capabilities. China's investment in offensive cyber capabilities comes because of the understanding that dominance of the information realm will essentially allow China to skip large chunks of military modernization and still be highly effective in any conflict with the United States.

Think of it this way: it's now assumed that the Stuxnet/Duqu/Flame family were created by the US and/or Israel. (Keep in mind that even overt admissions prove nothing, and can be self-serving...) Even before the books and articles about OLYMPIC GAMES, attribution was assumed because of the target and because of snippets of clues in the code. In general, why is that assumption any more or less valid than this? Is it because some are more inclined to believe that of course the US engages in cyber warfare; but any cyber attacks against us are suspect.

Of course, there are those who will assume that indications of any cyber attack will always be a "false flag" and/or used by those with ulterior motives who want war. It can't possibly be that there are aggressors who indeed want to attack the US, and who greatly benefit from the odd proclivity of those in free societies to see the enemy as their own government, while overlooking the actual adversary. Sun Tzu would be beaming.

Background:

Chinese Insider Offers Rare Glimpse of U.S.-China Frictions
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/03/world/asia/chinese-insider-offers-rare-glimpse-of-us-china-frictions.html?_r=1

"The senior leadership of the Chinese government increasingly views the competition between the United States and China as a zero-sum game, with China the likely long-range winner if the American economy and domestic political system continue to stumble, according to an influential Chinese policy analyst. China views the United States as a declining power, but at the same time believes that Washington is trying to fight back to undermine, and even disrupt, the economic and military growth that point to China’s becoming the world’s most powerful country."

China is on track to exceed US military spending in real dollars by 2025
http://www.economist.com/node/21542155

China’s military rise
http://www.economist.com/node/21552212

The dragon’s new teeth: A rare look inside the world’s biggest military expansion
http://www.economist.com/node/21552193

Essential reading on China cyber:

The Online Threat: Should we be worried about a cyber war? (The first page of this is a must read wrt China.)
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/11/01/101101fa_fact_hersh

Great snippet: "“The N.S.A. would ask, ‘Can the Chinese be that good?’ ” the former official told me. “My response was that they only invented gunpowder in the tenth century and built the bomb in 1965. I’d say, ‘Can you read Chinese?’ We don’t even know the Chinese pictograph for ‘Happy hour.’"

U.S. cyber warrior accuses China of targeting Pentagon
http://news.yahoo.com/u-cyber-warrior-accuses-china-targeting-pentagon-011916520.html

Chinese Military Advocates Cyber Offensive Capability
http://www.infosecisland.com/blogview/21194-Chinese-Military-Advocates-Cyber-Offensive-Capability.html

China used downed U.S. fighter to develop first stealth jet
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1349906/Chengdu-J-20-China-used-downed-US-fighter-develop-stealth-jet.html

Capability of the People’s Republic of China to Conduct Cyber Warfare and Computer Network Exploitation
http://www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/2009/NorthropGrumman_PRC_Cyber_Paper_FINAL_Approved%20Report_16Oct2009.pdf

Occupying the Information High Ground: Chinese Capabilities for Computer Network Operations and Cyber Espionage
http://www.uscc.gov/RFP/2012/USCC%20Report_Chinese_CapabilitiesforComputer_NetworkOperationsandCyberEspionage.pdf

How China Steals Our Secrets
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/03/opinion/how-china-steals-our-secrets.html

China cyberspies suspected in new caper: what has experts worried
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2012/0927/China-cyberspies-suspected-in-new-caper-what-has-experts-worried

China's Cyber Thievery Is National Policy—And Must Be Challenged
http://online.wsj.com/article_email/SB10001424052970203718504577178832338032176-lMyQjAxMTAyMDAwOTEwNDkyWj.html

FBI Traces Trail of Spy Ring to China
http://online.wsj.com/article_email/SB10001424052970203961204577266892884130620-lMyQjAxMTAyMDAwNzEwNDcyWj.html

NSA: China is Destroying U.S. Economy Via Security Hacks
http://www.dailytech.com/NSA+China+is+Destroying+US+Economy+Via+Security+Hacks/article24328.htm

Chinese Espionage Campaign Targets U.S. Space Technology
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-04-18/chinese-espionage-campaign-targets-u-dot-s-dot-space-technology

Report: Hackers Seized Control of Computers in NASA’s Jet Propulsion Lab
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/03/jet-propulsion-lab-hacked/
http://oig.nasa.gov/congressional/FINAL_written_statement_for_%20IT_%20hearing_February_26_edit_v2.pdf

Chinese hackers took control of NASA satellite for 11 minutes
http://www.geek.com/articles/geek-pick/chinese-hackers-took-control-of-nasa-satellite-for-11-minutes-20111119/

Chinese hackers suspected of interfering with US satellites
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2011/oct/27/chinese-hacking-us-satellites-suspected

Former cybersecurity czar: Every major U.S. company has been hacked by China
http://www.itworld.com/security/262616/former-cybersecurity-czar-every-major-us-company-has-been-hacked-china

China Attacked Internet Security Company RSA, Cyber Commander Tells SASC
http://defense.aol.com/2012/03/27/china-attacked-internet-security-company-rsa-cyber-commander-te/

Chinese Counterfeit Parts Keep Flowing
http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_channel.jsp?channel=defense&id=news%2Fasd%2F2012%2F03%2F27%2F04.xml&headline=Chinese+Counterfeit+Parts+Keep+Flowing

China Corporate Espionage Targets U.S. Firms
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-03-15/china-corporate-espionage-boom-knocks-wind-out-of-u-dot-s-dot-companies

U.S. Official on Cyber Attacks: "It's Getting Harder for China's Leaders to Claim Ignorance"
http://www.securityweek.com/uscc-commissioner-cyberattacks-getting-harder-chinas-leaders-claim-ignorance

China's Role In JSF's Spiraling Costs
http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story.jsp?id=news%2Fawst%2F2012%2F02%2F06%2FAW_02_06_2012_p30-419987.xml&channel=defense

I could go on...

My advice has been the same from the 1995-ish days of RH... you need a solid foundation that is close to static and stable to build on. Just like the kernel, there cannot just be chaos. Linux needs to be not just the kernel but the basic framework and a single set of core apps. Instead of 15 terminal apps, window managers, editors, etc. There needs to be one, and the very best/stable/simple one from each category. This would get people interested in working on that one project since it would bring the most fame and notice, it would make the base system close to a standard, and it would eliminate a lot of complexity. From there people can be free to add whatever they want in any of those categories or specialized apps but the foundational base would still be standard. That alone would be huge.

After that my opinion is that there should be self-contained applications. All the files and dependencies should be in the apps package and directory. With disk being cheap and huge the redundancy and extra space would be completely worth it to give up. It would make the dependency hell go away and it would simplify so many aspects.

After 17 years though, I'm not holding my breath... the usual crew will just continue to say how it isn't necessary and go about their business with no regard for reality.

Valve has already "blessed" this effort, and the Black Mesa devs have said as much. There will be no C&D letters.

From Valve (in January 2007...)

Congratulations to the Black Mesa for Half-Life 2 MOD team for picking up the Most Anticipated MOD Award for the coming year from Mod DB. Over 80,000 votes were cast for MODs built for a number of different games, and they have been crowned this year's most wanted. More information on this ambitious project to recreate Half-Life 1 from scratch in the Source engine is available on their site. We're as eager to play it here as everyone else.

The only thing Black Mesa did was remove "Source" from the mod name, but Valve allowed them to keep the domain because of fan base recognition.