Comment Re:Durability concerns valid, but... Tampering? (Score 1) 88
I use a Yubikey Neo mainly for 2FA with Google's services. The main security boost from it for me is that it is a physical object, and the main avenue of attack for my stuff is via remote. Same reason I use Google's Authenticator app as backup on my smartphone.
Since my Yubikey devices tend to be sessile resiliency isn't that important... but I am definitely not impressed with the durability. My eTokens [1] from SafeNet are far more durable, tamper resistant (once they started one piece epoxy manufacture), and can handle far more insertion cycles than the YubiKey can.
I wish Yubico could charge more, and put some money into a stronger USB keyfob. For me, the delicate construction is OK (because I use multiple keys that stay with my devices)... but for people like the parent who actually tote it around, the construction is pretty much unacceptable.
As for a key format for security, I wish the industry would have a special slot for that, as in some cases, NFC isn't acceptable. The best I've seen was the old Dallas Semiconductor "one wire" reader which worked even with high traffic. Since that is long gone, perhaps it is time to have something, even if it is just two small, durable conductive contacts on the side of a device for using a key, or using it for a key interchange.
[1]: I have multiple for PGP, and use the keys as ADKs (which were generated on the device and never leave.) Other than finding drivers for them, they have served me well. Plus, if one uses PGP Desktop (er, now SED), one can use the eTokens as keys, so an attacker would have to have the token, and the PIN (which can be set to lock for good after a certain amount of guesses) in order to boot the machine.