The motto of CIA's National Clandestine Service is the Latin "Veritatem Cognoscere": Know the truth. It's no wonder that so many believe the function of intelligence services is to discover the "truth".
Mark Lowenthal, former CIA Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Analysis and Production, spent some time in his book "Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy", now the gold standard for undergraduate and graduate intelligence texts, explaining that intelligence is not about truth at all, but rather about arriving at some informed conclusion about reality, or possible future realities, neither of which can be considered strictly to be "truth".
"Intelligence is not about truth. If something were known to be true, states would not need intelligence agencies to collect the information or analyze it. Truth is such an absolute term that it sets a standard that intelligence rarely would be able to achieve. It is better - and more accurate - to think of intelligence as proximate reality. Intelligence agencies face issues or questions and do their best to arrive at a firm understanding of what is going on. They can rarely be assured that even their best and most considered analysis is true. Their goals are intelligence products that are reliable, unbiased, and honest (that is, free from politicization). These are all laudable goals, yet they are still different from truth."
Perhaps the biggest issue with "truth" in intelligence work is the absolute nature of "truth". If it is an analyst's job to find the "truth", then any deviation from that analysis by actual events means that the analysis was a "lie".
"Is intelligence truth-telling? One of the common descriptions of intelligence is that it is the job of 'telling truth to power'. (This sounds fairly noble, although it is important to recall that court jesters once had the same function.) Intelligence, however, is not about truth. (If something is known to be true then we do not need intelligence services to find it out.) Yet the image persists and carries with it some important ethical implications. If truth were the objective of intelligence, does that raise the stakes for analysis? [...] A problem with setting truth as a goal is that it has a relentless quality. [...if] an analyst's goal is to tell the truth - especially to those in power who might not want to hear it - then there is no room for compromise, no possible admission of alternative views."
This creates an environment where success is impossible, because discovering "truth" by every measure is a standard that can never be reached. It also discourages differing analytic viewpoints, each of which may be equally valid. Ultimately, someone needs to look at the available information and make a decision:
"[T]he role of intelligence is not to tell the truth but to provide informed analysis to policy makers to aid their decision making."
Synthesizing information into some measure of "truth" needs to consider all of the above. What, then, happened to the "truth" in the case of this famous so-called "intelligence failure", that of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction? The intelligence components of the US, Russia, France, Germany, and the UN as a whole believed Iraq to be in continuing possession of WMD, not to mention that Iraq was in material breach of no less than three binding and in-force UNSEC resolutions (the only kind of UN resolution with the "teeth" to compel member nations to use force to ensure compliance, unlike oft-cited General Assembly resolutions regarding Israel); witness this exchange on NBC's Meet the Press in 2004:
"MR. RUSSERT: When you look at the CIA information on the weapons of mass destruction, former President Clinton said Saddam had weapons of mass destruction, as well as current President Bush. The U.N. inspectors. The Russian, French and German intelligence agencies said he had weapons of mass destruction. What happened? How could there have been such a colossal intelligence failure?
SECRETARY POWELL: Well, maybe because what we were all looking at was a body of evidence that gave you every reason to believe that he did have weapons of mass destruction. He had the intention. He used them. He stiffed the U.N. for 12 years. He had the infrastructure. He had the capability. The only thing we haven't been able to find are actual current stockpiles of such weapons. Everything else was there. Everything else was there with respect to capability and intention. And any reasonable person looking at this regime, looking at the threat inherent in that intention and capability would have come to the conclusion based on unanswered questions."
So, what was the truth? In this case, the truth, as established prior to 2003, is that Saddam Hussein had the intent and capability to possess WMD. Without physically discovering WMD themselves, all information, history, and evidence - even when viewed in the context of contradictory evidence - indicated that Saddam Hussein had WMD.
Unfortunately, the most important aspect - namely, Iraq actually having WMD - ended up being absent. When the policy of containment with regard to Iraq changed to a more aggressive posture after 9/11, the truth pointed to Iraqi possession of WMD. This enabled policymakers to push forward with a policy to remove Saddam from power.
After the invasion, only then did we discover that the US analysis was almost all wrong. But was the analysis wrong? This is remembered by many, incorrectly, as an example of "politicized intelligence". In fact, it is simply an illustration of how intelligence is not about truth, but rather is a vehicle to inform the decisions of policy makers.
Furthermore, there is never "one" reason a military action may be undertaken. Does anyone honestly believe there was only a single publicly-discussed reason the US entered World War II? If there were more complex reasons than those put forth for public scrutiny, does that mean our leaders are "lying"? It's hilarious to me, if sad, that people tend to fall neatly in political boxes with respect to things like the Iraq invasion.
Intelligence exists solely to support policy makers. Most policy makers are politicians. This does not mean that intelligence itself is politicized, only that it is, necessarily, serving a political master.
The greatest enemy of any one of our truths may be the rest of our truths. - William James
There is no truth. There is only perception. - Gustave Flaubert
The opposite of a correct statement is a false statement. But the opposite of a profound truth may well be another profound truth. - Niels Bohr
The truth will set you free - but first it will make you angry! - Anonymous