Can't they already cut off phone service without killing the phone itself? Seems like two different things mixed together. If the purpose of the kill switch is to erase data and render inoperable, and therefore prevent theft, there is little logical reason that not erasing a phone's data would somehow present a threat or prevent a criminal act. In fact, it may erase evidence.

While that particular proposed solution may make no sense, it doesn't mean there isn't one, and the need for that solution is partially the result of poor overall planning. Yes, nukes can load follow quite easily if designed that way, but that was not a design need when this generation of plants was built. The fact that other sources are being put on line that needlessly offset or are not compatible with the characteristics of existing generation is more the result of a political push to renewables than an engineered and planned approach. Placing renewables on line without appropriately valuing the required backup assets, and making best use of already available power, causes unintended consequences like this as well.

With that said, your point is well taken and I don't presume that the green agenda is 100% to blame for anything. Canadian nuclear operators have done a poor job at reliably keeping those plants running over the years. That's not the example of how to do it.

Good points. The thought that utility designation is the best path enforce net neutrality confuses me. To me, its trading commercial influence on web traffic for government/political influence. I'll take commercial over those two evils. I'd much prefer to see net neutrality goals achieve without utility designation, and the maximum chance that competition will emerge. I'm stuck with TWC right now, no other reasonable options, although it appears Google may start emerging nearby. If they are designated as a utility, then I think I may be stuck forever.

Actually, there is not an official definition of "net neutrality", and there are certainly differing visions on what it means. That is actually a problem for those promoting net neutrality (me included), not being able to present a consistent vision. Recognizing the different contexts in how it is used is important.

Simply designating ISPs as utilities does nothing to ensure net neutrality of any kind, although it can be path to enforce net neutrality requirements. On the other hand, it could also enable its own brand of net restriction. If the government controls the ISPs, then politics might eventually begin to guide content, which IMO would be much worse than commercial influences.

I would prefer to see net neutrality goals achieved without "utility" designation if possible, and keep the door open for as much competition as possible.

The fundamental flaw in your response is that the Fukushima units had no design features to deal with a tsunami from the start, so analysis was never part of the equation. If you postulate a tsunami that breaches the wall, then you must analyze the plant to ensure it can withstand, and this was never done. In the case of Diablo, they designed the plant with the ability to withstand an earthquake from the start. They postulated the earthquake, performed the analysis, then obtained new earthquake information and validated that the existing analysis enveloped the new data. None of this happened at Fukushima.

A huge difference is that in this case, there is analysis to show the plant can withstand the postulated event. In the case of the tsunami, it was not so, as the plant was never designed to handle a tsunami. The key failing being placing a plant not designed to handle a tsunami in a potential tsunami path.

Diablo Canyon is designed to withstand an earthquake.

No, the spent fuel in each of the pools was determined to be just fine, although there were concerns as the event unfolded because access to the spent fuel pools was pretty much non-existent.

SCRAM in 10 seconds is fine. But a SCRAMmed plant does not instantly become safe nor is it considered completely shut down. You still need heat removal for quite some time afterword ( which varies between designs) . That is where the seismic requirements come in. The heat removal systems must withstand the event and remain operational. Every single safety system and backup safety system is required to endure the event.

I think we are saying the same thing. The 'requirements' are in the form of the licensing basis of the plant. They did the evaluation but did not revise the basis. When the actual fault data was finalized and useful is, however, unclear to me.

Meanwhile, there is a fleet wide re-evaluation of all sites underway to ensure any new seismic data for each regions/site is evaluated against the plants' existing capabilities.

And that is the answer. Too bad it eludes so many in search of their own vision of the holy grail of green. Unfortunately, politics and ideology will get in the way, rather than a common sense evaluation of cost, risk, reliability, environmental impact, technological maturity, and ability to implement given our current state.

Safe before, during, and after. No warning needed. That's the only way.

This is not a new story, basically a reprint. With that said, if there is any indication the the plant cannot withstand postulated earthquake levels it should be shut down. This was not ignored, and the article does mention that an evaluation was performed based on the new information.

"In 2012, the agency endorsed preliminary findings that found shaking from the Shoreline fault would not pose any additional risk for the reactors. Those greater ground motions were “at or below those for which the plant was evaluated previously,” referring to the Hosgri fault, it concluded."

Given our experience with plants holding up extremely well to seismic events and the large margins that are included in seismic design of these plants, the finding is not surprising. Work continues, as it should, to look for anything that could possibly have been missed or not enveloped by the new data.

The basis for the inspectors complaint is, in large part, not that the plant is not capable of withstanding the quake, nor that the analsyis is faulty or incorrect, but rather that the licensing basis document has not been revised to require a higher peak acceleration design level. It is debateable whether such a would make any difference, since they are already required to analyze for the higher levels. Meanwhile, the concern is being handled through the appropriate processes.

Very interesting. Thanks.