The mortgages themselves weren't the problem. The problem was the inflation of the mortgages into many times their original value, using financial derivatives and insurance. Because the derivatives were rated AAA, shadow banks didn't take out enough insurance. And insurance companies didn't really insure the derivatives, because they were rated so high they couldn't fail.
Then a few RMBSes failed, and market groupthink took over. Suddenly no one wanted these derivatives, not because they had no value, but because the market became paranoid and emotionally panicked. No private party wanted to roll over funding using the derivatives as collateral anymore. The private parties all wanted T-bills, because they were much much safer.
The government stepped in to take the instruments off the banks' balance sheets.
The government didn't make banks create financial derivatives. The government didn't rate those derivatives AAA. The government didn't fail to insure them adequately. In fact, the government became the insurer when the ostensible insurers (i.e., AIG) failed.
Righties like to quote Kenneth Rogoff. Here's a quote from him:
Without question the best and most effective approach to the problem would have been to bail
out the subprime homeowners directly, forcing banks to take losses but keeping them manageable.
For an investment of perhaps a few hundred billion dollars, the US Treasury could have saved
itself from a financial crisis whose cumulative cost, counting lost output, already runs into many,
many trillions of dollars. Instead of âoesaving Wall Street,â a subprime bailout would have been
targeted, almost by definition, at lower-income households. But unfortunately, this approach too
would have been politically impossible prior to the crisis.
Why don't righties quote that passage from Rogoff? Why wasn't bailing out individuals politically feasible? Because of the ignorance of the Tea Party, that's why.