This is incorrect.

The University of Wisconsin-Madison Nuclear Reactor was one of six NRC-designated Research and Test Reactors to use highly-enriched uranium. Wisconsin's was enriched to 70%, and some research reactors use U-235 enriched to 90%.

[...] since 1978, out of concern that the uranium might be turned into bomb fuel, the Department of Energy has spent millions of dollars to develop lower-grade fuel and convert scores of reactors to run on it. As of July 30, according to the Government Accountability Office (formerly the General Accounting Office), 39 of 105 research reactors worldwide had converted or were in the process. But the six campus reactors in this country are not among them.

[...]

Power reactors in this country use uranium fuel in which the proportion of U-235 has been raised to 3 to 5 percent, which is low-enriched fuel. Anything over 20 percent is considered highly enriched. Bombs are generally over 90 percent. Some research reactors run on fuel enriched to over 90 percent; Wisconsin's is 70 percent, and the quantity is probably a little less than is needed for a bomb.

Ref: http://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/15/us/uranium-reactors-on-campus-raise-security-concerns.html?pagewanted=all

You can still see the characteristic and beautiful Cherenkov radiation at the research reactor at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. I've seen it a number of times.

Up until recently, it contained 1400 pounds of highly-enriched (weapons grade) U-235 in 58-pound bundles. It is in a building across from a 7-level parking ramp and an 80,000-person football stadium.

There are a number of such "Research and Test Reactors" around the US.

A 2005 ABC News report found:

- "No guards. No metal detectors. Bags were brought into the reactor room. Doors to the building are open during the day, and no IDs are required for entry."

- "The building was undergoing major renovation, and construction workers, large trucks and building materials surrounded the rear exterior."

- "The university Web site includes a 'virtual tour' and detailed photos, descriptions and diagrams of the reactor, the fuel elements and the control room. The reactor manager informed the Fellows that tours had to be scheduled three weeks in advance and that a locked door with a window view of the reactor was the closest they could get. But a friendly professor told the Fellows about a basement entry to the reactor room, where a reactor operator opened the door and let the Fellows photograph the reactor from the doorway. Two other operators allowed the Fellows to come inside carrying their tote bags, and briefly take photographs about 15 feet from the reactor's base. No campus security ever approached the Fellows."

An 2004 New York Times report found:

- "[UWNR's] fuel is weapons-grade uranium. If it were stolen, experts say, it could give terrorists or criminals a major head start on an atomic bomb."

- "[...] out of concern that the uranium might be turned into bomb fuel, the Department of Energy has spent millions of dollars to develop lower-grade fuel and convert scores of reactors to run on it. [...] But the six campus reactors in this country are not among them."

- "Campus reactors have far less security than places where the government keeps bomb-grade uranium, and they may have foreign students of unknown political sympathies."

- "[...] the fuel now in the campus reactors is dangerously radioactive, making it hard to handle. [...] however, that highly enriched uranium was an easier fuel from which to build a bomb than is plutonium."

- "The reactor operators are paid $10.50 an hour. They recently got a raise to that level [...] because someone discovered that campus file clerks were paid more than the reactor operators.

- "[...] the current fuel load will last about 108 years at current rates of use."

"The truck is the real threat. You want to make sure the truck stays away 250 feet minimum." - Ronald Timm, Former Department of Energy security analyst

Here, the primary entrance to a major parking ramp is about 50 feet away.

Also, it's not like it's really a mystery what he saw at BNL. There have only been so many reactors there in the last 60 years. It's odd, beautiful, and I suppose comparatively rare for a person to see, but it's not a big deal.

A couple of things:

1. I thought your Google manifesto was very good (I know it's a work in progress).
2. I think you're reading WAY too much into certain things.

There is no grand conspiracy at play to "prevent people from running their own servers". There are many normal things on even client systems that can be described as a "server" such that the distinction is almost meaningless. Yes, there are plenty of traditional "server" and cloud services which many people use. The reason that Google has such language in the TOS isn't to do things like break the fundamental promise of the Internet or to enable government surveillance; it's because Google doesn't want people running businesses on 100 Mbps connections out of their homes. The promise of Google Fiber is predicated on the assumption that it's going to be consumer-type use; consumption, educational use, interaction with content, etc.

We all might be able to say that no one can predict what kinds of legitimate, high-bandwidth outbound services someone might be able to dream up from a home setting; Google is saying, "Don't set up the next slashdot or a cloud virtualization business from your house." The net neutrality argument is interesting, and I have to say I agree with the essence of everything you wrote on that subject.

Back to the other issues. I'm a little disappointed you called so many of my responses straw men; they're not in any respect.

I have not seen any serious calls for "backdoors" in secure protocols. You're completely misunderstanding what even the FBI wants: you're imagining a scenario where "the Man" has a secret backdoor to any running system, encryption, or secure protocol, anywhere. That is not only false, it actually would be gravely detrimental to our own security: we -- individuals, the civilian sector, the government, the military -- rely on the security of these protocols. It's similar to the belief among some that NSA has a "secret backdoor" in AES, even though AES is well-understood, and we use various levels of AES to protect everything up to the most sensitive classified information. If AES has a backdoor -- ANY backdoor -- it is useless to us.

What the FBI "wants" is the ability to lawfully wiretap communications that occur on the internet just as easily as it's been able to with, e.g., something like landline telephones. Telephone companies have implemented equipment and procedures which let law enforcement say, "We have a warrant, and we need to tap phone number XXX-XXX-XXXX in realtime," and the telecom operator needs to provide that capability in a timely fashion. Not a log of past activity, not days or weeks later -- realtime. This is a long-established practice.

The proposed CALEA modifications are intended to extend that capability to major internet communications providers. The Yahoos, the GMails, the Facebooks. So that instead of phone number XXX-XX-XXXX, a law enforcement entity has a clearly established procedure for obtaining a realtime "tap", as it were, on a person's private Twitter activity, Facebook activity, Yahoo email account, or similar. Again, this is using the same standards for probable cause and warrants which have been applied to communications for decades.

This doesn't mean "the FBI" wants a "backdoor" in ssh, ssl, or any other protocol. It's not even a "backdoor". If anything, it is a FRONT door: a formal set of procedures, and the systems and processes in place at internet and communications providers to handle it, which allows for the same kind of lawful "taps" on internet/digital communications.

So, what's "lawful"?

Why should law enforcement not have a capability to intercept communications with a warrant? Why is "the Internet" different? Because it's not just a thing, but also an idea which allows the free global exchange of ideas? Sure, but why does the body of law on our own society not apply to "the Internet"? Why should the FBI or any other law enforcement entity with a properly-obtained warrant not be able to have a mechanism to tap a person's communications in the same way they have been able to tap POTS phones? That's the crux of the issue. The fact is that the law already supports the interception of ANY communications with a warrant; the purpose of any enhancements to CALEA would be to make it actually happen in a useful and timely fashion.

Now, you can make it political if you must, but this is really mundane communications search and seizure activity, and as long as it happens within the letter and spirit of BOTH the Constitution and the law, there is absolutely no reason why digital communications are afforded any special status.

Now, YOU, as a person, may choose to use encryption. That is your choice. You may choose to use Tor, you may choose to use other methods to hide or obfuscate your communications. You may choose to communicate with anyone in the world. That's the beauty of this thing we've all built. But we still have our own social contract, our own body of laws, responsibilities which temper our rights.

You know, why don't you just email Vint Cerf and see what he thinks about the core of your net neutrality question wrt Google Fiber? He just might respond.

The answer is simple: in our country and system of government, the military fundamentally, and as a matter of law, answers to civilian authorities.

The military doesn't need to have day-to-day "control", but we need to have the capability, when attacked militarily, to defend ourselves militarily -- including in the "cyber" realm.

The mistake people make is believing it's a binary either/or; either civilian or military. The fact is that our information capabilities are so critical that they need appropriate levels of protection. The notion that civil authorities can defend systems from a cyber attack is a fine notion, but not realistic if we are under a coordinated cyber attack from a nation-state explicit seeking to cripple us. If a foreign military is bombing civilian targets within our own borders, is not the purpose of our military to protect us? Sure, civil first responders will be involved, too, but I think most would expect a military response. We as a nation are so used to the military being something we use in foreign lands and faraway places that the concept of our military being here to defend ourselves at home is a concept that is, well -- foreign.

There can certainly be (and already are) public-private partnerships, civilian-military cooperation, etc. This also doesn't mean that secure systems and protocols should be "backdoored" for the government, but it might mean having some combination of infrastructure, equipment, accesses, standards, partnerships, rules, and similar in place at civilian facilities.

I think the problem people have is that we can see planes, tanks, and soldiers -- we are worried we can't "see" what "the government" is doing, as is the case in the digital realm. But what we can "see" is the law and a robust system of oversight. Yes, history tells us that there have been abuses. There no doubt will be again. It is a system made up of humans and all of their requisite imperfections.

But we shouldn't throw the baby out with the bathwater -- just because we know we can't do something perfectly doesn't mean we shouldn't do it. Does the benefit outweigh the risks? Some believe that giving any military or intelligence service ANY control over defense of systems and networks represents too big a risk -- I would ask those people to get a broader perspective.

Hope this answers at least part of your question; this is just my own view.

This might be more true in the uniformed services (though I've certainly worked with a pretty diverse array of people and ideas; perhaps not as diverse as our society at large, but diverse nonetheless) and a lot of direct federal government employment at some of the intelligence agencies, but it's definitely not true of contractors. What you're describing is true in agencies that have a very established and rigid culture, like has been developed for a lot of the federal law enforcement positions (such as FBI). I've seen my share of combinations of eccentric, gay, pierced, odd, tattooed, interesting folks with clearances working for DOD/IC contractors.

The biggest issue with a clearance is getting your foot in the door because you have a special skill set. Many go the military route -- they already have a clearance, and it's any easy choice when they go to the civilian or contractor side. It's a big investment to hire someone who is uncleared, start paying them, and wait a year while their clearance investigation is in process. It's definitely akin to the whole, "they won't hire without experience, but how will I get experience if no one will hire me?" Persistence, mainly.

The repeal of DADT will go the furthest to changing the broader culture, I think. But you know what? I've met very few people, save perhaps some young kids who don't yet know any better, who really cares. And if any of the senior or middle leadership personally cares, they don't show it. This is a non-issue for the military. I'm also glad to see ROTC being welcomed back to institutions like Yale. It was the right thing to do.

And as was noted there are plenty of ways to perform service to your country and those around you without serving in the military!

If a system administrator misconfigures a router and damages our information infrastructure, is that any less relevant than someone sticking C4 to the side of a power transmission tower to cause a similar amount of damage?

One word:

Intent.

Intent matters. That's why we punish people who kill someone or cause property damage, etc., intentionally, and don't punish those who do the same things, but don't do so intentionally (and also don't do so because of negligence or reckless disregard). It's the same result: someone is dead, property is destroyed, etc., no?

(Ahh, the gray area -- negligence. What if that network admin can be proven "negligent"? Well, I'm not a lawyer, but the general answer is still intent.)

So, intent matters. We care when someone is actively and purposefully trying to do us harm. That's also the simple answer to the question of why we prosecuted a "war on terror", and why we don't have a war on ladders, a war on lightning, a war on car accidents, or any manner of other things that can kill people. Those things are accidents. Sure, sometimes there is negligence peppered in, and there is immeasurable complexity beyond how I've distilled it down here.

But what of cyber -- when we talk of something like "neglecting" to secure a router (secure how? by whose standards? by what measure?), and it is compromised and real, quantifiable damage is caused, who is at fault: the admin, or the attacker? There are two general camps here: those who believe that the admin and/or router vendor is at fault, and those who believe the attacker is at fault. The truth usually lies somewhere in between, but on the friendly side it's less about "fault" and more about responsibility.

If you leave your house unlocked, and someone comes in and burns it down, is that your "fault"? There are all sorts of ways to argue this, but the bottom line is that while you might have a responsibility to protect your property in a sensible manner given your circumstances, it's still the attacker who is solidly at fault, and subject to punishment.

When it comes to cyber war it's a complex landscape. Civilian, academic, financial, critical infrastructure, government, and military systems are all interconnected. What's the difference between cyber war, cyber espionage, cyber crime, cyber terrorism, hacktivism, or simple malicious hacking? We as a society rely on these systems. We want to be protected, but we don't trust the government to do it. Perhaps that will always be a shortcoming of free and open society in this and other realms; the benefits of open society certainly outweigh the risks. But that also puts us at a distinct disadvantage to those who wish to attack us, whatever their motivation and affiliation.

As for how we trust the military? By learning what the capabilities, techniques, and threat landscape looks like. Sure, some information is classified or so arcane as to be boring, but it's all out there. How can we trust the military to properly execute any military action -- to maintain air superiority, to drop a bomb, or to capture a city? Because, politics and personal feelings on any particular issue aside, these things are well-understood concepts. Cyber might not yet be as well-understood, but even for all the obfuscation, confusion, and hype, it's a realm that also has rules and can be understood.

Militaries have been deceiving their adversaries for literally millennia. Cyber is new, but it is no different. Yes, it is powerful, and a single person or small group can create havoc far disproportionate to their manpower. But we've had many significant force multipliers over the course of warfare. We develop new tactics, new intelligence methods, new techniques, new capabilities.

If an adversary attacked a US civilian asset militarily, is it not the job of our military apparatus to protect us...? It seems we have gotten to a point where people believe it is laughable to "trust" the US government or the military, when there is egregious oppression, suffering, and death at the hands of repressive governments elsewhere in the world. Some people say the government has forgotten the Constitution. I'd say that, with the aid of the echo chamber that is the internet, many people have utterly lost their perspective. The irony, I suppose, is that adversaries will take advantage of that, too...

Attribution.

Disclaimer: I am a Navy Information Warfare Officer.

First, it's important to note that the White House didn't confirm the suspected source. It was anonymous officials who said this appeared to originate "from China" -- take that as you will.

As you point out, an attack may appear to come from a particular (set of) IP address(es), network(s), or source(s). An attack may have a certain profile, or share a profile with other attacks. An attack may have an assumed motivation based on its target. The attacker(s) may even wish to make it appear that the attack is originating elsewhere.

Even if the "source" is established, is it a nation-state? Hacktivists? Nationalist hackers acting on behalf of government or at the government's explicit or implicit direction? Transnational actors? None of the above?

No one wants to "start a war" with China, but the error in balancing the cyber threat against the "hype" is assuming that all threats are bogus, or must be the result of hawks looking for neverending war, excuses to begin/escalate the next "Cold War", and similar. The threat from China is very real, long-established, and well-understood for anyone who cares to look. It has been discussed thoroughly, even for the Chinese, in their own strategic literature, and there are very public examples of China's offensive cyber capabilities. China's investment in offensive cyber capabilities comes because of the understanding that dominance of the information realm will essentially allow China to skip large chunks of military modernization and still be highly effective in any conflict with the United States.

Think of it this way: it's now assumed that the Stuxnet/Duqu/Flame family were created by the US and/or Israel. (Keep in mind that even overt admissions prove nothing, and can be self-serving...) Even before the books and articles about OLYMPIC GAMES, attribution was assumed because of the target and because of snippets of clues in the code. In general, why is that assumption any more or less valid than this? Is it because some are more inclined to believe that of course the US engages in cyber warfare; but any cyber attacks against us are suspect.

Of course, there are those who will assume that indications of any cyber attack will always be a "false flag" and/or used by those with ulterior motives who want war. It can't possibly be that there are aggressors who indeed want to attack the US, and who greatly benefit from the odd proclivity of those in free societies to see the enemy as their own government, while overlooking the actual adversary. Sun Tzu would be beaming.

Background:

Chinese Insider Offers Rare Glimpse of U.S.-China Frictions
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/03/world/asia/chinese-insider-offers-rare-glimpse-of-us-china-frictions.html?_r=1

"The senior leadership of the Chinese government increasingly views the competition between the United States and China as a zero-sum game, with China the likely long-range winner if the American economy and domestic political system continue to stumble, according to an influential Chinese policy analyst. China views the United States as a declining power, but at the same time believes that Washington is trying to fight back to undermine, and even disrupt, the economic and military growth that point to China’s becoming the world’s most powerful country."

China is on track to exceed US military spending in real dollars by 2025
http://www.economist.com/node/21542155

China’s military rise
http://www.economist.com/node/21552212

The dragon’s new teeth: A rare look inside the world’s biggest military expansion
http://www.economist.com/node/21552193

Essential reading on China cyber:

The Online Threat: Should we be worried about a cyber war? (The first page of this is a must read wrt China.)
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/11/01/101101fa_fact_hersh

Great snippet: "“The N.S.A. would ask, ‘Can the Chinese be that good?’ ” the former official told me. “My response was that they only invented gunpowder in the tenth century and built the bomb in 1965. I’d say, ‘Can you read Chinese?’ We don’t even know the Chinese pictograph for ‘Happy hour.’"

U.S. cyber warrior accuses China of targeting Pentagon
http://news.yahoo.com/u-cyber-warrior-accuses-china-targeting-pentagon-011916520.html

Chinese Military Advocates Cyber Offensive Capability
http://www.infosecisland.com/blogview/21194-Chinese-Military-Advocates-Cyber-Offensive-Capability.html

China used downed U.S. fighter to develop first stealth jet
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1349906/Chengdu-J-20-China-used-downed-US-fighter-develop-stealth-jet.html

Capability of the People’s Republic of China to Conduct Cyber Warfare and Computer Network Exploitation
http://www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/2009/NorthropGrumman_PRC_Cyber_Paper_FINAL_Approved%20Report_16Oct2009.pdf

Occupying the Information High Ground: Chinese Capabilities for Computer Network Operations and Cyber Espionage
http://www.uscc.gov/RFP/2012/USCC%20Report_Chinese_CapabilitiesforComputer_NetworkOperationsandCyberEspionage.pdf

How China Steals Our Secrets
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/03/opinion/how-china-steals-our-secrets.html

China cyberspies suspected in new caper: what has experts worried
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2012/0927/China-cyberspies-suspected-in-new-caper-what-has-experts-worried

China's Cyber Thievery Is National Policy—And Must Be Challenged
http://online.wsj.com/article_email/SB10001424052970203718504577178832338032176-lMyQjAxMTAyMDAwOTEwNDkyWj.html

FBI Traces Trail of Spy Ring to China
http://online.wsj.com/article_email/SB10001424052970203961204577266892884130620-lMyQjAxMTAyMDAwNzEwNDcyWj.html

NSA: China is Destroying U.S. Economy Via Security Hacks
http://www.dailytech.com/NSA+China+is+Destroying+US+Economy+Via+Security+Hacks/article24328.htm

Chinese Espionage Campaign Targets U.S. Space Technology
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-04-18/chinese-espionage-campaign-targets-u-dot-s-dot-space-technology

Report: Hackers Seized Control of Computers in NASA’s Jet Propulsion Lab
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/03/jet-propulsion-lab-hacked/
http://oig.nasa.gov/congressional/FINAL_written_statement_for_%20IT_%20hearing_February_26_edit_v2.pdf

Chinese hackers took control of NASA satellite for 11 minutes
http://www.geek.com/articles/geek-pick/chinese-hackers-took-control-of-nasa-satellite-for-11-minutes-20111119/

Chinese hackers suspected of interfering with US satellites
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2011/oct/27/chinese-hacking-us-satellites-suspected

Former cybersecurity czar: Every major U.S. company has been hacked by China
http://www.itworld.com/security/262616/former-cybersecurity-czar-every-major-us-company-has-been-hacked-china

China Attacked Internet Security Company RSA, Cyber Commander Tells SASC
http://defense.aol.com/2012/03/27/china-attacked-internet-security-company-rsa-cyber-commander-te/

Chinese Counterfeit Parts Keep Flowing
http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_channel.jsp?channel=defense&id=news%2Fasd%2F2012%2F03%2F27%2F04.xml&headline=Chinese+Counterfeit+Parts+Keep+Flowing

China Corporate Espionage Targets U.S. Firms
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-03-15/china-corporate-espionage-boom-knocks-wind-out-of-u-dot-s-dot-companies

U.S. Official on Cyber Attacks: "It's Getting Harder for China's Leaders to Claim Ignorance"
http://www.securityweek.com/uscc-commissioner-cyberattacks-getting-harder-chinas-leaders-claim-ignorance

China's Role In JSF's Spiraling Costs
http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story.jsp?id=news%2Fawst%2F2012%2F02%2F06%2FAW_02_06_2012_p30-419987.xml&channel=defense

I could go on...

Consoles choose RISC vs. CISC for a much simpler reason. The performance isn't really that important. It's typically an issue of endianess.

It has become quite simple in modern times to make a CPU emulating JIT (meaning treating the binary instruction set of one CPU as source code and recompiling it for the host platform.) what is extremely expensive execution-wise is data model conversion on loads and stores. Unless Intel starts making load and store instructions that can function in big endian mode (we can only dream), data loading in an emulator/JIT will always be a huge execution burden.

The result being that while an x86 can run rings around any of the console processors, a perfect one to one JIT can't be developed to make big-endian code run on a little endian CPU with a 1 to 1 mapping.

As an example of this, if you look at emulators for systems that make use of little endian ARM, performance of the JIT is perfect. In fact, the JIT can sometimes even make performance better. But if you look at a modern 3.4Ghz Quad-Core Core-i7, it still struggles with emulating the Wii which is insanely low performance.

So, don't read into RISC vs. CISC here. It's really an issue of blocking emulators in most cases.

Valve has already "blessed" this effort, and the Black Mesa devs have said as much. There will be no C&D letters.

From Valve (in January 2007...)

Congratulations to the Black Mesa for Half-Life 2 MOD team for picking up the Most Anticipated MOD Award for the coming year from Mod DB. Over 80,000 votes were cast for MODs built for a number of different games, and they have been crowned this year's most wanted. More information on this ambitious project to recreate Half-Life 1 from scratch in the Source engine is available on their site. We're as eager to play it here as everyone else.

The only thing Black Mesa did was remove "Source" from the mod name, but Valve allowed them to keep the domain because of fan base recognition.

For better or worse, this is a new battlespace, and DOD is talking about it

Another interesting development is that Judge Koh "unexpectedly reversed a lower magistrate's finding and decided to change the jury instructions with regards to the destruction of evidence from Samsung, changing the wording to imply that both Apple and Samsung should be presumed to have destroyed email evidence that could be relevant to the case." and "Despite the fact that there is no evidence that Apple has withheld any such emails, Koh's decision opts to give similar notices about both companies to the jury rather than instruct them on Samsung's deletions only. Koh could have also opted to not mention the evidence spoilation entirely, but chose instead to infer that Apple must also have deleted emails potentially favorable to Samsung's case. Had the previous instructions stood, it would have painted Samsung as more untrustworthy -- a key point in Apple's barrage of evidence."

With Apple and Samsung CEOs holding last-minute talks, it will be interesting to see how this shakes out.

Idaho National Laboratory actually commented on the Slate piece, saying:

It was disappointing to read Mr. Brumfiel's article. The Curiosity mission represents everything that is great about American ingenuity and engineering. For months, we've hosted a public website that explains via a virtual tour and factsheets how the nuclear battery was developed, fueled, tested and delivered. The website is available at http://www.inl.gov/marsrover.

The answer:

Dee Rybiski, an FBI spokeswoman in Richmond, said there was no Facebook snooping by her agency.

"We received quite a few complaints about what were perceived as threatening posts," she said. "Given the circumstances with the things that have gone on in the country with some of these mass shootings, it would be horrible for law enforcement not to pay attention to complaints."

Whitehead said some of the posts in question were made on a closed Facebook page that Raub had recently created so he questioned whether anyone from the public would have complained about them.

Really?

So the fact aside for a moment that it's not possible for a Facebook Page to be closed (was it his page, or more likely a Closed Group?), it's not possible for any one of his friends and/or group members to have complained?

Really?

Whitehead said he found nothing alarming in Raub's social media commentaries. "The posts I read that supposedly were of concern were libertarian-type posts I see all the time," he said.

Indeed. Then all of those people should be hauled away then, too, right?

But there will likely be plenty of people here who choose to believe the government is routinely and without warrants monitoring private communications on social media -- it will be the same folks who believe that the government is illegally dragnet-wiretapping all Americans while ignoring legitimate foreign intelligence interests.

...as an unabashedly pro-Apple piece, isn't an argument for a "-1, Flamebait" moderation option on main page article postings on slashdot, I don't know what is. ;-)

For what it's worth, these are the numbers from 2011 IRS data:

Category..........Top 0.1%....1%....5%...10%..25%..50%..Bot 50%
Income Req'd $........1.4M..344K..155K..112K..66K..32K..N/A
Income Share %...........8....17....32....43...66...87...13
Effective tax rate.%....24....24....20....18...15...12....2
Income tax share.%......17....37....59....70...87...98....2

I don't think many people realize these are the actual shares of income, tax, and real tax rates paid...