It is the City of London Police that is involved in this case. The City of London Police are a territorial police force for the financial district of the City. The Metropolitan Police are a completely different organisation.

Cheating between grandmasters in an over-the-board game doesn't really need a system requiring electronics. Kasparov once said many years ago, that all he would need to get an edge is to know that there is a devastating move to find. Once you know that such a move exists, you can concentrate your time (chess at this level is really a game of time management) on the key move. The grandmaster can find the solution themselves from there. Communicating that type of information is very cheap and easy. It's just one bit of information - normal move vs critical move. It could be done very effectively by someone sat in the audience holding a water bottle. Hold it in the left hand normally, and then hold it in the right hand to indicate the critical move. It sounds ridiculous but this is something that has worried grandmasters for decades. In the 1978 World Championship, Korchnoi objected to tubs of yogurt being bought out for his opponent Karpov. It was eventually agreed that he could have the same flavoured yogurt bought out at the same time every match, thereby eliminating any information being transmitted by flavour or time. Once you realise the possibilities of signalling in this way, it's very easy to see how a player can be driven to distraction or paranoia; and I suppose in extreme cases, madness. "If it's not the tub of yogurt or the bottle of water, maybe it's the flicking of the lights, or the cough in the background or the sound of aeroplanes flying overhead..." The possibilities are almost endless. So while there's no evidence of it happening in Niemann vs Carlsen, cheating (for a limited definition of cheating) in live events is not as difficult as it first appears. My own opinion is that Carlsen is simply paranoid but given Niemann's admitted history, it's not completely unjustified.

Excellent. I've not seen this video.

This is quite an old article.

Discord were using Go v1.9.2 which was two years old at the time of this post (Feb 2020). So they were comparing an old version of a language with the bleeding edge of another language.

All power to them, Rust is a fine language, but it seems strange to me that they never bothered trying the latest version of Go before putting the effort into porting to a new language.

FWIW, Go's performance since v1.9 has improved dramatically. And there are performance improvements which will hopefully be added in the next version later this year (register based arguments and return values, as opposed to stack based)

Interesting that I wrote a paper describing these results in 1990, based entirely on existing research found in the library at a community college in Dallas, TX, but somehow this news? I guess the difference is that people are finally becoming interested in the possibilities, instead of being hung up on the propaganda.

Sounds like Kaspersky is either trying to deflect or didn't do a good job of prevention/protection. Were I Kaspersky, at this point, I think I might have kept my mouth shut.

Understood. However, I would say that encrypting this sort of personal information on a per-customer basis is worth the resource hit. We shouldn't want that information cached even by accident.

Without knowing more details, I think your analysis sounds correct.

What I want to know is, why isn't this information encrypted apart from the SSL connection? There should be a public-private key pair for every customer managed by the Steam infrastructure and which is used to encrypt these sensitive details. In other words, personal information is encrypted long before it gets anywhere near the caches. That way, if there is a caching problem, the problem is minimal.

I don't like the idea of relying on SSL to protect this information.

Shrugs. I don't know (none of us do at this point) but I'll be very interested to hear what the cause of all this is.