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Journal capoccia's Journal: Army Thinktank Criticizes US Terrorism Policy 9

Dr. Jeffrey Record, a Visiting Research Professor of the US Army's Strategic Studies Institute, has published a paper, Bounding the Global War on Terrorism , critical of the Bush Administration's Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).

Record asserts that, "The global war on terrorism as currently defined and waged is dangerously indiscriminate and ambitious, and accordingly that its parameters should be readjusted to conform to concrete U.S. security interests and the limits of American power." The paper proposes six changes the administration should make to its foreign policy. I have abbreviated these conclusions:

  1. Deconflate the threat. This means, in both thought and policy, treating rogue states separately from terrorist organizations, and separating terrorist organizations at war with the United States from those that are not.
  2. Substitute credible deterrence for preventive war as the primary policy for dealing with rogue states seeking to acquire WMD. This means shifting the focus of U.S. policy from rogue state acquisition of WMD to rogue state use of WMD. There is no evidence that rogue state use of WMD is undeterrable via credible threats of unacceptable retaliation or that rogue states seek WMD solely for purposes of blackmail and aggression. There is evidence, however, of failed deterrence of rogue state acquisition of WMD; indeed, there is evidence that a declared policy of preventive war encourages acquisition.
  3. Refocus the GWOT first and foremost on al-Qaeda, its allies, and homeland security. This may be difficult, given the current preoccupation with Iraq. But it was, after all, al-Qaeda, not a rogue state, that conducted the 9/11 attacks, and it is al-Qaeda, not a rogue state, that continues to conduct terrorist attacks against U.S.
  4. Seek rogue-state regime change via measures short of war. Forcible regime change of the kind undertaken in Iraq is an enterprise fraught with unexpected costs and unintended consequences. Even if destroying the old regime entails little military risk, as was the case in Iraq, the task of creating a new regime can be costly, protracted, and strategically exhausting.
  5. Be prepared to settle for stability rather than democracy in Iraq, and international rather than U.S. responsibility for Iraq. The United States may be compelled to lower its political expectations in Iraq and by extension the Middle East. Establishing democracy in Iraq is clearly a desirable objective, and the United States should do whatever it can to accomplish that goal. But if the road to democracy proves chaotic and violent or if it is seen to presage the establishment of a theocracy via "one man, one vote, one time," the United States might have to settle for stability in the form of a friendly autocracy of the kind with which it enjoys working relationships in Cairo, Riyadh, and Islamabad.
  6. Reassess U.S. force levels, especially ground force levels. Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and its aftermath argue strongly for an across-the-board reassessment of U.S. force levels. Though defense transformation stresses (among other things) substitution of technology for manpower, postwar tasks of pacifi cation and nationbuilding are inherently manpower-intensive. Indeed, defense transformation may be counterproductive to the tasks that face the United States in Iraq and potentially in other states the United States may choose to subdue and attempt to recreate.

Additionally, there is an interesting quote on pages 18-19:

Strategically, Operation IRAQI FREEDOM was not part of the GWOT; rather, it was a war-of-choice distraction from the war of necessity against al-Qaeda. Indeed, it will be much more than a distraction if the United States fails to establish order and competent governance in post-Saddam Iraq. Terrorism expert Jessica Stern in August 2003 warned that the bombing of the U.N. headquarters in Baghdad was "the latest evidence that America has taken a country that was not a terrorist threat and turned it into one." How ironic it would be that a war initiated in the name of the GWOT ended up creating "precisely the situation the administration has described as a breeding ground for terrorists: a state unable to control its borders or provide for its citizens' rudimentary needs." Former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) director of counterterrorism operations and analysis, Vincent Cannistraro, agrees: "There was no substantive intelligence information linking Saddam to international terrorism before the war. Now we've created the conditions that have made Iraq the place to come to attack Americans."

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Army Thinktank Criticizes US Terrorism Policy

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  • The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

    The thinktank did not criticize the war, the author did.

    The press and the left are misrepresenting this all over the place.

    This ignores the fact that the war with Iraq has led to increasing compromise from Libya, Syria, Iran and to a less extent North Korea, all state sponsors of terrorism. This
    • The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

      The thinktank did not criticize the war, the author did.

      WRONG. The Army did not criticize the administration, its thinktank, the Strategic Studies Institute, did. This criticism does not have the backing of the Army (yet or maybe ever), but more people than just the author are in support.

      This report i

      • The President and his administration said in public many times that the reason was because Saddam had WMD and he was an imminent threat.

        When? The only quotation involving that concept I've seen was the State of the Union address in which the President said Iraq was not an imminent threat yet, and that only an idiot would wait until that was the case before fixing the problem. Removing Hussein has been an official government aim for half a decade, after all; if that decision had been motivated by Iraq bein

      • Some have said we must not act until the threat is imminent. Since when have terrorists and tyrants announced their intentions, politely putting us on notice before they strike? If this threat is permitted to fully and suddenly emerge, all actions, all words, and all recriminations would come too late. Trusting in the sanity and restraint of Saddam Hussein is not a strategy, and it is not an option.--G.W. Bush, State of the Union Address [whitehouse.gov], January 28, 2003

        He said we should not wait until the threat is im
        • I fail to see why this is a 'bad thing' because Bush did it, other than blatant partisanship. Sorry.

          for what it's worth, i voted for bush (would've voted mccain). but i have been rather suspicious ever since bush pulled away from his anti-nation-building position [issues2000.org].
          • Somalia started off as a humanitarian mission then changed into a nation-building mission and that's where the mission went wrong. The mission was changed. And as a result, our nation paid a price, and so I don't think our troops ought to be used for what's called nation building. I think our troops ought to be used to fight and win war. I think our troops ought to be used to help overthrow a dictator when it's in our best interests. But in this case, it was a nation-building exercise.-- GWB

            Seems consiste
      • Re:Correction (Score:2, Interesting)

        by GMontag ( 42283 )
        Ahem . . .

        ONE author in said Think Tank wrote ONE paper with this conclusion.

        For some reason this is met with surprise be the entire body of the left and taken as some sort of "evidence" of whatever axe they are grinding at the moment.

        Here is some real world info: true Think Tanks are not rubber stamps of policy. Part of their job is to provide counter ideas, yes even in the military.

        Actually, this case is more similar to the Federation of Atomic Scientists criticising the US nuclear policy in the 195
        • For some reason this is met with surprise...

          it is surprising because every other organization that would normally be critical of the President and his policies are blathering tomes of blind patriotism.
          • it is surprising because every other organization that would normally be critical of the President and his policies are blathering tomes of blind patriotism.

            Such as?

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