algebraist's Journal: Iraq and the "Arab Street": An upbeat prognosis

The talking heads, pundits, and other commentators have begun the assessment of risks facing the U.S. and U.K. as an outcome of this war, anticipating the speedy dispatch of the rest of Saddam Hussein and his henchmen. Comparisons with the spectre of Vietnam are being drawn and, oddly, they are being done in a tone which acts as if the comparisons hadn't already been made.

In matter of fact, the Coalition is dispatching the Iraqi regime in a way which is far less bloody and brutal than was anticipated, even by the war plan's supporters, and with a loss in lives and dollars that's remarkable. There remains the dangers assigned to "the Arab street".

That whole scene is hard to understand. The Iraqi defense plan, whatever of it there was, seemed to have the consensus of this Arab general opinion, that Americans were too soft to be "real warriors" and that Americans could not stand to see their troops coming home in body bags. The conclusion was that if the fight were prolonged and made bloody enough, Americans would tire and eventually leave. In essence, the Iraqi leadership and, apparently, opinion-makers in the Muslim world felt that the United States never grew out of its Vietnam phobias and that the public now is the same as the public then.

To the Western world, that's clearly not the case, at least to anyone who has eyes. And that is particularly true of the American military.

In fact, now, it seems, the pundits, the Iraqi media, what little there remains of it, the talking heads, and "the Arab street" are now drawing large Iraqis as victims of American aggression. Somehow these U.S.-U.K. dough soft boys and could be so easily defeated are now conquering monsters crushing babies heads beneath their boots.

In matter of fact, what this war has shown is that sheer zealousness and dedication, even if religiously sourced, is no match in combat for training, knowledge, technology, machinery, as well as the determination that comes with key American values. Sure, if horrific bodily damage is inflicted upon a civilian population, they will recoil in their psyches and feel cowed, at least initially. But, unfortunately for the supporters of the al-Queda approach to world domination, their military heroes, the al-Queda, or the Iraqi leaders, studied America and Americans too little.

I think even the British don't understand us that well, and they, of anyone, probably understand Americans best. The French would deny understanding us even if they did. The Russians have too bruised egos to know quite what to do, having bet on a long-term alliance with the United States, but being unable to follow its courageous lead. And the Chinese know when to remain aloof.

The fact is, Americans have a violent past, a past that even Americans whitewash in their historical recounts of it. Americans are not, I believe, any more violent than anyone else, but if they are injured in a big way, the public can collectively lash out at a perceived enemy with terrible ferocity, and with a firm belief in their moral justification that convinces them it isn't mere revenge. I recall after September 11th how, when asked, even George W Bush was amazed at the anger Americans were expressing regarding the terrorist attack. He may have been amazed, but he understood the message.

Indeed, it may be that the only folk who will suffer long term from this war is "the Arab street" itself if they misunderstand what it means. American tanks were charged by true believers driving explosive-laden trucks, trying to attack the infidels and "burn them", and the true believers were cut into ribbons and little pieces. But, for America, it is possible the outcome will be much better than the pessimists are saying.

An upbeat prognosis is offered by The Economist , one of my favorite news periodicals. The Economist cannot be pigeonholed in any neat "liberal", "conservative", "green", "neoconservative", or "nationalist" category. Indeed, the best description of them is "rational" and--not surprisingly--"economic". I don't agree with them on everything and, in particular, I don't agree with their position on manned space exploration. But I agree with them on surprisingly many things, or I have been convinced by them.

In an April 3rd 2003 article titled "At the gates of Baghdad", they present their upbeat assessment of the possibilities for the United States. They have not yet addressed the post-war fallout for Europe, but I am sure they will, and I look forward to that. For now, they say:

In Vietnam the Americans fought for ten years. The Soviet army spent ten years in Afghanistan. This war entered its third week with the Americans battering through Iraq's Republican Guard divisions to the gates of Baghdad. At this rate, it will be a surprise if the Americans have to fight for ten weeks, let alone ten years. Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza has lasted for 36 years. If America has its way, its occupation of Iraq is more likely to last for fewer than 36 months. And there is no reason why America should not have its way: unlike Israel and the Palestinians, America and Iraq have no territorial quarrel. America's stated aim is to remove the regime and its mass-killing weapons, allow the Iraqis to replace their dictatorship with a representative government, and then depart.

By sticking to this plan and remembering to go home, the Americans should be able to reduce the damage their victory does to wider Arab pride. They and the British are already going to unusual lengths to bring some delicacy, even political correctness, to the battlefield. There is no tactless raising of the Stars and Stripes or the Union Jack over captured Iraqi positions. The civilian casualties, which even the Iraqis put at under 1,000, have so far been negligible by the standards of war.

When the war is over, especially if its ending emboldens Iraqis to say out loud that they abhorred the previous regime, Iraq will make an improbable Afghanistan. The Arabs who flocked to fight in Afghanistan had a superpower (America) on their side and a base (Pakistan) to fight from. They also had an idea: they were fighting for Islam against communist atheists. None of this applies in Iraq. Iran and Syria, already on George Bush's watch list, have good reasons not to pick a fight with America. Iraq's other neighbours--Jordan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait--are already America's friends. Some of these governments will no doubt seek spheres of influence inside the new Iraq. This is a danger. But none will risk making itself the base for an anti-American guerrilla war. However much they disapprove of this war, most Arab governments will stay on side. And those that do not stay on side will stay in line.

The prognosis is not starry-eyed. It does not speak from inexperience or from an insufficient appreciation for how things can go quickly wrong. But it is a hugely refreshing analysis compared to the endless murkiness and "analysis paralysis" wafting over the media as this war ends. And whatever the risk to the United State or to Britain, they point out that the risks to the Muslim world are greater and that only the Muslim world can really do anything about those:

... Arabs are having to fume helplessly while Israel's superpower patron knocks the stuffing out of the one Arab state that had set its heart on becoming a superpower itself. To judge by the rage in Cairo, Damascus and other capitals, it is more than many Arabs can bear.

Humiliation is a dangerous thing. What is worse is that there is not much the western powers can do to soothe the wounds. In Iraq, America and Britain believe correctly that they are acting in their own vital interest and that of the wider world by separating Mr Hussein from his mass-killing weapons. They can try harder to bring peace to Palestine---indeed, to create a Palestine---but this will be possible only if the Palestinians and other Arabs stop hoping that they can reverse what many still see as the humiliation of Israel's creation. They can try to create the conditions in which a post-Saddam Iraq can become an exemplary democracy. But what if Iraq cannot rise to the occasion? Ultimately, it is for the Arabs themselves to opt for the modernity and democracy that have eluded them. All this war can do is to make that possible. It cannot guarantee that it will happen.