algebraist's Journal: Conventional thinking considered harmful

There has been a lot of media discussion in connection with the war in Iraq about asymmetrical warfare, guerilla tactics, and the limits of technology in warfare. Many of these discussions try to address military problems such as countering use of civilians and civilian areas as shields, compelling resistence from ready-to-surrender Iraqi troops, sabotage during humanitarian operations, and urban warfare. Military plans and thinking have also been criticized.

Current military thinking for prosecuting a war is based upon a doctrine called Airland Battle. This is derived from a Cold War doctrine dubbed Airland Battle 2000 which was intended to exploit superior technology in NATO and, in particular, the U.S. Armed Services for communications, sensor, space, intelligence, computing, and weapons to provide a force multiplier for NATO forces countering a Soviet invasion of Europe where NATO forces were outnumbered. Airland Battle was a revolutionary concept.

Much of traditional military theory for modern armies has focussed upon the need to construct and maintain unbroken lines of communication and supply to forces fighting at a from. This is actually a consequence of technology, for large, mechanized, often airborne forces require greater resources in fuel, ammunition, food, and medical support. Earlier, less organized forces could subsist on what they were given, what they found, or what they raided from the country they passed through. Even so, the need for consistent supplies was a factor for armies as long ago as the Peloponnesian War.

In Airland Battle, superior battlefield communications, information management, precision weapons, airpower, and close air support are exploited to redefine the concept of a battle front and increase the tempo of operations. Essentially, the front becomes a 4+ dimensional construct, involving time and pace, and, with delivery, insertion, and recovery of troops and special operations forces, separated from traditional military objectives of seizing and holding terrain. Forces still need supplies, food, and medical evacuation, but air power is used to make terrain irrelevant and to deploy, manage, and protect forward air refueling and rearming points ("FARRPs"). Infantry is still needed, but armored units no longer require their close support, something which was once a basic principle of tank warfare. Armor moves on its own at high, often in advance of infantry and supporting artillery, relying upon timely and comprehensive battlefield intelligence, pass-off targeting, speed of movement, being able to fire while traveling, and heavy armor to survive and achieve objectives.

It's interesting that flat terrain without groundcover is theoretically one of the best environments for using this kind of doctrine, with hummocky, glacial terrains being second best. For obvious reasons, it is a doctrine which does not apply to mountainous regions. It is also less useful in jungles or marshes.

That the Iraqi regime is relying upon irregulars to defend it is not surprising. Basically, that is their only option. Like some Viet Cong, the Iraqi Fedayeen are terrorizing other Iraqis so they will not desert to Coalition troops, and not rebel (see note 1). As is appropriate, this presents tactical, operational, and moral problems for Coalition troops, since overt self-protection not to mention surrender-inducing bombing cannot be done without large numbers of civilian casualties. Some commentators have observed that these tactics limit the effectiveness of better military technology and its force multiplication effect. Therefore, they argue, greater numbers of infantry are required, particularly if urban warfare is contemplated. Right now, of course, commanders need to work with what they've got. But, hopefully, this lesson will be learned and appropriate priority given to greater amounts of technology, not less.

In fact, the problems of urban combat, counterterrorism particularly in hostage situations, and battlefields rich with non-combatants have been thought about. The United State has invested in so-called unconventional weapons or non-lethal weapons for some time, and has studied how these could be used in urban warfare. Unfortunately, it has not done it enough (see note 2). There are all kinds of possibilities. The greatest limitation has been too conventional thinking about them and underappreciation of the great need for them, now becoming clear.

So, while some criticize the U.S. approach in Iraq for using too much technology in an inappropriate place, I say what's great about our approach is precisely our use of technology and, if there is any shortfall or critique, it is in developing and deploying too little technology for urban warfare.

Notes

Note 1

The comparison with the Vietnamese VC and North Vietnamese regulars ends there, however, since the Vietnamese were a modern army using guerilla tactics and, moveover, they were the surrogates of two major foreign powers.

Note 2

To see some of what is being developed, check out a year 2000 annual report from the U.S. Marines, and a tactical procedures manual.