I listened to Bill O'Reilly's RadioFactor show on the way to a client's site today and learned of this article by Gary Kamiya on Salon.com. I used to subscribe to Salon, even had a banner for them on my Web site. But I dumped them when they became virulently anti-war after the UN Security Council fiasco.
I guess some Republicans are more connected than others. I think the government might owe Dr Wen Ho Lee a real apology.
There's more in this article, and here.
Anyone know what's going on in the case of the Mike Hawash story?
I'm a member of the Software Contractors' Guild, as is Mr Hawash. I learned about the case from the Guild's founder, Dave Keeney, who I've known forever, ever since the Guild was founded.
The talking heads, pundits, and other commentators have begun the assessment of risks facing the U.S. and U.K. as an outcome of this war, anticipating the speedy dispatch of the rest of Saddam Hussein and his henchmen. Comparisons with the spectre of Vietnam are being drawn and, oddly, they are being done in a tone which acts as if the comparisons hadn't already been made.
In matter of fact, the Coalition is dispatching the Iraqi regime in a way which is far less bloody and brutal than was anticipated, even by the war plan's supporters, and with a loss in lives and dollars that's remarkable. There remains the dangers assigned to "the Arab street".
That whole scene is hard to understand. The Iraqi defense plan, whatever of it there was, seemed to have the consensus of this Arab general opinion, that Americans were too soft to be "real warriors" and that Americans could not stand to see their troops coming home in body bags. The conclusion was that if the fight were prolonged and made bloody enough, Americans would tire and eventually leave. In essence, the Iraqi leadership and, apparently, opinion-makers in the Muslim world felt that the United States never grew out of its Vietnam phobias and that the public now is the same as the public then.
To the Western world, that's clearly not the case, at least to anyone who has eyes. And that is particularly true of the American military.
In fact, now, it seems, the pundits, the Iraqi media, what little there remains of it, the talking heads, and "the Arab street" are now drawing large Iraqis as victims of American aggression. Somehow these U.S.-U.K. dough soft boys and could be so easily defeated are now conquering monsters crushing babies heads beneath their boots.
In matter of fact, what this war has shown is that sheer zealousness and dedication, even if religiously sourced, is no match in combat for training, knowledge, technology, machinery, as well as the determination that comes with key American values. Sure, if horrific bodily damage is inflicted upon a civilian population, they will recoil in their psyches and feel cowed, at least initially. But, unfortunately for the supporters of the al-Queda approach to world domination, their military heroes, the al-Queda, or the Iraqi leaders, studied America and Americans too little.
I think even the British don't understand us that well, and they, of anyone, probably understand Americans best. The French would deny understanding us even if they did. The Russians have too bruised egos to know quite what to do, having bet on a long-term alliance with the United States, but being unable to follow its courageous lead. And the Chinese know when to remain aloof.
The fact is, Americans have a violent past, a past that even Americans whitewash in their historical recounts of it. Americans are not, I believe, any more violent than anyone else, but if they are injured in a big way, the public can collectively lash out at a perceived enemy with terrible ferocity, and with a firm belief in their moral justification that convinces them it isn't mere revenge. I recall after September 11th how, when asked, even George W Bush was amazed at the anger Americans were expressing regarding the terrorist attack. He may have been amazed, but he understood the message.
Indeed, it may be that the only folk who will suffer long term from this war is "the Arab street" itself if they misunderstand what it means. American tanks were charged by true believers driving explosive-laden trucks, trying to attack the infidels and "burn them", and the true believers were cut into ribbons and little pieces. But, for America, it is possible the outcome will be much better than the pessimists are saying.
An upbeat prognosis is offered by The Economist , one of my favorite news periodicals. The Economist cannot be pigeonholed in any neat "liberal", "conservative", "green", "neoconservative", or "nationalist" category. Indeed, the best description of them is "rational" and--not surprisingly--"economic". I don't agree with them on everything and, in particular, I don't agree with their position on manned space exploration. But I agree with them on surprisingly many things, or I have been convinced by them.
In an April 3rd 2003 article titled "At the gates of Baghdad", they present their upbeat assessment of the possibilities for the United States. They have not yet addressed the post-war fallout for Europe, but I am sure they will, and I look forward to that. For now, they say:
In Vietnam the Americans fought for ten years. The Soviet army spent ten years in Afghanistan. This war entered its third week with the Americans battering through Iraq's Republican Guard divisions to the gates of Baghdad. At this rate, it will be a surprise if the Americans have to fight for ten weeks, let alone ten years. Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza has lasted for 36 years. If America has its way, its occupation of Iraq is more likely to last for fewer than 36 months. And there is no reason why America should not have its way: unlike Israel and the Palestinians, America and Iraq have no territorial quarrel. America's stated aim is to remove the regime and its mass-killing weapons, allow the Iraqis to replace their dictatorship with a representative government, and then depart.
By sticking to this plan and remembering to go home, the Americans should be able to reduce the damage their victory does to wider Arab pride. They and the British are already going to unusual lengths to bring some delicacy, even political correctness, to the battlefield. There is no tactless raising of the Stars and Stripes or the Union Jack over captured Iraqi positions. The civilian casualties, which even the Iraqis put at under 1,000, have so far been negligible by the standards of war.
When the war is over, especially if its ending emboldens Iraqis to say out loud that they abhorred the previous regime, Iraq will make an improbable Afghanistan. The Arabs who flocked to fight in Afghanistan had a superpower (America) on their side and a base (Pakistan) to fight from. They also had an idea: they were fighting for Islam against communist atheists. None of this applies in Iraq. Iran and Syria, already on George Bush's watch list, have good reasons not to pick a fight with America. Iraq's other neighbours--Jordan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait--are already America's friends. Some of these governments will no doubt seek spheres of influence inside the new Iraq. This is a danger. But none will risk making itself the base for an anti-American guerrilla war. However much they disapprove of this war, most Arab governments will stay on side. And those that do not stay on side will stay in line.
The prognosis is not starry-eyed. It does not speak from inexperience or from an insufficient appreciation for how things can go quickly wrong. But it is a hugely refreshing analysis compared to the endless murkiness and "analysis paralysis" wafting over the media as this war ends. And whatever the risk to the United State or to Britain, they point out that the risks to the Muslim world are greater and that only the Muslim world can really do anything about those:
... Arabs are having to fume helplessly while Israel's superpower patron knocks the stuffing out of the one Arab state that had set its heart on becoming a superpower itself. To judge by the rage in Cairo, Damascus and other capitals, it is more than many Arabs can bear.
Humiliation is a dangerous thing. What is worse is that there is not much the western powers can do to soothe the wounds. In Iraq, America and Britain believe correctly that they are acting in their own vital interest and that of the wider world by separating Mr Hussein from his mass-killing weapons. They can try harder to bring peace to Palestine---indeed, to create a Palestine---but this will be possible only if the Palestinians and other Arabs stop hoping that they can reverse what many still see as the humiliation of Israel's creation. They can try to create the conditions in which a post-Saddam Iraq can become an exemplary democracy. But what if Iraq cannot rise to the occasion? Ultimately, it is for the Arabs themselves to opt for the modernity and democracy that have eluded them. All this war can do is to make that possible. It cannot guarantee that it will happen.
If we don't provide consumers with our product in a timely manner, the pirates will.
With those words, Michael Eisner, CEO of the Walt Disney Company, announced an about face in their approach to digital programming and technologies, embracing it, and competing with pirates on their own turf.
The context was the 2003 convention of the National Association of Broadcasters in Las Vegas, NV. The most concrete example of Disney's new found faith was their announcement of Movie Beam, a new service that will allow consumers to receive on demand high-quality versions of motion pictures using a set-top box.
I say IT'S ABOUT TIME!
Perhaps this is a result of belated wisdom, or perhaps the threat of Pixar leaving the lucrative partnership with Disney was simply getting too much, but Eisner sure sounds like he got that ole Steve Jobs religion in contrast to his earlier bitter statements. If so, it would be a big come-down for Eisner, considering the recent bleak relationship between Disney and Pixar, and Mr Eisner's reputedly large and sensitive ego.
If Pixar doesn't leave the partnership, Disney, its stockholders and fans will, IMO, owe a big debt to Steve Jobs for turning this around and perhaps in the process teaching Mr Eisner that technology is crucial in both the future of entertainment and for the Walt Disney Company, a lesson which Disney should never have forgotten. Walter Elias Disney himself said new entertainment.technology, such as color television, never really replaced existing media, only provided additional ways of telling stories. Steve Jobs also might have taught Eisner some humility, something Jobs learned the hard way.
Here was part of my take on Eisner and Disney about a month ago as posted on a discussion board at the exquisite unofficial Disney site, laughingplace.com:
... I think the solutions have been widely proposed here and elsewhere: Invest more cash in the theme parks and on the entertainment Disney is supposed to be great at making rather than spending it on cute acquisitions.
I do not know the company's cash situation or flow, since that is closely guarded. Obviously, too, it's harder now to justify such spending during travel recession and when major companies are abandoning exhibits and pavilions left and right.
But the point was to forestall that by improving the parks and creating an environment where companies would either want to stay or where other companies in better financial shape would see a great opportunity in sponsoring exhibits.
As far as "knowing Eisner" goes, no, I do not know him. However, I fail to see how Mr Eisner's personality has any relevance with how a prospective investor evaluates him, apart from the hypothetical case where a CEO simply doesn't get along with their board of directors or other management because of it.
And, whether Mr Eisner likes it or not, digital technology is going to mow other kinds of entertainment down, not because it is inherently better or more entertaining, but because more can be done with it at less cost in people and fixtures. Mr Eisner should be courting Pixar, not letting them go off on their own. Steve Jobs should be asked to be on the Disney board, not implicitly criticized for managing companies which steal money from Disney.
Folks talk about the dot-com trend having bombed, but I don't see anything changing or slowing about digital technology. If anything, prices for it are plummetting, partly because of the dot-bomb phenomenon.
Maybe Disney was too early in the GO.com phenom, but that technology is beginning to pervade everything. What Disney needs is leadership in this area, not excuses or complaints.
The May 2003 issue of Dr Dobb's Journal contains an
article ambitiously
titled "XML & Relational Databases". In it, two software design engineers discuss the problem of viewing
"traditional relational data as XML". That sounds interesting enough but, alas and in (obviously) my
opinion, the article rapidly deteriorates into a rant into why "there are
relational databases are excellent persistent storage mechanisms for storing highly structured, normalized data--"square data".
If they left it at that, it would be nearly good enough. Unfortunately, they go on:
But as anyone who has modeled real-world busines objects knows, the real world is not square. For instance, consider a typical customer list where there is some variability between customers. One customer has a cell phone, work phone, and home phone; while another has a cell phone and pager number. A typical first attempt at a representation with relational tables uses a column for each property; see Table 1(a). However this approach leads to sparse tables with highly denormalized data and can potentially cause performance and scalability problems for a typical relational database. The solution for most databases is to pull out properties and place them in their own normalized table that has an N:1 relationship with the master table, as in Table 1(b). It would then be possible to further normalize the curstomer data bvy separating the PhoneNumbers table into separate tables based on type, like Table 2.
The results would be a highly normalized view of customers that would require users to join several tables to get the desired Customer objects. For most experienced DBAs and SQL users, this probably wouldn't be a problem. However, for most application developers, it would probably be easier to program against a logical Customer object without exposing the details of the underlying relational storage mechanism.
There is little wrong with the author's decomposition. How and why such a re-representation or normalization is done seems completely misunderstood. The author's do retain the relational form of the source data, but they go on to argue why the "XML abstraction" is superior. They also do not address their own complaint and complain that XML is somehow better for "real world", non-"square" data, data which is just far more prevalent than the "normal" stuff you sometimes find lying around. **sigh**
There are basically three problems with the paper, again, of course, in my opinion.
First, relational databases are treated as if they are branded software widgets of some sort. Now, that is true if you are dealing with particular approximations, such as Oracle, IBM, Sybase, or MS Access. And, given some of the advertising from these vendors, I can understand how people might confuse these brands with the database relational model itself, since a strong case can be made vendors have done such a misreable job realizing it. Nevertheless, the relational model and a truly relational database offers far more than a some-fangled widget for doing persistent storage that mere mortals are better off not knowing about. It provides a basic technique for analyzing and structuring information so that the resulting structure solves what in artificial intelligence work used to be called the McCarthy frame problem, albeit limited to recurring sets of scalar data. That problem is the one of determining what remains unchanged as a consequence of an action or event. The normalization process organizes information in a way that when something needs to be updated it only has to be updated in exactly one place, whether that "update" is changing the value of some attribute or, for that matter, expanding an attribute to provide greater nuances of description.
Second, the presentation of relational databases is entirely devoid of relational theory. This is not a question of style or academic form. It is a question of being able to apply logic and to compare same-kinds with same-kinds. The theory of relational data when done properly supports facilities and feats noone expects of "object-oriented" or off-the-shelf software systems. My point is, people should expect these things. Consider the following, taken from The Database Relational Model: A Retrospective Review and Analysis by C.J.Date (page 15):
The language would provide symmetric exploitation. That is, the user would be able to access a given relation using any combination of its attributes as knowns and the remaining ones as unknowns. "This is a system feature [that is] missing from many current information systems." Quite so!--but of course we take it as a sine qua non now, at least in the relational world (the object world doesn't seem to think it's so important for some reason).
Third, the "XML & Relational Databases" article piles on yet another example of reducing what should be an engineering argument and engineering decision to the cheering on of a favored (sports) team, surrendering to the false but disturbingly common notion that all decisions and argument about software are basically subjective and best decided by who wins the content in the marketplace. To the degree to which people in the software business believe this, the industry is doomed to a recurrent faddism and ultimately its financial dissolution. And, as I have argued elsewhere--notably in a letter to the editor of Dr Dobbs Journal itself (page 10, DDJ, November 2002)--and in direct connection to the matter of XML:
The fact is that XML is in serious danger of succumbing to the "New Kid in Town" mass psychosis that sweeps promising software technologies into town, and then out again, without slowing down to say "Hi." Somehow, we all can't seem to resist the temptation to hype the technology, hoping to pry free some venture capital, supportive funding, or maybe just a few purchase orders. Then, when the rubber doesn't meet the road, it's dumped. Fast.
XML's success was always predicated upon industry groups defining semantic--meaning as implemented in procedures, mostly software--interpretations for XML utterances. The idea, actually reasonable, is that each niche group would convene and hammer out standard tags usable for the niche interest. They'd publish, everyone would sign on, and we'd have Capitalist Heaven.
XML and relational databases have some kind of relationship but without these interpretations for XML utterances, that relationship is simply syntactic. XML has no theory inherent in it.
Poor Al-Jazeera , it seems Akamai won't help them handle their loading and denial-of-service issues.
Although apparently Akamai was polite and advised them about what was going on, they declined to help. However, there's something very personal about Akamai's feelings which I share, since I have a graduate degree from MIT. Akamai was co-founded by September 11th victim Danny Lewin, and Lewin was a professor at MIT's Laboratory for Computer Science in their algorithms group.
By using tactics such as the latest Iraqi car bomb which killed Coalition soldiers coming to the aid of a pregnant woman and driver, the Iraqi leadership is blurring the distinction between Iraqi soldiers and civilians. All this is doing is providing the Coalition with justification for defensive tactics which allow no subjectivity at checkpoints, tactics which will result in false alarms and the deaths of innocent civilians.
Consider the words of the essential warriors:
With the sudden doubletake today from the Iraqi regime, whether or not it was actually delivered by Saddam Hussein, admitting that Coalition forces and Americans were at the Baghdad Airport, however qualified the admission, I wonder if the Iraqi regime actually believed what had been said through yesterday. That was, in short, that Coalition forces were bogged down and had not advanced anywhere and that the Iraqi defenders were winning.
Most, including me, thought this was simply propaganda on the part of the Iraqi leadership, directed primarily towards their own people and that the reports were simply duplicity. But suppose it wasn't.
Suppose that, because of the fear and autocratic rule imposed upon the country and tightened after invasion -- to the point of using threats to kill family and murdering critics -- noone in the lower ranks is willing to give Saddam bad news. For if they do, that means they have failed in their charge and the leadership has frequently used extreme measures to deal with failure, including measures applied to the Iraqi Olympic team. Suppose, then, the news fed to the regime was strongly edited, censored by the very fear the regime used to control Iraq, and the leadership believed the news.
This would be most ironic, and a strong comment on the importance of hearing criticism in any enterprise. For it is always easier to prove a fact wrong than prove it right.
There are some nice closeup satellite images of Baghdad available from the French imaging company, SPOT. These are only as of 29th March 2003. One is of Baghdad's airport which is being contested today
.
They also have images from some time ago which are useful for comparison.
arb kindly provided a pointer to a better source of these images, being DigitalGlobe, often cited on CNN.
I wonder how extensive the tunnels and underground facilities are in Baghdad. There is a report of a tunnel that goes back to the Tigris found today. Could many of the Republican Guard people disappeared in there?
There is a really excellent briefing and press conference with Deputy Secretary(*) of Defense Paul Wolfowitz with Iraqi-Americans Emad Dhia, Zakiya Hakki and Sam Kareem that's been put up on the DefenseLink news site. In particular, consider the following Q&A:
Q: I have a question for the Iraqis, but also a question for Mr. Wolfowitz, if you don't mind.
The question for the Iraqis, I was watching CNN the other day, and there was a person who introduced himself as a replica of Mr. Uday, Saddam's son. And this man made a point, which is that, yes, he is against the Iraqi regime very much and we wished that it would fall, like many people, I guess, in the Arab world, but he said that he has family in Iraq and he opposes the war because he does not want this bomb, you know, these tremendous bombs, you know, to fall on top of the heads of his own family in Baghdad. So, I just wanted to hear your kind of, you know, view about this -- your country being destroyed and your being happy with it.... Thank you.
A1: (Hakki) Well, actually, Saddam gave a speech in 1983. At that time, there was the war between Iran and Iraq and it was -- it climaxed at that time when he said that he will not give up Iraq land and people because he believes in torched land. And that's what he is doing now. Before he left -- last left Kuwait, he torched the oil field there. Now, he is doing same thing in Iraq. Also, now all -- he is the one and the only one who is responsible for all these casualties against civilians.
A couple days ago in Qadisiya residential, you know, area -- this is where I lived -- used to live there. I know what's there. There is the military air force, there is the Mukhabarat, which is the main office of the intelligence service, in the front of them. And at the back of them, it is the presidential palace. There is the headquarter of Ajaysha Shabi (ph) military -- militia -- (to others) -- what they call? -- yeah -- Ajaysha Shabi (ph). There is also the headquarter of the Republican Guard.
And you know, I am sorry to say that although I am not blaming the correspondents there, because I know if they will be fair, they will risk their life, because, you know -- or either they will kick them out of the country, if they will just look at the top roof of the buildings, of the houses, the mosques, the hospitals there, it is full of anti-aircraft and missiles.
Even there is -- we have the biggest -- we call it Medina -- (inaudible) -- which is the medical city, it is even -- there is rocket on the rooftop of that medical. Then what we expect? Of course they will return the fire, the casualties will be among civilians.
A couple days ago in a big market, there we found to be that there was a satellite, of course they are, you know, chasing -- where is the satellite? There was a big truck with a satellite TV inside, inside that market. And the casualties -- it is only this brutal dictator; he is responsible of all these casualties among the civilians. Also, two days -- a couple of days ago, 500 of -- you know, Jabur tribe, they are not Kurds, they are not Shi'a; they are Arab and Sunni. They asked them to go to Kirkuk and, you know, to fight against the coalition. They refused. Do you know how -- which way they killed them? I have here this, you can find it in Arabic and in English -- by knife, by knife hand they cut them, 500 of those brave men.
This is a brutal dictator, you know. I cannot express how much he is brutal, this dictator, and his henchmen.
A2: (Dhia) Just one comment I have. The first is, nobody is happy or willing to see his family being bombarded. But also, the facts on the ground, for the last 23 years, 24 years, we have over 1 million Iraqis killed in two wars, and continuous brutality of Saddam.
The other fact, there is 4 to 5 million Iraqis outside Iraq. Now, you tell me why there is so many Iraqis outside Iraq, running for their lives and trying to escape the brutality of Saddam Hussein. These are the facts on the ground. Iraqi people really need to be liberated from this brutal regime.
It's hard to imagine anything being clearer.
As an aside, I also find DefendAmerica is a good source of news regarding the Iraq War as well.
While criticism of many media pundits properly rages, there have been many thoughtful essays written about the Iraq War, with those of The Economist being among my favorites. There are others.
A recent essay putting the Iraq War in a historical context appeared on a blog site. In fact, there are blogs entirely devoted to the Iraq War, including some by deployed soldiers (and here's another), and some by journalists. It's interesting that although CNN's embedded reporters provide coverage and pictures that are irreplaceable, these blogs provide far more interesting and insightful coverage than the print or radio media and, oftentimes, provide better entertainment than the Tube's array of experts who opine.
Also, although there are several Kurd-related Web sites, I have only found one news site, Kurdish Media , being updated regularly, in addition, of course, to the reporters who cover the Kurdish aspects of the fight.
While much of France's media coverage of the Iraq War goes along with "Oh, oh, America's getting bogged down again" silliness of some U.S. media, Alain Louyot, editor of L'Express seems quite sensible, saying in an interview with CNN that "It's not Vietnam, y'know".
His comments appear about 1 minute, 50 seconds into that RealMedia stream.
Former U.S. Secretary of State General Alexander Haig recounted the preparations Saddam Hussein made to flee during the last Iraq war in 1991. Apparently, but without surprise, Saddam and members of his regime have already made plans and preparations to get out of Baghdad should things go badly, as they inevitably will.
I sure hope he doesn't get away.
I also think these stories should be made the leading edge of any radio broadcasts and leaflets being dropped on Baghdad and elsewhere in Iraq. Why should Iraqis fight when their coward and scum of a leader is abandoning them, probably leaving orders to his closest troops to do everything possible to kill Coalition troops, even if that means annihilating the civilian population of Baghdad.
There has been a lot of media discussion in connection with the war in Iraq about asymmetrical warfare, guerilla tactics, and the limits of technology in warfare. Many of these discussions try to address military problems such as countering use of civilians and civilian areas as shields, compelling resistence from ready-to-surrender Iraqi troops, sabotage during humanitarian operations, and urban warfare. Military plans and thinking have also been criticized.
Current military thinking for prosecuting a war is based upon a doctrine called Airland Battle. This is derived from a Cold War doctrine dubbed Airland Battle 2000 which was intended to exploit superior technology in NATO and, in particular, the U.S. Armed Services for communications, sensor, space, intelligence, computing, and weapons to provide a force multiplier for NATO forces countering a Soviet invasion of Europe where NATO forces were outnumbered. Airland Battle was a revolutionary concept.
Much of traditional military theory for modern armies has focussed upon the need to construct and maintain unbroken lines of communication and supply to forces fighting at a from. This is actually a consequence of technology, for large, mechanized, often airborne forces require greater resources in fuel, ammunition, food, and medical support. Earlier, less organized forces could subsist on what they were given, what they found, or what they raided from the country they passed through. Even so, the need for consistent supplies was a factor for armies as long ago as the Peloponnesian War.
In Airland Battle, superior battlefield communications, information management, precision weapons, airpower, and close air support are exploited to redefine the concept of a battle front and increase the tempo of operations. Essentially, the front becomes a 4+ dimensional construct, involving time and pace, and, with delivery, insertion, and recovery of troops and special operations forces, separated from traditional military objectives of seizing and holding terrain. Forces still need supplies, food, and medical evacuation, but air power is used to make terrain irrelevant and to deploy, manage, and protect forward air refueling and rearming points ("FARRPs"). Infantry is still needed, but armored units no longer require their close support, something which was once a basic principle of tank warfare. Armor moves on its own at high, often in advance of infantry and supporting artillery, relying upon timely and comprehensive battlefield intelligence, pass-off targeting, speed of movement, being able to fire while traveling, and heavy armor to survive and achieve objectives.
It's interesting that flat terrain without groundcover is theoretically one of the best environments for using this kind of doctrine, with hummocky, glacial terrains being second best. For obvious reasons, it is a doctrine which does not apply to mountainous regions. It is also less useful in jungles or marshes.
That the Iraqi regime is relying upon irregulars to defend it is not surprising. Basically, that is their only option. Like some Viet Cong, the Iraqi Fedayeen are terrorizing other Iraqis so they will not desert to Coalition troops, and not rebel (see note 1). As is appropriate, this presents tactical, operational, and moral problems for Coalition troops, since overt self-protection not to mention surrender-inducing bombing cannot be done without large numbers of civilian casualties. Some commentators have observed that these tactics limit the effectiveness of better military technology and its force multiplication effect. Therefore, they argue, greater numbers of infantry are required, particularly if urban warfare is contemplated. Right now, of course, commanders need to work with what they've got. But, hopefully, this lesson will be learned and appropriate priority given to greater amounts of technology, not less.
In fact, the problems of urban combat, counterterrorism particularly in hostage situations, and battlefields rich with non-combatants have been thought about. The United State has invested in so-called unconventional weapons or non-lethal weapons for some time, and has studied how these could be used in urban warfare. Unfortunately, it has not done it enough (see note 2). There are all kinds of possibilities. The greatest limitation has been too conventional thinking about them and underappreciation of the great need for them, now becoming clear.
So, while some criticize the U.S. approach in Iraq for using too much technology in an inappropriate place, I say what's great about our approach is precisely our use of technology and, if there is any shortfall or critique, it is in developing and deploying too little technology for urban warfare.
Notes
Living on Earth may be expensive, but it includes an annual free trip around the Sun.
