Please create an account to participate in the Slashdot moderation system

 



Forgot your password?
typodupeerror
×

Comment Re:Moral of the story... (Score 5, Informative) 135

The only thing that was replicated was the API - API's are *NOT* copyrightable.
      https://arstechnica.com/tech-p...
      https://www.osnews.com/story/2...

Neither are programming languages...
      https://www.cnet.com/news/prog...
      https://www.neowin.net/news/eu...

Sorry Oracle - you're fucked.

Comment When strong passwords aren't. (Score 1) 84

You can find the source for the topic of this post at the folowing site: https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-...

The updates are broken down into 3 sections, with section “b” being the most relevant to this e-mail.
https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-...
https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-...
https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-...

Extract from section 63b:

When processing requests to establish and change memorized secrets, verifiers SHALL compare the prospective secrets against a list that contains values known to be commonly-used, expected, or compromised. For example, the list MAY include (but is not limited to):

        Passwords obtained from previous breach corpuses.
        Dictionary words.
        Repetitive or sequential characters (e.g. ‘aaaaaa’, ‘1234abcd’).

        Context specific words, such as the name of the service, the username, and derivatives thereof.

If the chosen secret is found in the list, the CSP or verifier SHALL advise the subscriber that they need to select a different secret, SHALL provide the reason for rejection, and SHALL require the subscriber to choose a different value.

*Verifiers SHALL implement a throttling mechanism that effectively limits the number of failed authentication attempts an attacker can make on the subscriber’s account as described in Section 5.2.2.*
*Verifiers SHOULD NOT impose other composition rules (e.g., mixtures of different character types) on memorized secrets.*
*Verifiers SHOULD NOT require memorized secrets to be changed arbitrarily (e.g., periodically) and SHOULD only require a change if the subscriber requests a change or there is evidence of compromise of the authenticator.*

Forcing password changes just to change the passwords also contributes to this security “fallacy”, that in fact does more to weaken our security than anything else.
When both of these are combined, we should find that the rules are in several ways, much like the TSA at airports, good security theater that causes no end of grief for travelers, yet does almost nothing to make people safer or more secure.

As a follow up, I saw an article in the Wall Street Journal regarding this topic.
https://www.wsj.com/articles/t...
That may be pay-walled, so another variant from Gizmodo.
http://gizmodo.com/the-guy-who...
Interesting to find out that the “supposed” strong password rules were developed by a bureaucrat with very little knowledge about computer security.

Finally, a previous paper I composed as an attempt to point out the fallacy of those laughably weak "strong password rules" several years ago.

You know, every time I see people asking for the ability to enforce "strong" password rules like the above, I have to laugh.
Those kinds of rules actually reduce the safety and "strength" of the passwords.

It wouldn't surprise me at all if those "recommendations" came directly from the NSA with the express purpose of making brute-force cracking of the passwords so much easier for them.

Let's do a little math here.

Start with a typical 8 character password requirement - with 95 printable characters in the ascii character set, we subtract 1 for the "space" character, leaving us with 94 character "options" for each of the 8 spaces.

So now, we do the math, 94 characters for each of the 8 positions gives us just a little over 6 quadrillion possibilities.

Now, we start to add in the "rules".
1 uppercase - means 1 space has only 26 possibilities
1 lowercase - means 1 space has only 26 possibilities
1 numeric - means 1 space has only 10 possibilities
1 special - means 1 space has only 32 possibilities

Let's say that we put all of our "rule" characters in the first 4 positions just to make the "math" simpler

4 positions with 94 possibilities gives us 78,074,896 or just over 78 million possibilities
4 positions following the "strength" rules gives us 216,320 or not even a quarter of a million possibilities.

According to my math allowing every possible character in every possible position of the password gives us a 360 times stronger password than the "strong" password character set.

If we extend that to the full 8 characters, where 4 positions allow the full ascii printable set of 94 characters, then multiply by the characters available for the remaining "strong" rule base, gives us a maximum entropy value of only 17 billion possibilities from the original 6 quadrillion possibilities. 17 billion goes into 6 quadrillion 349 times.

Keeping the full character set available for all 8 spaces nets us a 349 times stronger password or 349 times greater entropy pool from which to draw from.

Add in rules like the number of times a character can be used in the password, or dictionary word validation only weekens the passwords even more, by further reducing the entropy pool.

If we truly want strong "authentication", then we need to forget passwords and switch to passphrases and throw out those silly rules that make it easier for the rogue alphabet agencies and hackers to break in.

Submission + - CBS All Access Fails to Launch Star Trek Discovery!! 1

GuyverDH writes: Across the nation, Star Trek fans paid extra and tuned in to watch the live premiere of Star Trek Discovery in their local time zone only to have Oprah Winfrey and 60 Minutes show up with the "Star Trek Discovery" title on screen.

Complete and Utter Failure

Comment Re:Seems appropriate (Score 3, Insightful) 353

Data stored digitally on your computer is the equivalent of your own memory.

Encrypting it keeps others out of it.

5th amendment protects against self-incrimination, period.

This trumped up charge needs to be dropped.
The judge needs to be de-benched and sent to prison for being a constitutional terrorist.
The prisoner should sue the City, the district attorney's office and the judge for everything they have for wrongful imprisonment, falsifying charges, and basic ass-hattery.

Submission + - DC Comics refuses to license Superman logo for murdered child's memorial. (thestar.com) 1

GuyverDH writes: DC Comics has refused to allow the Superman logo to be used on a memorial for a 5 year old child, Jeffrey Baldwin, that was starved to death by his grandparents.
Jeffrey Baldwin was a huge fan of anything Superman, and when the story came out about the circumstances of his murder, the community wanted to do something for him. They raised funds to create a memorial statue with the Kryptonian S on the chest.
The latest incarnation of the Superman saga, Man of Steel, tells us that it's not an S, but a symbol for "Hope".
What better use for the symbol of hope, than on a memorial to a murdered child, in hopes that nothing like this happens again.
DC Comics doesn't feel that way, perhaps they don't feel at all.
They implied that it would put a stain or stigma on their trademark to allow it to be used for his memorial because of the conditions surrounding his death.
If Superman were real, he would have stood up for Jeffrey, maybe even prevented his death. At the very least he certainly would have been the first one there to carve his symbol on the memorial himself with his heat vision.

Slashdot Top Deals

"Intelligence without character is a dangerous thing." -- G. Steinem

Working...