So what youâ(TM)re telling me is that employees might have different political interests than their senior executives?

Wow we ought to write that down or something.

Yeah, youâ(TM)re right, the sensible first response to âoehey, sexism is kinda prevalent and also badâ is âoeI bet those females are lyingâ.

Well done. Good job.

Lemme guess...you have never seen a comic book.

Iâ(TM)d love for you to make that argument for Windows Mobile. Thatâ(TM)d be pretty funny.

Looks like decent specs, and ASUS phones are always reasonably priced. I'm surprised they didn't go full 4K resolution on the screen though, given it's supposed to be an "augmented reality" device.

No, but that's not the point. Nuget packages have Powershell install scripts. Nuget packages can be created by anyone. Ergo, if you're really so paranoid about security that you plan to audit every script or program you run, then you should be auditing these too.

You say "caring", I say "having integrity". But hey, you've got the only correct value system, right?

No they aren't. All modern pathways look promising until they tried to scale them up. And both of these are subject to the non-equilibrium braking radiation problem, which appears insurmountable.

Citation needed. Polywell certainly has theoretical losses due to Bremsstrahlung radiation, but they also have a theoretical argument suggesting this should be surmountable, an argument that hasn't been definitively refuted, and requires experimental validation. The money poured into other approaches is orders of magnitude more than that required to validate Polywell.

Focus fusion has no known theoretical limitation, and they're operating with even less money.

The problem is not actually physics, its economics, and we already know fusion is not competitive.

Well that's pure bull. The economics of fusion are purely driven by the physics of fusion. Of course it looks expensive when you still don't know how to do it efficiently. This is true of every technology until the first few breakthroughs.

So basically, a classic, well known TOCTTOU vulnerability.

Focus fusion and Polywell are also promising, but underfunded.

Are you for real? You can decompile executables and see what they're going to do too, so do you seriously expect people to audit every program they're going to run?

Just because scripts are one or two orders of magnitude smaller than executables, why should the burden suddenly fall on end users to audit when a properly designed system wouldn't need such auditing for either programs or scripts.

So here's an idea: don't design insecure systems so people don't have to do unnecessary, stupid and laborious work.

Do you read all of the Excel macros in a spreadsheet before allowing them to run? Do you read the NPM or nuget install scripts for every package before you download it so you can get your actual work done? How about for every update to every package?

You seriously underestimate the number of scripts that are automatically run during normal, every day activity. You'll be fired for low productivity if you seriously think you can audit every script or program you need to run.

Don't you use nuget if you're a .NET developer? NPM or Grunt if you do front-end web development? They all use scripts that run with your full authority, and these are used daily by tens of thousands of software developers. People who manage popular NPM packages could probably do a lot of damage if they wanted to, just by uploading a new version that does something nefarious. It's like a road runner cartoon, and we've all walked off a cliff and just keep reassuring ourselves that everything will be fine as long as we don't look down.

Even non-developers use software they download from the internet, like browsers, e-mail clients, photo apps, and even office documents with macros that can trash their systems. It has nothing to do with time-crunches, it's just a reality in our world that people use programs for just about everything; that most of these programs come from sources most people wouldn't even begin to know how to verify, even with code signing; that, even if they did know how to verify a code signature, chances are this verification step would be meaningless because they probably don't know the person or entity who signed it; that even if they did know the person(s) who signed it, they have no idea if those persons themselves were somehow vulnerable to some attack which compromised their product.

The ultimate solution can only be found in ensuring that running programs that you know nothing about is inherently safe. Verifying the source of these programs is just a very poor proxy for that property. Fortunately, it's been proven to be achievable.

There is no difference between scripts and programs. Everything I said applies equally to any software you download from the internet (browsers, e-mail clients, Office documents with macros), any packages you install via a package manager to do your development (npm, grunt, etc), etc. I think you can see that everyone downloads programs from the internet, and they face the choice of "run this and do my job or don't do my job" every day.

And it's only going to become more pervasive. All of these scripts and programs run with all of your authority, with access to all of your files.

Code signing solves one very small aspect of the security problem quite well, and then people bafflingly try to use it everywhere like a hammer thinking it will solve other problems.

This means two things: 1. the executable wasn't modified since it left the publisher's build farm, and 2. you know whom to sue if there are problems (especially in jurisdictions that don't allow a blanket disclaimer of all liability).

Which a) just costs you more time and money, b) doesn't recover your lost data, and c) plenty of people with certificates aren't in your jurisdiction. Furthermore, you overestimate how difficult it is to obtain a valid certificate. All I need to do is own a domain. Anyone can purchase a domain.

I think the idea is that when faced with an unsigned script and a competitor's signed script, users will choose the signed script because of the guarantees of an OV certificate.

Certificates don't guarantee safety, which is really all the user wants to know, right after the question of whether the script does the job they need it to do.

Furthermore, given how easy it is to obtain a domain-validated cert, your scenario isn't realistic. Users are actually faced with the choice of running two programs both of which are signed with certificates. Now how do they choose?