I wonder how many generations of ransomware we will see before backups come back into "style". It used to be in the '90s that people actively did some type of backups, and even PCs shipped with some form of tape drive. Then disks got cheap, and offsite storage become viable, so backups were not done, or if done, were just kicked to the cloud.

Any backup is better than none, but I wouldn't be surprised if the next generation of ransomware would either encrypt files slowly (but use a shim driver to decrypt stuff until it is done, and then completely zap all decryption keys and tell the user to pay up), or if it does notice a backup program being run, actively or passively corrupt it... or just erase the hard disk or the file share it is being backed up to. A simple TRIM command would make the data on a SSD unrecoverable. An overwrite of a directory synced with a cloud service will make that unrecoverable.

I wouldn't mind seeing tape come back, as it isn't slow, and it is relatively cheap (I've seen ads for LTO-6 tapes for $10 each.) The drives are pricy [1], but tapes are reliable [2], LTO4 and newer have AES-256 encryption in hardware (and very easy to turn on, be it by third party software, the tape silo's web page, or the backup utility.) A tape sitting on a shelf takes zero energy to store (other than HVAC), and if dropped, unless there is major physical damage, it is almost certain the media will be usable.

Will tape be 100% against malware? Nope. However, it keeps the data offline, so that a single "erase everything" command won't touch the data [3]. One can buy WORM tapes to protect against erasure/tampering as well, as well as flip a write protect tab.

In a ransomware scenario, WORM tapes would be very useful, especially if the malware decides to try to force an erase on all backups. The fact that tapes tend to be offline brings even more security since if the tape isn't physically in the drive, it can't be touched. Again, nothing is 100%, but the barrier for ransomware to destroy all backups goes a lot higher with offline media than with cloud storage or an external HDD.

I wouldn't mind seeing backups be done again, and done in a smart, time-tested way... done to local, archival grade media that is very inexpensive, but yet super reliable.

[1]: I think there is a market niche for USB3 tape drives at the consumer level. Newer drives have variable speeds to minimize/prevent "shoe-shining", and with all the space on a tape, if areal densities similar to HDD are present, it would store quite a lot of data, even with multiple layers of forward-ECC. LTO tape drives are even bootable so a bare metal restore can be done with just the tape in hand and the drive on the machine, no other media.

[2]: In the past decade at multiple IT shops, I've gone through thousands, possibly tens of thousands of LTO tapes. The total number of tapes that I introduced to the degausser were fewer than five, and all the errors thrown when read/written were all soft errors, so all data was recoverable. This is pure anecdotal evidence, but it has impressed me personally on the reliability of these drives. It is wise to have a backup process of rotating tapes and having some task just verify data when nothing else is going on, and goes without saying to use multiple media just in case hard read errors do happen.

[3]: One can tell a tape silo to zero out all tapes sitting in it, but that is going to take some time, and not be instant. It can be done... but if one has a basic offsite procedure in place (where all tapes leaving get the write protect tab sent), even this can be mitigated without much time and effort.

According to a more informative article, this won't be nearly as bad, then.

Ah, yes, I remember those days well. Those were the days when DoubleClick had tracking cookies on most of the major media sites, and the major sites that hadn't partnered with DoubleClick usually had their own advertising departments, so often their banners were placeholders advertising their advertising ability.

Of course, with decentralized management, all of those major players thought it was a new and innovative idea when X10 started their pop-under ad campaign using the new-fangled Flash thing, so it could be animated, too! Surely that would catch the eye, and they could finally make some steady income from those ads, right?

Then Google came along with its ad program. Simple text ads, tailored to the viewer, and all managed by an upstart company who seemed to be pretty good at managing such things. They didn't do pop-ups (or -unders), and they didn't do sound or video. They did volume. Sure, there are now ads everywhere, but they're not as bad as what we had before. I call it a net improvement.

Ah, yes, there was the content of the adolescent World Wide Web, hosted in large part by ad-supported GeoCities (and the like) and grant-supported universities, and consisting of low-bandwidth servers run as an afterthought to a business whose primary business wasn't dependent on having five-nines availability through DDoS attacks and peering disputes. I guess most of those "service unavailable" messages counted as some form of content.

...Like Slashdot, which offers a subscription that you don't appear to have?

Not quite. Ignorant people like me know that different companies are free to pick whatever business model they like, and I am free to use their service if and only if I agree with it. I find that Hulu Plus still offers me more value than they charge (including my time watching ads), so I'm inclined to subscribe to their service.

If only we were all as enlightened as you are, knowing that advertising is all Google's fault, and that all business must be conducted in the BitZtream-approved way.

Tripwire/AIDE is passive. It can tell me if a binary is changed, but won't actively block a dropped script.

SELinux is great for assigning roles and denying execution in directories. However, it doesn't sign executables, nor keep a manifest in place.

AppArmor is similar to SELinux.

All of these are quite useful, but what would be an addition which would stop this type of Trojan cold would be something that checks an executable to see if it is on a manifest, checks its signature, then allows/denies/logs access. One can use -noexec flags and ACEs in SELinux for similar effect, but having a feature overlap wouldn't hurt.

Sometimes I wonder if Linux should have functionality similar to AIX's trustchk.

This command on AIX can make a list (signed with an OpenSSL key), then either warn when something runs that isn't on that list, or block it entirely. Functionality can be turned on to watch libraries as well, so if a library was changed, execution stops or a syslog entry is generated. In fact, it can be locked down so a reboot into another OS instance would be required to modify the trustchk settings.

If someone has static scripts that don't change often, this functionality would come in handy and would nip something creating scripts or executables on the fly almost immediately.

Even better would be to combine trustchk with BSD's securelevel so that a signed list of executables can be created, then locked down until the machine reboots.

It might be that if one uses a VPN, and a limited number of IP addresses, maybe just block everything except for those ranges, and the VPN (preferably a less known, but reliable provider, maybe even a static IP on a linode box) would allow one access if one wasn't on that range.

Of course, the attacks I see coming are often compromised Windows boxes on DSL or cable modem IP ranges, so blocking Elbonia directly may not help much. The best bang for buck is maybe blocking the obvious hotspots, then rate limiting dynamic IP pools.

I've wondered, at an extreme, having a custom sshd that had a list of IPs in place, and if someone connected from a blacklisted IP, it would randomly just deny them, or perhaps give them a fake shell before closing the connection. Of course, tarpitting can't hurt either, but a botnet only connecting 2-3 times from an IP at a time, that won't help much.

Another idea would be to combine it with port knocking so that the sshd would give bogus reponses to anything that connects unless it previously knocked on another port. Of course, this would be in combination with blacklists.

I use fail2ban and RSA keys as my primary login mechanism... but I also use the RFC 6238 TOTP tokens (Google Authenticator code available from git, or just fetch it from EPEL if on RedHat or a downstream distro like CentOS. For an app, one can use RedHat's FreeOTP, Google's app, Amazon's, or a slew of others.)

This isn't 100%, but two factor authentication should be the minimum standard for Internet communication these days.

After that, what may or may not help is the push to run everything in containers (think domains in Solaris, or WPARs in AIX.) Docker seems to have a lot of enterprise support, and it is relatively new, and that would put another layer of security in place.

This isn't to say malware can misbehave in a container. In fact, malware running in the user context on Windows can do a lot of mayhem. However, containers provide better defense in depth, same with SELinux.

A swimming pool noodle cut to fit works perfectly with gaps in the hot/cold aisles. Don't ask how I know...

The advantage of a even an easy-bump tumbler lock is that it requires physical presence to do that, with immediate risk (big dog waiting for his/her next meal behind the front door.)

The problem with these devices is that someone can be -anywhere- and break them. Done right, one button push from a script kiddie in Elbonia can unlock hundreds of thousands of deadbolts without warning, and no way for the perp to ever face consequences. This can be done either out of sheer malice, or perhaps extortion/blackmail against each and every user of the device, as well as the device maker.

Of course, if they have an easy mechanism to get flashed, that means an easy mechanism to get hacked, or perhaps bricked as well.

I can put packages down for a second while I stick my key in the lock. Fumbling for an app on my smartphone to unlock the deadbolt actually would take longer.

The problem is that there is an conflict between a password suitable enough for protection (i.e. 20+ characters), and something quick enough to access in a short time.

mSecure addresses this in an interesting way -- they cache the extra long sync password used for the cloud. The password that is used to encrypt the synchronized database that sits in iCloud or DropBox is different from the app's passphrase. Since most phones have decent innate protection, it is not impossible, but very difficult to dump the data on a locked device [1], so one can have a fairly easy to type in PIN on the device, but the synchronized backend file is protected with a much longer (and more secure) passphrase.

[1]: iOS on the iPhone 4 and up always encrypts. Android since 3.x has the option of using md-crypt and encrypting the /data partition, then using another tool to separate the password asked on boot to decrypt that partition from the screen locker password.

Done right, storing passwords on the web can be decently secure, especially if there is some part of the decryption key (be it a public key, a secondary authenticator, or a keyfile) that is not available to the attacker, in combination with the master passphrase.

I'd say the best implementation of this would be a utility that piggybacked on the cloud provider of choice, so one isn't limited to GDrive, Dropbox, Box, Skydrive, iCloud, or others. The utility would ask for permission just for its own directory (if possible), and would store its main DB file, as well as some backups in that directory. That way, the password program author or company doesn't have to maintain a cloud infrastructure.

Hate responding to my own posts, but adding another idea... Each endpoint device has its own private key... so the data that is stored on the backend cloud provider would be conventionally encrypted, but would be unlockable by any key in the access list, similar to a PGP attachment that lists multiple public keys. That way, one can add and remove devices by using their key, and no common file needs to be shared.

I'd probably say KeePass is as secure as things get, since it doesn't use the Web in any way, shape, or form.

What I'd like to see with password apps that use a cloud provider for backend storage, (be it 1Password, mSecure, or so on), would be a keyfile that is manually transferred between devices, and never is put on the cloud backend. This way, if/when the cloud provider is hacked, the password file is not just protected by the passphrase, but by a keyfile that an attacker would have to compromise a physical device to get.

Who? A court issuing a judgement, or the IRS seeking unpaid taxes? There is no Department of Government that simply decides anything. It's always the result of some bureaucracy, with a defined process for dispute resolution.

No explanations, or none that you understood? I've had the IRS come looking for money a few times, and each time it included an enumerated list of what parts of my paperwork they disagreed with. In typical government form, there was no colloquial interpretation, but to an accountant and tax preparer, though, all of the necessary information was there.

How did you get notice that you owed the money, then? Have you checked that the suitable department has your address correct?

That's a mistake. Keep records of every time you talk to someone about the matter, and take notes on what they say.

Which guy? Record names, ID numbers, or any other identifier. Those are important to track down exactly who has said what, and on what authority. I've had some matters resolved just by pointing different bureaucrats at each other, and letting them work out the disagreement internally.

"Froze" and "stole" are not the same things. Either way, get a good lawyer.

...as can any lawsuit.

...I said to get a good lawyer.

The bottom line is that either your story doesn't add up, or you're rather incompetent with governmental matters. Find a suitable advocate for this matter (either a different lawyer for a judgement, or a tax specialist for an IRS dispute, etc.) and give them absolutely every piece of information you have. Record absolutely everything that transpires. Yes, it will cost you a significant amount of money now, because you've sat on this for three years, but I'd be surprised if it totaled more than $37,000.

The most important thing is to make sure that someone fighting on your side is an expert in the relevant process. If you work within the established process, the various governmental entities are actually very forgiving and understanding. You must realize that the actual humans involved don't really care about taking your money, finding guilt, or screwing you over in any other way. They're interested in following the process and closing disputes, so if you show that you're interested in doing things the right way, they'll often be happy to explain exactly what that is. You don't need to waste their time professing your innocence, or telling them how horribly wrong the Big Bad Government is for attacking you. Just find out what you need to do to resolve the dispute, have an expert on hand to verify the information and ask questions, then do whatever's appropriate.

If the US were to change the dollar like that, most folks wouldn't care. The vast majority of American money is held in banks, which would make the change automatically on their electronic balance.

The only thing affected by such a change would be large stockpiles of cash. For legitimate businesses, replacing the cash in circulation would be an annoyance, but not impossible. For most individuals, who would have less than a few thousand dollars in cash on hand, the change would mean just a quick trip to the nearest bank.

The biggest disruption would be to those who have significant stockpiles of cash, larger than what banks would normally exchange. For that, the process could be pretty similar to what happens today if you need to make a large cash withdrawal or foreign-currency exchange: the bank can accommodate it with advance notice. You call the bank, give them a name and amount, and they'll make sure they have the cash on hand to serve your needs. The key detail, then, is that the bank knows your name and the amount you're exchanging, providing a paper trail indicating the presence of large amounts of cash. That paper trail is a problem for the criminal and the paranoid, but there aren't enough of those to make for a successful uprising.