Ahh... the good ol' Slashdot rationalization - "Facebook is dead, really, it'll die any day now, seriously!". Which would be funny if it weren't so pathetic - since Slashdot has been predicting the imminent demise of FB since 2007.

The Reddit administration is interested in one thing, and one thing only right now: Milking the site for as much money as possible, as quickly as possible, and fuck the users.

How do you differentiate between that and a site that wants to remain open for it's users despite the actions of few?

That means Reddit as a whole is popular (and fairly large) but popularity != influence.

Especially when you consider that even the largest subreddit is but a fraction of that traffic - much of the traffic is spread across thousands of subreddits (many of them quite small, even though they're popular among their habitues). It's essentially a collection of independent websites (though bound by a common interface and portal) ranging from fairly small (in terms of the overall web) to infinitesimally tiny.

Looking at this list of subreddits that have gone dark is instructive. Relatively few break the 100k subscribers mark, most are under 10k. And unless Reddit is very unusual in it's counting, the number of subscribers is a significant multiple of the number of active users.

Reddit has unbelievable traffic and reach, so stuff that earns popularity there gets spread to virtually everywhere and everyone.

[Remainder of tinfoil hat rant snipped]

That's what the Reddit hivemind thinks... In reality, not so much. Reddit only makes the news when it's on fire, again.

I actually lost IQ points reading that mess...

I should have stopped at the third paragraph,

Charcoal, in this case, is not the briquettes you use on your grill, which often contain no actual charcoal, but is the carbon residue left behind by organic matter (like wood) once it has been charred (or pyrolyzed)

Um, who is this moron? Yes, charcoal briquettes contain actual charcoal. They most certainly do contain (among other things) "the carbon residue left behind [etc...]". The rest of the article, breathless clickbait written at the kindergarten level, just goes downhill from there.

Looking at his submission history, he has a record of submitting equally moronic content all from the same site. (And one comment, over a year ago.) Pure slashvertisement.

because it's still wildly popular in Japan. The US shards are, as the author notes, virtually complete ghost towns. I recently went back for a month, and other than banksitters in Luna or house collapses I'd literally go days without seeing another player.

If you want to talk spinoff technology from manned spaceflight, so far we have infrared ear thermometers, ventricular assist devices, artificial limb enhancements, "invisible" braces, scratch resistant lenses, memory foam, enriched baby food, cordless tools, freeze drying techniques, water purification, pollution remediation technologies, food safety tech, and quite a bit more just from NASA alone.

ROTFLMAO. I just love it when the cargo cultists quote NASA on how wonderful NASA is.

Damm few of those come from NASA, at best NASA used them and took credit for using them, and that's been spun into NASA creating them. Take freeze dried food for example - the process was first used commercially in 1938. The modern process was perfected just a few years later when it was used to preserve blood products during WWII. Or cordless tools, first available commercially in the 1950's. Etc... etc...

you can imagine that since Uber already has a fleet of vehicles driving around they could pay drivers to capture this imagery while delivering people and save a fair bit of money.

It doesn't make any sense (capturing the imagery requires specialized hardware), but you can imagine it.

One of the lessons that came out of this and the Zumwalt-class destroyer programs is that the military should stop trying to cram every feature into a program. While the proliferation of designs led to unwieldy logistics in the 60s, 70s, and 80s

It did a whole hell of lot more than just lead to unwieldy logistics.

It made managing training more costly and complex. If you have, say, a class of four ships with a unique sonar, you only need a couple of dozen new bodies a year max. But you still need a complete school suite with all the requisite simulators, instructors, and maintenance and support personnel. That raises costs considerably. When I was a 98/0 instructor to support 16 crews with 5 techs each, we maintained an office of 12 people (the number was set by the number of training specialties required, and one guy can know and do so much) just to run four classes a year of 6-8 students. And that was at the tail end of initial manning - when we still needed new or converted techs by the gross lot. Class numbers and sizes went down shortly after I left.

The same is true for advanced training, unless you're lucky enough that the schools are located on the same base as the vessels. While that was true when I was a 98/0 tech... When I was an 88/2 tech, we initially had no advanced training on the OAG MK2/1 because there was no trainer in Charleston - the nearest was at the basic trainer near Norfolk. The program was nearly a decade old before they could get funding to convert an 88/1 (MK2/0) trainer to 88/2 (MK2/1).

It vastly complicated manning for much the same reason... There were only about 200 88/2 techsat any given time, so all it took was a handful of guys unexpectedly getting out, or deciding to stay in, or becoming ineligible for sea duty, or losing their clearance or whatever to royally screw up the whole pipeline.

I actually got to see both ends of that bell curve.

After I graduated from 98/0 school here at Bangor, I ended up filling a warm body billet for a year (my expensive training going to waste) because 98/0 (a community of only sixty or so at the time) was running overmanned by about fifty percent. (My class of twelve alone would have overmanned the community for a year or two until enough boats reached the stage of construction where they needed bodies.) I ended up being converted to 88/2 and sent to Charleston.

After my sea tour, I converted back from 88/2 to 98/0 and was on shore duty when the Navy desperately tried to get me to convert back. Their numbers had been wrong two years running, and average crew size had dropped to 5.8 - and the minimum to run a normal watch rotation without doubling up was 6. They'd started short cycling guys, and sending them on back-to-backs... but you can only do that so long before morale goes to hell in a handbasket, and more guys get out and your problem just gets worse. Norfolk was empty of spare bodies, Charleston was empty of spare bodies, King's Bay was empty of spare bodies... Little ol' me sitting up here at Bangor was literally the last warm body available. (But I ended up being medically ineligible for sea duty anyhow, and stayed out here.)

It also compromises combat capabilities and planning... when I was in SUBLANT, they had 88/1 (C3) boats and 88/2 (C4B) boats, and the two missiles had different ranges, different numbers and sizes of warheads, and the missile capabilities were different. There wasn't always a spare boat of the right kind available, and you couldn't swap them one-for-one. It didn't matter which way you swapped, some capability was compromised either way.

And that's just the SSBN force and doesn't even begin to address logistics problems, or the other support problems, or the maintenance problems, or... well, you get the picture. Multiply that by SSN's, FF's, DD's, and cruisers of a dozen different types and the problems I didn't even touch on and you have a hellaciously complex and expensive mess.

The Navy shifted to having more common platforms starting with Ticonderoga's and Burke's for a lot of very good reasons.

The worst case for a warning are mere days when a NEO comes more or less directly from the sun.

If you're going to measure capability only against the rarest and worst case, you can safely be ignored as complete fool.

And as I corrected the nuke fanatic above

Looked thorough your postings, and I didn't find any 'correction', just ignorant handwaving bullshit that serves only to confirm the above impression that you are in fact a complete ignorant fool.

Since we're not working to develop that capability, pretty much anything else we do is irrelevant....

We don't need to 'work towards' a capability we already have. On a global scale, let alone locally (in the US), launchers are rolling off the assembly lines on a regular basis - and it's likely we'll have months (at worst) to years warning before an impact. (We're actually much better off in that respect than we were in 1989.)

Development of a payload needn't take that long either, especially with a Manhattan/Apollo Project style development program.

Figure the damage became catastrophic at max q, typical for first stage and interstage failures.

Wrong on all counts. The first signs of failure didn't occur until after max-q, and if you were sober when you saw the video it's very plain that it involved neither the first stage or the interstage.

SpaceX has been very forthcoming with their telemetry data and analysis

Huh? The most they've ever released is standard PR fluff/stuff - "we ran out of hydraulic fluid", "the valve failed", etc... No data, no analysis.

That sound you heard was my point zooming over your head.

I am going by what SpaceX themselves have estimated.

Estimates are not reality - even if you do have the experience to base your estimate on. Experience SpaceX lacks.

They plan to inspect, refuel and relaunch in a matter of days so those costs will be minimal.

Plans are not reality. See above about experience.

Remember the boosters are not going into space nor the stress of reentry.

You say that as if it's relevant. It's not. The structure is still highly stressed and the engines still run at full power. These things matter.

SpaceX has stated that in order to achieve the full economic benefit of the reusable technology, it is necessary that the reuse be both rapid and complete

That falls under the category of "no shit Sherlock". Anyone who has actually studied the issue knows this. That's why NASA was trying for a week turnaround back in the 1970's.

Saving 9 engines from a Falcon 9 is a considerable savings but saving all 27 engines from a Falcon Heavy launch would bring the cost per kg down to perhaps $100.

Slashdot is filled (at least theoretically) with smart people... so why do I have to keep explaining this?

It's virtually impossible to determine how much recovery will bring down the costs of launch because we don't know how much it will cost to refurbish the recovered vehicle. Certainly it will be cheaper than building a new one, but how much cheaper is impossible to predict... especially in the beginning with zero experience.

The case with the Shuttle is instructive... it took dozens of flights to go from removing and dismantling the SSME's after every flight to only removing them for inspection every third to fifth flight and only dismantling them for cause. (And they were on the second or third block of engines by the time they reached that point.)

Falcon has the additional problem of figuring out how to inspect and re-certify the tank.