Comment Re:inapt comparison (Score 1) 193
1. Reactor 1's cooling system likely failed due to the quake, not the failure of the backup diesels. This opinion is based on analysis of the remaining sensors, that indicated the reactor was having problems even while the battery-powered cooling was still running. The existing plumbing and wiring had been embrittled from 4 decades of operation in a quake zone and proximity to, well, a nuclear reactor.
No, reactor 1 failed first probably because an employee mistakenly shutted the isolation condenser system (a passive cooling system) http://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?p=3572578#post3572578
2. Design flaw and hardware failure: locating the backup diesel generators in a basement under the reactors, such that they were guaranteed to flood if water entered the area.
Reactor buildings are relatively waterproof, the failure of the diesel generator was due to the fact that they were located in the turbine buildings. For the more recent reactors 5 and 6, the diesel generators were located inside the reactor building and were not flooded.
3. Design flaw: locating the spent fuel pools directly above the reactors in the same buildings, such that if the reactor had a little problem (hydrogen explosion, or moderated prompt criticality), said fuel would get blown sky-high, which it did in the reactor 3 explosion.
No, the spent fuel pools are not located above the reactors, and I cannot remember any report of used fluel rods being blown in the air due to the hydrogen explosions.
4. Design flaw: no externally located terminals for "connect portable generators HERE", and no rationalization of Japan's two different electrical standards (it's a fucking nuclear power plant that will blow up if not cooled, so support both standards, guys).
Nothing to do with Japan having 50hz / 60hz zones. The problem was that all the electric panels were flooded (they should have installed them at a safer place).
5. Management failure: All reactors should have been flooded with seawater immediately after the quake, as soon as the situation on the ground at the site became clear. This might have averted the hydrogen explosion by keeping the reactors cool enough to not oxidize the zirconium fuel-rod cladding. Local personnel correctly identified the situation, remote management denied permission to flood the reactors with seawater (because that basically ends the reactor's productive life). Eventually a local guy did so anyways.
How do you inject seawater in reactors without working pumps ? The response to the accident was delayed because the roads were unpracticable due to the earthquake and the tsunami, even the power plant was a field of debris where it was nearly impossible to drive a vehicle.
