The Court concludes today that a criminal suspect waives his right to remain silent if, after sitting tacit and uncommunicative through nearly three hours of police interrogation, he utters a few one-word responses. The Court also concludes that a suspect who wishes to guard his right to remain silent against such a finding of “waiver” must, counterintuitively, speak—and must do so with sufficient precision to satisfy a clear-statement rule that construes ambiguity in favor of the police. Both propositions mark a substantial retreat from the protection against compelled self-incrimination that Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U. S. 436 (1966) , has long provided during custodial interrogation. The broad rules the Court announces today are also troubling because they are unnecessary to decide this case, which is governed by the deferential standard of review set forth in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 28 U. S. C. 2254(d). Because I believe Thompkins is entitled to relief under AEDPA on the ground that his statements were admitted at trial without the prosecution having carried its burden to show that he waived his right to remain silent; because longstanding principles of judicial restraint counsel leaving for another day the questions of law the Court reaches out to decide; and because the Court’s answers to those questions do not result from a faithful application of our prior decisions, I respectfully dissent.
[...]
Rarely do this Court’s precedents provide clearly established law so closely on point with the facts of a particular case. Together, Miranda and Butler establish that a court “must presume that a defendant did not waive his right[s]”; the prosecution bears a “heavy burden” in attempting to demonstrate waiver; the fact of a “lengthy interrogation” prior to obtaining statements is “strong evidence” against a finding of valid waiver; “mere silence” in response to questioning is “not enough”; and waiver may not be presumed “simply from the fact that a confession was in fact eventually obtained.” Miranda, supra, at 475–476; Butler, supra, at 372–373.3
The only reassuring part of Berghuis v. Thompkins is that Sotomayor wrote the dissent, and in no uncertain terms. That makes me feel slightly more charitable toward Obama (though, realistically, Sotomayor was nominated in May '09, when Obama had not yet fully discovered his "inner Yoo").
The same majority might very well be willing to perversely construe the Constitution to protect the privacy not of the citizens, but of the State, in upholding these interpretations of wiretap law.
Yowch! There were 105 comments when I started this post; now there are 733. For all of the apologists who have now responded to the parent, as Sotomayor writes in the dissent (which you should all read!), the reason this decision is important is that "[i]n the 16 years since Davis was decided, ample evidence has accrued that criminal suspects often use equivocal or colloquial language in attempting to invoke their right to silence." This decision may not affect you and me, who are fully aware of our constitutional rights (though a few of the responses cast that assumption in some doubt), but most criminal suspects are poor and poorly educated, have not had the benefit of a university education (or even a high school one), and certainly have not read widely on the current state of constitutional law (the last condition, unfortunately, seems to generally obtain among police officers as well). The full implications of the Fifth Amendment, as determined by the Supreme Court, are unknown to them.
As for Miranda itself, the reasoning behind it was that custodial police interrogation was inherently coercive (even when not blatantly coercive), and therefore usually inadmissible. Miranda provided a formula that the police to follow to magically de-coercify their interrogations (requiring suspects to explicitly waive Fifth Amendment protections). Miranda did not just require the warning itself, the warning was there to establish that suspects understood what rights they were waiving. It actually helped the police in some ways, because before the decision the admissibility of any confession could be challenged on the grounds that the interrogation was coercive, and many confessions were thrown out. The confession of a Mirandized suspect who has explicitly waived his rights cannot be thrown out; Miranda provided the kind of "bright line rule" that simplifies the application of the law.
To be sure, the three justices in full dissent with Miranda felt that it was drawing the line too far in the suspects' favor; ignorance of the Fifth Amendment serves the interests of the State well. Justice Harlan wrote, "[t]he aim, in short, is toward "voluntariness" in a utopian sense, or, to view it from a different angle, voluntariness with a vengeance." History, however, has arguably vindicated that "utopian" goal by fully incorporating it into the national culture without a concomitant collapse of the criminal justice system.
Another factor is the "self esteem movement" and its pernicious notion that "you can't love anyone else until you love yourself."
I don't know if the "self esteem movement" is effective or not (I would guess "not"), but what the fuck is she really advocating here? Self-hatred is okay? If you don't like yourself, you don't believe that other people should like you either, which is a formidable obstacle to love. Whether we go about creating it the right way or not, calling self-esteem "pernicious" seems...pernicious.
The author also absurdly idealizes the past, seriously advocating "playing outside" as a panacea. She should take pushing her books to the next level and give Dr. Laura Schlesinger a run for her money on the radio. Malevolent conservatism vs. malevolent liberalism. They could have their own malevolent channel, where anything goes (except facts).
She spends the last half of the article railing against Social Darwinism, which (after it was invented by Ronald Reagan!) apparently created the empathy epidemic. It is interesting that reliable polling data invariably indicates that the (40% more sociopathic) millennial generation is overwhelming more liberal (the only true measure of empathy, according to the author) than the Tea-Partying baby boomers, who enjoyed such empathetic childhoods, romping under the open sky. Either there is no empathy epidemic, empathy is not closely correlated with political leaning, or both (my bet). In any event, the author obviously doesn't really care.
To me technology is a privilege, not a right and abusing a privilege should be punished.
What the fuck. I think you are abusing your "privilege" to promote your retarded un-American (un-Enlightenment) opinions.
"Luke, I'm yer father, eh. Come over to the dark side, you hoser." -- Dave Thomas, "Strange Brew"