Comment Re:How does it secure against spoofing? (Score 2) 121
What keeps me (or my malware, respectively) from opening a google page in the background (i.e. not visible to the user by not rendering it but making Chrome consider it "open") and fool the dongle into recognizing it and the user into pressing the a-ok button?
For one thing, if the tab with the malware-loaded page isn't on top, Chrome won't allow it to talk to the dongle. If there is some way to render a page that is not visible to the user but which Chrome considers sufficiently "open", that's a Chrome bug which should be fixed.
A machine that is compromised is no longer your machine. If you want two factor, use two channels. There is no way to secure a single channel with two factors sensibly.
You should have stopped after the first sentence, because two channels doesn't help. If the machine you're using is compromised, it's no longer your machine, period. This is true regardless of the authentication method being used. That said, some authentication methods are susceptible to replay attacks... if I can compromise your machine and grab your credentials then I can log in as you from my machine. Security keys make that sort of attack very difficult, much harder than, for example, an out-of-band one-time-password. In that case, I just have to make sure I use the one-time password before you do, grabbing and submitting it before you click "Go". With a cryptographic challenge response protocol performed by a security key that's more difficult, because a secure channel is established between the authentication server (at Google) and the security key. It's still not impossible, but it's much harder.