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Comment Re:Since these people still don't get it.... (Score 2) 79

Don't be naive... security is a deep and subtle problem, full of nasty surprises. There is no magic bullet solution... your "safe programming language" has thousands of bugs in its standard API and run-time

I think you should update your knowledge of this field. Then you should also realize that over 90% of security vulnerabilities in programs written in unsafe languages wouldn't have occurred with safe languages. And of the vulnerabilities among safe languages, 90% of those wouldn't have occurred if they were designed to be capability secure (which is just another safety property most languages ignore).

it won't prevent devs from concatenating SQL with user input

You can't do this in, say Haskell, unless you write your own SQL interface library that builds solely on strings.

misusing threading primitives

You can't do this in concurrent safe languages, like Concurrent ML, Rust and Haskell.

bungling up an authentication protocol

Session types, which Haskell can verify too. Of course, all of these safety properties are encodable in even more powerful systems, like Agda or Coq.

you must at minimum use an approach where (1) security is a primary design concern thru the entire product lifecycle, (2) security solutions are deployed in a structured/layered approach using (3) actual expertise, and (4) security is an ongoing program with both proactive and reactive elements.

So basically, safety properties have importance on par with domain requirements, and must be subject to the same rigour that domain features get, ie. testing, verification, etc. So basically, the safer the language, in the sense that the more properties can be assured at compile-time, the more features and safety properties you can verify, and the fewer security vulnerabilities.

Comment Re:Since these people still don't get it.... (Score 2) 79

Last I checked, programming languages are designed and implemented by human beings. Even if a programming language can decrease your attack surface, there could still be an exploit associated with the interpreter/compiler or a mistake in implementation of the language.

That's what theorem provers are for. The seL4 microkernel was just formally verified as correct, we have verified C compilers, we have C verification tools (Frama-C for instance), and we have higher level, safer languages even at the systems level (Ada and Spark-Ada). This isn't an open theoretical CS question anymore, these technologies can and have been used very successfully to produce formally verified software, but the inertia behind outdated technologies and the hubris of developers who think they know better will continue to result in exploitable software.

The idea that there's a non-zero probability that your compiler, the theorem prover used to certify it, and the theorem prover used to certify that theorem prover, may all have a bug that coincidentally permit an exploit is about as meaningful as the argument that hypothetically, QM implies there's a non-zero probability that you could spontaneously be transported to the surface of the sun.

Comment Re:The $50,000 question... more energy out than in (Score 1) 315

Costs are a big issue, but the problem with fusion is getting more energy than is put in... and keeping that reaction sustained indefinitely.

I think the real problem is how much we've fixated on only one or two fusion reactor designs for decades. Plasmas are hard to control, hence why it's taking so long to materialize real fusion power. They've pursued the Tokamak too long I think, but they keep going after it because they're already so heavily invested. Time for some fresh thinking.

Comment Re:Backward-thinking by the DMV (Score 1) 506

No need to guess, the tests are well documented. Driverless cars have achieved 700,000 miles, incident-free.

As for frozen sensors, freezing is no more a problem for sensors than it is for your eyes. A heating element will keep any sensor free of ice and snow, just like a car's internal heat keeps your eyes from freezing. It's merely a matter of engineering.

Comment Re:Backward-thinking by the DMV (Score 1) 506

Autonomous cars need to prove that they're capable of being safer than operator-driven cars. Right now they haven't done so, and until there's data there will be a need for autonomous cars to be manually operatable.

Sure they have. Driverless cars have driven thousands of miles without making a single mistake. That error rate is already better than virtually any human could achieve.

Comment Re:Ellsberg got a fair trial (Score 1) 519

Snowden made a decision to break the law because he believed his cause was good which justified breaking the law. What if the NSA used the same argument? What if they believe their cause is just as good and justified and more important then adhering to any laws?

Who is ultimately right is for the courts to decide. But the government will try its damndest to prevent the courts from ever seeing this kind of case, if they can help it.

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