Definitely start small, but make sure you measure the response time and load from the beginning, as close to the user as possible.
The load will tell you how many users you're gaining, albeit in computer terms, and the response time will tell you if the system is starting to annoy people by slowing down. If you plot RT against load, you'll get the curve you need for capacity planning when and if the program becomes popular. report
[In part from a reply to http://www.slaw.ca/2013/04/04/access-to-server-data-for-foreign-criminal-investigative-purposes/ at Slaw]
The U.S. requests under our Mutual Law Assistance Treaties for private information re Megaupload parallels the CISPA proposals, and both strike me as wrong-headed (;-)) It is arguably valid for such a process to be followed in cases of copyright infringement, and can be critiqued on the basis of whether it is necessary and sufficient.
However, it suggest that at least the U.S. government is trying to deal with a minor crime, copyright infringement, because they don't know how to deal with major ongoing ones, commercial espionage.
Real "computer crime"is centred around breaking in to people's machines to steal data or crash them to deny the data to its owners. This is done via viruses, root-kits and the like, communicating across the internet to "bot-nets", collections of machines used as accomplices and cut-outs. These in turn are run by "bot master" machines in the hands of the criminals.
To investigate a key-logger (snooping) virus running on the machine of your chief counsel, you need to trace the connections across the internet from the infected machine to the "bot" and thence to the master. This requires cooperation of the police in the jurisdictions where the machines are and the ISPs they are connected to, to trace the connections between machines. To the best of my knowledge, that is barely in discussion at ICANN, and is nowhere part of the law or practice.
Only once that is done does one need to identify persons, and only one person, the criminal operating the master, and seize the machine for evidence, possibly in a foreign country.
All the other human beings in the story are victims, whom we do not need to identify, but merely transmit a warning to via their ISP. Once we have seized the master machine, we know the IP addresses (and ISPs) of the people who are being attacked, and the IP addresses of the people whose machines have been taken over by viruses to become the bot-net. Without breaching confidentiality, an ISP can forward a message that they are infected by a criminal's virus, and in extreme cases require the machine to be cleaned of infectious before being allowed to connect to the ISPs other customers.
I'm just a bit horrified at our American cousins: right now, people are stealing corporate information, collecting credit-card numbers and sabotaging centrifuges using techniques that neither the police, legislators nor courts are paying any attention to. Instead they are prosecuting a drop-box operator for a misdemeanor.
They remind me of the story of the drunk looking for his car-keys under the street-light, instead of in the dark garage where he dropped them.
The proponents want you to think that: in fact, the non-"anal probe"* companies will object to this variant. Time for another "paint it black" day!
* Thanks to wierd_w for the term!
Canada now requires a wiretap warrant to ready stored texts on pohone-company servers, which is harder to get than a regular one. See http://www.cbc.ca/news/technology/story/2013/03/27/technology-telus-text-messages-scc-decision.html [www.cbc.ca]
The Ontario appeal court separately ruled that one needs to put a password/passcode on your phone to demonstrate that you have and expect privacy in the data it contains. See http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/ottawa/story/2013/02/21/ottawa-cell-phone-users-beware.html [www.cbc.ca]
Logically, a police force anywhere should need a wiretap warrant to read your (electronic) mail, and you have a duty to password-protect your email (:-)) At the moment this hasn't been tested in court, even in Canada. --dave
Canada now requires a wiretap warrant, which is harder to get than a regular one. See http://www.cbc.ca/news/technology/story/2013/03/27/technology-telus-text-messages-scc-decision.html
In a separate decision, the Ontario appeal court ruled that one needs to put a password/passcode on your phone to demonstrate that you have and expect privacy in the data it contains. See http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/ottawa/story/2013/02/21/ottawa-cell-phone-users-beware.html
The world of end-user programming is larger that one would think on first glance, although in the case of spreadsheets it looks like functional-languages-with-globals (;-))
I've seen occasional graphic languages (POLs) that could be used in more general ways than spreadsheets: one needs to find one that solves an interesting problem everyone faces.
In addition, their actions have been found to be a fraud upon the courts in some cases.
Applying to the courts for an order to identify people on the grounds you will sue them, and then extorting payments instead, makes the initial application fraudulent.
In the U.S. and the U.K., this has led to legal or law-society actions against the fraudulent plaintiffs. In Canada, as we just passed a law to limit such suits, it may lead to stronger measures.
Declaring “the guilty must pay,” Anonymous has released 4.6 gigabytes of data detailing the personal information of Wall Street CEOs and other high level Wall Street executives.
Links to the data began appearing via Twitter on March 2. AnonymousIRC, a popular Twitter account associated with the international hacktivist collective known as Anonymous, tweeted the following:4.6GB
.xml files on CEOs and Directors [Compressed to 520mb zip] http://bit.ly/15VxSkA #Anonymous #OWS #OpWallStreet #BofA #Bloomberg
Between Too Big To Fail banksters and online vigilantes, we are not going to have any law in this country."
"Kill the Wabbit, Kill the Wabbit, Kill the Wabbit!" -- Looney Tunes, "What's Opera Doc?" (1957, Chuck Jones)