Ok, so you're just talking about how the brain is not just a turing machine.
More precisely, I'm talking about how the brain is not just a machine.
Physicalism means everything that is exists within the realms of physics and let's forget about magic and souls and higher beings.
Mechanism means that everything can be explained with deterministic cause-and-effect chains, and things like randomness and free will are just an appearance of complexity.
I don't doubt physicalism, to the best of our current knowledge it holds true. Mechanism, on the other hand, has been on its deathbed ever since Einstein made his famous quote about the dice.
The limit of a map as accuracy approaches unity is an exact copy of the territory,
There is still a difference you can't get away with: The map will be in a different place. The map, even if it is a 1:1 copy, never is the territory.
Maybe I should've said that no matter how detailled and precise it describes the dishes, you shouldn't eat the menu.
Likewise, whatever function it is that constitutes "feeling", if we built something that perfectly carried out that function, or a function sufficiently similar to it, then it's more accurate to say that we built a thing that feels (perhaps not exactly like a human feels, but feeling nonetheless), than merely a thing that simulates feeling.
You still assume that emotions are a function. I claim it isn't. The details are still poorly understood, but emotions seem to be parts of a bigger network encompassing adaptive states and learnt reactions, processing shortcuts and acquired traits. What all that means is that it is unlikely that you will be able to isolate an emotion from everything else going on in the brain. Basically, you can't create true emotions without creating an entire brain-body replicate with consciousness, memory, education etc. etc. etc.
At which point you're building a human being, not a robot.
Last I checked, the so-called "hard problem" of "phenomenal consciousness", to which the question of emergence applies, was still an open issue, with competing answers to emergentism ranging from total skepticism (there really is no such thing, it's a confused idea) to refinements of panpsychism (such as panexperientialism, panprotopsychism, and panprotoexperientialism); and the easier problem of "access consciousness" was considered a mere triviality now, easily understood in mechanistic terms.
That's a mouthful and I admit I had to look up a term or two. I'm not really sure how any of this relates to the original point, though. If consciousness can be constructed by any means, I hold it to be reasonable to assume that we can engineer it as well, and not just duplicate humans. If we can engineer it, there is no reason to include the bugs of the naturally evolved system. Meaning the social rules we have created in order to not trigger them unnecessarily won't apply to engineered conscious beings.