For a long time, governments of modern democracies have been rather afraid of public opinion and the press, and have avoided doing things that would result in protests and opposition.

Then at some point they realized they could bribe the press, and that the public's opinion doesn't really matter, nor does it amount to much or lead to much violence in a society of over-fed TV addicts. Today's protesters are all bark and no bite, and the powers-that-be know it full well. So they do whatever the fuck they want without even trying to be discreet about it.

That's where we're at right now. Welcome to a new form of tyranny, in which dictators are "democrats" who resort on soothing words and the complicity of mass-media to pussify the populace and keep it in check. Violence and outright dictatorship is so yesteryear...

The same things a national security letter could, and almost certainly did, demand from Groklaw.

(A) All emails
(B) All account information for every account
(C) IP-addresses and any other data on hand that can be used to track ever Slashdot user
(D) to install a surveillance box on the network to scan and log every packet of everyone who views Slashdot (regardless of whether they post)

The would probably also demand (E) to copy the entire database of all posts by every user and all other publicly available information. Category E is stuff anyone can get merely by scanning the site over the internet, but doubtless they'd take it because they can and because it saves them a lot of work trying to crawl the entire website themselves.

And based on what happened with TOR recently, and based on the available information on the Lavabit situation, it seems very possible the government has moved beyond "passive listening" and has moved into the realm of forcing active code onto websites to attack/subvert visitors' machines. As I understand it, Lavabit was set up in such a way that the Lavabit servers literally didn't have access to the information the government would need to access the mails... that the only way the government could obtain useful information would be to hijack the Lavasoft servers and use them to actively extract the required information from visitors.

Note that the government has already beenhacking into cellphones and car ONSTAR type systems to turn on the microphones an use them as "roving wiretaps". Those aren't even National Security Letter level stuff, those are court cases of regular law enforcement doing it.

So yeah, no big shocker if they're demanding websites host attack code to trace people who's true IP address is hidden behind TOR or a proxy or otherwise hard to trace.

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The title of her farewell message is "Forced Exposure", the very first sentence is about Lavabit, and her discussion of privacy centers around government surveillance. She includes a link where "You'll find all the laws in the US related to privacy and surveillance there". And continues with "Not that anyone seems to follow any laws that get in their way these days. Or if they find they need a law to make conduct lawful, they just write a new law or reinterpret an old one and keep on going".

This is clearly isn't about creepy stalkers or corporate private investigators. This is Force-Of-Government "Forced Exposure".

She wouldn't abruptly shut down the site without explanation. The post she did leave is clearly an attempt at explanation, with a glaring hole where the actual reason would be. A hole with the exact size and shape of a government gag painfully wedged in her mouth.

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Nope. But they can shut down abruptly, like Groklaw and Lavabit did. And they can put up a shutdown notice like Groklaw did, mentioning Lavabit like Groklaw did, and "inexplicably" lock out comments like Groklaw did. Hell, they could put up a page with nothing but a link to the Groklaw message.

I bet a LOT of people would be freaked and outraged by such an event.

I'm kinda hoping it turns into a whole chain of sites abruptly shutting down like Lavabit did. It might stir up a large part of the population if a lot of websites started shutting down in that manner. Hell, imagine the fallout if something like Wikipedia were to suddenly shut down with no explanation beyond a message like the one currently sitting on Groklaw. A message decrying government intrusion and total loss of privacy, and directly mentioning Lavabit. Hundreds of reporters asking why.... and the only answer fro the Wikimedia foundation is "Under advice of our lawyers we are unable to answer that question", and just directing the reporters back to the shutdown message.

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Yeah, no one starting to fight is about as far from "stopping" fighting as you can get.

Well, there's Snowden, Lavabit, and PJ. But 99.997% of us are snacking on Doritos and watching the news like it's a sports channel.

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The stunning abruptness of the shutdown and the discussion of Lavabit screams at me that she was hit with an NSA letter. There's no way PJ would yank the plug without warning like that on some whim. Even comments were disabled. If PJ simply wanted to retire the project she would have wound things down gracefully. She would have encouraged the community to stay active. She would have given the community time to look for alternatives. She would have encouraged someone else to take up the job running a successor site.

I saw nothing in her post that I would call "false information". If she got an NSA letter and didn't mention it, that does not make any of what she wrote untrue. If PJ got an NSA letter with a legal gag order, she would obey it to the letter. But that can't stop her from shutting down the site to refuse to participate, and she knows the community is smart enough to see how utterly out of character such an abrupt shutdown is.

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I downloaded it and tried the password 12345.
The file didn't open, but oddly my luggage did.

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Oops, I meant to include the following link in my other post:
Here's the latest TPM Main Specification Level 2 Version 1.2 from the Trusted Computing Group

I dunno if you actually want to dig though that, it's pretty dense techno-jargon specifications for the microchip. I just wanted to include it as a official source for the specification-quotes in my post, and to generally back up my other claims and explanations.

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Oh sorry, maybe I should have answered that sooner :)
Get yourself a sophisticated science laboratory and crack / acid-etch the chip open. Then use microscopic probes to extract the key directly out of the silicon circuitry.

Oh, and by the way the chips are explicitly designed to be attack resistant, meaning you have to be really careful the keys don't get damaged/wiped during the process.

Oh, and if you *do* manage to get your keys, you've got to be really careful that no one ever detects you doing anything the Trust system prohibits, like not obeying DRM. The PubEK is the public "name" for your PrivEK, and they can track you by it. They specified a revocation system they can use to effectively kill that key. You then need to go out and buy a new chip (perhaps even buy an entire new computer with a new key and new set of certificates), and crack that that chip open to get a new working key. And of course they'll revoke that key too if/when they detect your computer isn't securely locked down.

The entire point of the Trust system is for you to be able to "trust" that my computer will do what it says it will do, and only what it says it will do, and that my computer is secure against me meddling in that. And vice-versa, that I can trust that your computer is secure against you, and that it will do what I want it to do. For example you could agree to share personal information with some company. Under the Trust system you know that they don't know the Master Key to their own computer, so if their computer says that it will keep your personal information encrypted, then you can Trust that. If their computer says they will only use your personal information in an anonymous way to generate overall statistical data of all their customers, then you can Trust that their computer will enforce that. In theory.

Of course things will virtually always go in the exact opposite direction. A music service will sell you music files, and they will use the Trust system to ensure your computer strictly enforces that DRM against you. You don't have you master key, so when your computer says it will never allow you to read or copy the file (except through the approved DRM-enforcing-music-player), then they can Trust that your computer will never allow you to read or copy your music files. Some company can "rent" software to you, and they can Trust that your computer will never permit you to run that software, except during the paid rental time-span (and the computer would use a secure online date verification to enforce it). And my favorite example, websites using the Trust system to ensure you're not running any ad-blockers and that you can't right-click-save images or other content from the webpage.

The entire point of the Trust system falls apart if owners know or truly control their own computer's master keys. I can no longer Trust your computer, and you could no longer Trust my computer. That's why they set up an elaborate key-tracking and key-revocation revocation system. If you manage any sort of hardware hack to obtain control over your computer they can kill that key and establish your computer is no longer Trusted.

You could simply "make up" a completely random key and there are some limited things you can do with it, but in general it isn't going to work. It's not a "valid" or "real" key. It will fail in critical chip operations such as Remote Attestation.

The best comparison is like buying a cellphone without a SIM card. Sure, you can make up your own phone number, and you can program phone numbers into the speed-dial memory and stuff, but in general a cell phone is designed for calling other cell phones, and none of the main phone functions work without a genuine SIM card and genuine phone number for that phone.

The chip comes with a manufacturer's certificate which certifies that the specific PrivEK in the chip actually is a PrivEK. The certificate is like the SIM card, and the genuine PrivEK is like a genuine phone number assigned to that SIM card. The certificate turns that pre-installed key into a genuine and fully functional PrivEK, like a SIM card makes a phone-number into a genuine working number.

Here's the latest TPM Main Specification Level 2 Version 1.2 from the Trusted Computing Group.

5. Endorsement Key Creation
Start of informative comment
The TPM contains a 2048-bit RSA key pair called the endorsement key (EK). The public
portion of the key is the PUBEK and the private portion the PRIVEK. Due to the nature of
this key pair, both the PUBEK and the PRIVEK have privacy and security concerns.
The TPM has the EK generated before the end customer receives the platform.

Later it says:

The PRIVEK SHALL exist only in a TPM-shielded location.
2.
Access to the PRIVEK and PUBEK MUST only be via TPM protected capabilities

and later:

5.1
Controlling Access to PRIVEK
Start of informative comment
Exposure of the PRIVEK is a security concern.
The TPM must ensure that the PRIVEK is not exposed outside of the TPM
End of informative comment
1.
The PRIVEK MUST never be out of the control of a TPM shielded location

So a real (working) PrivEK comes pre-installed in the chip, and the chip is forbidden to give it to you. It is forbidden to exist anywhere outside the chip, so obviously you can't obtain it from anywhere else. You have to crack into the microchip to extract ir.

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I'll be quoting from this, the latest version from the Trusted Computing Group: TPM Main Specification Level 2 Version 1.2, Revision 116 Part 2 - Structures of the TPM

I'll paste quotes here in italics, key points in bold, and non-italics comments from myself in between.

An Endorsement Key (EK) has two parts, the public part and the private part. The private part the part in control, the public part allows anyone to verify signatures. The PrivEK is the highest level master key of a TPM. It's primary function is to sign messages sent out of the TPM to other people over the internet. PrivEKs are forbidden to ever exist outside a TPM. Anyone receiving a proper PrivEK -signed-message therefore knows that the message could only have been generated inside a TPM, secure under the controls and limitations of the TPM, and secure against tampering by anyone (including the owner).

Note that the PrivEK gets signed by a manufacturer key, securely identifying it as a genuine PrivEK securely locked inside a TPM. The manufacturer key is itself signed by the Trusted Computing Group's master key, authenticating the manufacturer key as a valid key of belonging to a valid and compliant manufacturer. If the Trusted Computing Group ever revokes a manufacturer's key then all TPMs made by that manufacturer are lo longer Trusted... for practical purposes those chips can be considered "dead". If some manufacturer's chips are found to be insecure the Trusted Computing Group can "close the security hole" by effectively killing all of those chips in one shot. And this is exactly how the Trusted Computing Group prohibits any manufacturer from making a non-compliant chip that allowed the owner to obtain control of his system.

5. Endorsement Key Creation
Start of informative comment
The TPM contains a 2048-bit RSA key pair called the endorsement key (EK). The public
portion of the key is the PUBEK and the private portion the PRIVEK. Due to the nature of
this key pair, both the PUBEK and the PRIVEK have privacy and security concerns.
The TPM has the EK generated before the end customer receives the platform. The Trusted
Platform Module Entity (TPME) that causes EK generation is also the entity that will create
and sign the EK credential attesting to the validity of the TPM and the EK. The TPME is
typically the TPM manufacturer.

So the chip's top key, the PrivEK, is inside the chip before the customer buys the computer or other device. This is generally done by the manufacturer.
You can skip/skim over this next section, I'm just including it to preserve continuity in copy/pasting from the source document.

The TPM can generate the EK internally using the TPM_CreateEndorsementKey or by using
an outside key generator. The EK needs to indicate the genealogy of the EK generation.
Subsequent attempts to either generate an EK or insert an EK must fail.
If the data structure TPM_ENDORSEMENT_CREDENTIAL is stored on a platform after an
Owner has taken ownership of that platform, it SHALL exist only in storage to which access
is controlled and is available to authorized entities.
End of
informative comment
1.
The EK MUST be a 2048-bit RSA key
a.
The public portion of the key is the PUBEK
b.
The private portion of the key is the PRIVEK

Here's where we start getting to the critical point you wanted, whether the owner is allowed to get his key:

c.
The PRIVEK SHALL exist only in a TPM-shielded location.
2.
Access to the PRIVEK and PUBEK MUST only be via TPM protected capabilities
a.
The protected capabilities MUST require TPM Owner authentication or operator
physical presence
3.
The generation of the EK may use a process external to the TPM and
TPM_CreateEndorsementKeyPair
a.
The external generation MUST result in an EK that has the same properties as an
internally generated EK
b.
The external generation process MUST protect the EK from exposure during the
generation and insertion of the EK
c.
After insertion of the EK the TPM state MUST be the same as the result of the
TPM_CreateEndorsementKeyPair execution
d.
The process MUST guarantee correct generation, cryptographic strength,
uniqueness, privacy, and installation into a genuine TPM, of the EK
e.
The entity that signs the EK credential MUST be satisfied that the generation process
properly generated the EK and inserted it into the TPM
f.
The process MUST be defined in the target of evaluation (TOE) of the security target
in use to evaluate the TPM

5.1
Controlling Access to PRIVEK
Start of informative comment
Exposure of the PRIVEK is a security concern.
The TPM must ensure that the PRIVEK is not exposed outside of the TPM
End of informative comment
1.
The PRIVEK MUST never be out of the control of a TPM shielded location

The PrivEK may never be exposed outside the TPM. YOU may never see your PrivEK. Also "Access to the PRIVEK and PUBEK MUST only be via TPM protected capabilities", which means that YOU may never make use of the PrivEK, except by the restricted "protected capabilities" allowed by the TPM. "Protected capabilities" that basically allow the chip to tell other people that the chip and the computer are secure against you. They don't trust you, so they want to know that they can Trust your computer, and trust that it's secure against you. They can Trust that your computer will only do what they want it to do.

You might have noticed the part about "The protected capabilities MUST require TPM Owner authentication or operator physical presence". That's for two reasons, privacy and "opt-in". The Trust system represents an unbelievable level of privacy threats, so they bolted on some aspects that kinda-sorta-sometimes help reduce the privacy threat. The the PubEK is a unique identifier that can be used to perfectly track you and your computer. It represents the biggest privacy threat. So direct use of this key is limited to the most restricted situations, and only used with "Owner authentication or operator physical presence", so software can't secretly grab the PublicEK to identify you. Also this direct part of the system is only used when you first "opt-in" to the surveillance-and-control system. You sign up with a Privacy Certificate Authority, you approve the activation of these top level functions, and the Privacy Certificate Authority uses it to scan what operating system and software you're running, ensuring that you haven't "tampered" with any of the software on your system and that it's all "secure" (in a DRM-sense of "secure"). Then the Privacy Certificate Authority gives your computer a supposedly Anonymous Trusted Identity, and they ensure that the Trust Chip will securely prohibit you from using that Trusted Identity if you've altered any of the software on your computer. And the chip can associate encrypted files on your harddrive with that Trusted Identity. The chip prohibits you from reading or modifying the contents of those files if you ever modify any of the software on your computer. These are effectively DRM files, they can only be accessed using the exact unaltered secure operating system, and only using the exact unmodified (DRM-enforcing) software approved to access those files.

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My favorite was this geeky one for a can of Uranium Ore:
"I purchased this product 4.47 Billion Years ago and when I opened it today, it was half empty."

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Schiavo was considered an atypically unambiguous case medically (with massive amounts of brain that just weren't present anymore, much less electrically active or not)

You mean to say that Terri Schiavo was kind of alive-o?

I clicked on this story just to find this.

Sure you can:
Dick Cheney was visiting the city.

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That's all swell, and I'll be more than happy to jump on board when they offer a system that does that without being designed to secure the computer against the owner in the process. There are lots of ways to do that, but the simplest example is that I'd be satisfied if they allowed the owners to get a printed copy of their chip-master-keys, the Private Endorsement Key and Storage Root Key. That would preserved 100% of the functionality you just listed, while ensuring owners had the final say to fix/overdrive any threat of the computer being secured against the owner. Simply drop the printed keys in a safety deposit box at your local bank vault.

There have been a number of other proposals to fix the problem, such as the EFF's OwnerOverride system, but the Trusted Computing Group has categorically REFUSED to address any of the anti-owner aspects of the system. Enforcing the anti-owner design aspects are their first priority.

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