Comment Re:Replacing CMD (Score 4, Interesting) 129
Some of them, like the encrypting ransomware requires no special privileges at all, but simply access to user files, and to network files that the user has read/write access to.
Those are special privileges. I don't think you truly appreciate the meaning of POLA. When you run a program with a POLA shell, it literally has access to nothing except the memory in its own address space and any parameters it's passed via the command line. Here's a simple example of copying a file in a traditional Unix shell:
$ cp foo.txt foo.bak
To implement the desired copy functionality, the cp command must have access to the entire local environment, including the entire file system since it can lookup an arbitrary path. This is an absurd amount of authority for a program that merely copies bytes from a source to a sink. Now here's a POLA version of the same command:
$ cp < foo.txt > foo.bak
Notice that the only permissions cp needs are explicitly specified in the command. They are then opened by the trusted shell and passed in as file descriptors, a read-only one and a write-only one, to the untrusted program. The explicit permission grants are obvious, and POLA shells generalize this type of pattern to compartmentalize all programs.
For whatever reason, Outlook allowed it to be executed, and the user clicked the dialog that might have prevented it, and then the script went to town encrypting files on the user's own folders and the share.
A perfect failure of POLA. In a proper least authority environment, it would have been perfectly safe to run that program because it would have had to raise a request to the environment for a set of read/write file descriptors and your user would have been rightly suspicious of any program requesting access to so many files.