In addition to all the valid arguments against this fallacy that have been made here, it is perhaps worth noting that most of the clues you are positing are equally valid whether or not you have an intercepted message. The only constraints that having a message puts on your set of clues is the fact that some message was sent, the maximum length of that message, and some constraints on the time and location of its creation. You cannot even know whether the message is pertinent to your clues. Guessing the content of a message from these clues is not decrypting it, even if, by chance, you get the exact wording right, and if you are doing this sort of guessing, the specifics of the message's encryption are irrelevant.

Reusing a key or generating a key from less than perfectly random keys are both key-protection issues, as they both provide avenues by which an attacker may recover the key, and in both cases, these attacks depend on properties of the key, not the message.

This is quite ironic, considering your sig:

This is not a useful analogy of the one-time-pad issue, because in that case, the distinction is not predicated on an ad-hoc definition.

The essence of the no-true-Scotsman fallacy is its arbitrary and entirely self-referential circularity: the definition of trueness implicitly adopted by the fallacy's maker is exactly that which (in his mind) makes his argument true - nothing more, nothing less. In particular, it is not derived from any consideration beyond the fallacious argument, and it is not a useful definition in any wider context.

You claim that it is a no-true-Scotsman fallacy to say that an encryption key is not a one-time pad if it is used more than once.

Firstly, it is important to note that this is a narrow claim about semantics: what, exactly, can the the phrase 'one-time pad' be used to denote? It is not a claim about encryption (even though it is made in the context of encryption) because the facts of encryption do not depend on whether this claim is correct.

For your claim to be correct, the assertion 'an encryption key that has been reused is not a one-time pad' must be ad-hoc, introduced solely for the purpose of making an argument look valid, but it is the opposite of that. As you yourself point out, non-reuse is essential to the purpose for what one-time pads are created and used, so the assertion is predicated on a very meaningful distinction. Therefore, it is not a no-true-Scotsman fallacy.

You may think you are still right on the usage issue. Rather than take a position on it, the rest of us can ignore it, because we can make ourselves perfectly clear to one another by considering the context in which the phrase is used. In particular, your original claim that the citation (about the security of one-time-pad-encrypted messages) was incomplete is still wrong, as it very adequately covered the ways in which a key intended to be a one-time pad can be misused.
 

Strictly speaking, Venona was the project to decrypt the intercepted messages, started once it was realized that the encryption keys were being reused. Nevertheless, MrNaz is adopting troll-like behavior in his snarky and cryptic post, and his post here, unlike yours, contributes nothing to the discussion.

But the possibility of improper use is considered in the citation that you questioned, through its very explicit list of conditions that must be met for the encryption to be unbreakable. You are being pedantic in an attempt to cover a mistake you made, but we can all see that the citation was satisfactory (it contained sufficient information for its purpose), and therefore that you were mistaken (or shall we say pointlessly pedantic, if we are being pedantic?) to say the citation was incomplete.

While watching "The Diving Bell and the Butterfly", it occurred to me that knowing morse code would give you the best chance of communicating from this frightening state.

There's nothing wrong with your view, and it is one that the younger me would have endorsed, but it turns out that the range of music I like keeps on growing, without any effort on my part, and without making myself suffer through music that I am not enjoying. My collection of recorded music goes largely unplayed these days, as I often find it more satisfying to listen to something I have never heard before.

Covering it in the EULA does not necessarily make it either reasonable or unremarkable.

The one example in the article is as follows:

This is claimed to be evidence for Flynn's argument that we have shifted to more abstract thinking. A simpler explanation would be that more people today have been taught that dogs and rabbits are both mammals, and are simply recalling that fact, which doesn't call for abstract thinking.

I do not know if this is a poor example for making Flynn's case, or an indication of its weakness.

The article tells us nothing about whether the change can be attributed to the slimming of a fat tail on the low side of the distribution in test-scoring ability. My understanding is that the renormalization of scores is done under the assumption that the underlying distribution is Gaussian-normal, an assumption that seems to be at least somewhat controversial. Could this practice be hiding evidence that could help explain the effect?

Another novel in which analytical engines play a part.

While I agree with the people who say that it is not data compression, it is also worth noting that the question is beside the point - you may as well say 'it is communication' as if the fact that something of that nature has been done before renders it irrelevant. The point is that it is a clever, useful and significant extension to the state of the art.

I think they are simply saying that the count is not statistically significant, as it is at about the background level of the clean room they are working in, and three of the four types identified match contaminants on the equipment.

This case shows that in the context of security, that is a distinction without a difference.