Damn right they should. The CPS has a long section on the use of test hardware.
The problem is that all the original team that built VeriSign have been gone for years. A lot of us left before the sale of the PKI business to Symantec. The PKI/DNS merger was not a happy or successful partnership. The original point of the merger was to deploy DNSSEC. that effort was then sabotaged by folk in IETF and ICANN which has delayed the project by at least 10 and possibly 20 years. ATLAS was originally designed to support DNSSEC.
Unfortunately, in PKI terms what VeriSign was to IBM, Symantec is to Lenovo.
They apparently remember the ceremonies we designed but not the purpose. So they are going through the motions but not the substance.
One of the main criticisms I have heard is that we built the system too well. From 1995 up to 2010 it worked almost without any issues. So people decided that they didn't need things like proper revocation infrastructure. The only recent issue the 1995 design could not have coped with was DigiNotar which was a complete CA breach.
There are some developments on the horizon in the PKI world that will help add controls to mitigate some of the issues arising since. But those depend on cryptographic techniques that won't be practical for mass adoption till we get our next generation ECC crypto fully specified.