Memroid writes: From the 2011 paper titled Comprehensive Experimental Analyses of Automotive Attack Surfaces, "[...] we can compromise the car’s radio and upload custom firmware via a doctored CD, we can compromise the technicians’ PassThru devices and thereby compromise any car subsequently connected to the PassThru device, and we can call our car’s cellular phone number to obtain full control over the car’s telematics unit over an arbitrary distance. Being able to compromise a car’s ECU is, however, only half the story: The remaining concern is what an attacker is able to do with those capabilities. In fact, we show that a car’s externally facing I/O interfaces can be used post-compromise to remotely trigger or control arbitrary vehicular functions at a distance and to exfiltrate data such as vehicle location and cabin audio."
Top Ten Things Overheard At The ANSI C Draft Committee Meetings:
(3) Ha, ha, I can't believe they're actually going to adopt this