Journal einhverfr's Journal: Citizens United v. FEC 1
I have spent a lot of time thinking about the oral arguments posed in the rehearing of Citizens United vs. FEC. This is a case whether a corporation which exists primarily for political advocacy could have their movie denouncing Hillary Clinton played legally over cable in the last two months before the primary. The district and appellate courts said "no" based on campaign finance laws. They then argued before the Supreme Court over whether campaign finance laws could be applied to them in this context.
If only it were that simple. Instead of issuing a ruling, the court asked the parties to come back and argue whether or not two important precedents in this area (Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce and McConnell v. FEC) should be overruled on first amendment grounds.
The ACLU, ever the champion of unpopular causes, has filed an amicus brief asking the court to rule the law in question facially overbroad and unconstitutional on first amendment grounds. The NRA also filed an amicus brief asking for more limited decisions on Constitutional grounds, striking down a single amendment and instead punting the issue back to Congress to fix the resulting issues.
The case is difficult for many people because of deep-seated prejudices about the virtues and perils of corporations in America. Some see corporations as good and wonderful engines of the economy which should be left alone from government interference and others see them as evil, greedy money-powered engines of social destruction which must be kept on a short leash. These prejudices get in the way of addressing serious concerns on both sides.
More troubling from my viewpoint though is the government's retreat from what is probably the most plausible defence of these cases: That very wealthy corporations (many of which have more wealth than any natural person in this country) can distort election dialog with their mere presence in that dialog. Instead Elena Kagan sought to emphasize corruption dangers and shareholder protection which seemed to be less well accepted by the court. In essence she asked them to keep the lines the same but change the underlying reasoning behind the line.
In the end though nobody seems to doubt that Citizens United should win, but the question is on what Constitutional basis. This leads in turn to the role of corporate first amendment rights and whether these even exist. Here the questions to seem to become far more murky.
Jamie Raskin, in his opinion piece "Corporations Aren't People" on NPR, said:
The corporation is not a membership organization but an "artificial entity," as the Supreme Court has called it, chartered by the state or federal governments to serve public purposes. Legally speaking, it has no independent constitutional standing outside of the rights of the people who own it -- and they already have the right as citizens to contribute and spend on campaigns. The idea now being promoted that CEOs have a First Amendment right to take other people's money out of corporate treasuries to spend on politics is outlandish.
Chief Justice John Marshall wrote in the Dartmouth College case that, "A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those properties which the charter of creation confers upon it, either expressly, or as incidental to its very existence."
I agree with John Marshall in his analysis but I don't think it necessarily follows that corporations don't have first amendment political campaign rights. Similarly even if we accept that corporations have first amendment political campaign rights we don't have to conclude that no regulation is possible. The fundamental question becomes whether Constitutional rights are applicable to an organization incidental to its very existence or not. Obviously some rights are not. Corporations can't vote, and IBM can't be nominated to fill a Supreme Court vacancy. Other rights, such as the rights to due process and equal protection of law are incidental to existing in the American legal system.
So which category includes freedom of speech? Or could this be settled instead by merely holding it to be a part of freedom of the press (which News Corp, NYT Corp etc. clearly have)?
Existing in the United States means participating in the marketplace of ideas. Both freedom of speech and of the press protect that marketplace from undue government control, and require that government rule are narrow as possible to meet legitimate and important government interests. The protection is not one which is limited to natural persons-- corporations routinely advertise their products and have some first amendment protections on those advertisements. Similarly, corporations have the right to petition government for a redress of grievances. I don't think it is outlandish at all to suggest that corporations, just like resident aliens, have a right to participate in our political system even if they can neither vote nor hold office. I don't think there is therefore any question that corporations have a right to disseminate company positions on election issues and candidates to the electorate in advance of an election.
Furthermore, it becomes difficult to distinguish a corporation like Citizens United, which exists for political advocacy, a corporation like News Corp or the NYT which IS allowed to air endorsements for candidates via freedom of the press, and a company like Microsoft or Oracle.
However, just because corporations, like natural persons, might have a right to participate in this dialog does not necessarily mean that no laws can be passed to protect the marketplace of ideas from being monopolized by corporate voices in these important areas-- there is no interest that I can think of more compelling for the government than the interest in free and fair access to election points of view. However, such laws would need to be narrowly tailored to meet this very compelling interest. Blanket bans on electioneering communications are facially overbroad, however, and should be struck down.
This shouldn't be a question of whether campaign finance reform itself as a concept is Constitutional but rather whether this specific section of this specific act is. I believe that the court should and probably will strike this down, but I hope that it does so without unduly undermining the rationale of Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce.
N/W-European view (Score:2)
For us Europeans, it is extremely hard to determine our point-of-view in this case, because of the completely different way of policital campaigning. However, what it comes down to in my opinion is -- are citizens so gullible that we need to limit others, through whatever medium these are brought? I don't think so.
Great piece, as always.