The same trick would work with powerlines or any other infrastructure. And the practice would fail for another reason: near everybody these days has a cell phone with GPS.
Assuming there's indeed no benefit to them, I don't see the point to this.
All it does is to maintain ideological purity for its own sake. This alternative is less convenient, a slower means towards the same end, and on the long term has the same result, just slower.
Why go with the least efficient approach?
Nope, not solved. All it means is that the 100000 morons using "password" as the password won't have the same hash. So the attackers won't be able to find out which accounts share the same password and focus on those, and won't be able to use a pre-computed dictionary.
It is however trivial to hash "password" 38 million times for each salt, on modern hardware probably in seconds.
The salting does provide an improvement, but when you have 38 million accounts, breaking even 1% already gives you a huge amount of successes. Salting doesn't do much against checking the list against the 100 best known passwords. 3800 million is a small number for a GPU accelerated password cracker.
Hashing doesn't help that much with a database this large.
Simply check the 38 million for "password", "secret", and the username. Guaranteed to have an enormous amount of successful hits that way.
I wouldn't be surprised if a million were trivially breakable in this manner, in just a few minutes if not less. If you can make $1 from each, that's a nice chunk of cash you just got.
The main advantage of this is moving protocol knowledge out of the kernel into userspace.
Which means that the kernel doesn't need a million modules that understand the various bits of various protocols. If something new comes up, the userspace compiler can patched to deal with it.
It should also make the kernel part much smaller and easier to make secure.
Whatever your problem is, it's not with SSL.
AES-256 on my old laptop works at 65 MB/s. AES-128 goes at 90MB/s. This might be a bit of a problem if you've got a gigabit LAN and are using it to full capacity, but given that googling stuff amounts to about 24K there's no way that is making a noticeable difference.
Because the US government has requirements about what it accepts.
You can't just implement whatever algorithm you like, then sell a router with that to the government. It must comply with whatever standard the government decided to adopt. And given that the government buys a lot of things, it wouldn't make economical sense to make equipment you could never sell to them.
This snowballs, and effectively sets a global standard for encryption. Sure, in your home you can do whatever you like, but the important thing is the security of the internet as a whole, and all of that is made of hardware and software that wants to be able to be used by the US government, and as such must support whatever standard it decides to adopt.
It's got nothing to do with the private key.
NSA goes to Verisign (for instance). Says "please sign our key for google.com". Verisign signs it. NSA intercepts traffic between google.com and you. Browser deems cert as valid, as Verisign signed it, and you seem to be connecting to google.com.
The CA system is weak because so long the connection is signed by a CA in the browser's list, the browser doesn't care which it is, even if it changes on a daily basis. If you can convince any CA in the list to sign what you need, you have a way to set up a MITM attack the browser won't warn you about.
The important thing isn't Google's servers, but the Certificate Authorities.
All that the NSA has to do is to get some CA to emit certificates for Google's domains. Then they can easily place themselves as a man in the middle, and the user won't notice.
No access to Google's servers necessary, then.
Thanks for reminding me of another reason why I don't buy your products
That was in 1975. The NSA that did that isn't necessarily the NSA that exists today. Just because they did something good nearly 40 years ago, dosn't mean they have anywhere near the same ideas now.
Internal priorities, people with the ability to push their agenda, and external factors can have easily changed in that time. Hell, most of the people from back then are probably dead by now.
Also, while they did make it stronger against differential cryptanalysis, they got the key length reduced, which means that today, DES is terribly weak, and 3DES is needed to patch it up.
This fits in quite nicely in what you say though. The thinking might have been that differential cryptanalysis makes cracking much easier, but a reduced key length would still require NSA-sized resources to break.
Ammunition for the plasma rifle and fuel for advanced aircraft.
Some may scoff at this, but this is exactly the sort of thing SL for.
Look around in there, you'll probably find something to your liking.
This is for positioning satellites relative to each other. The applications are things like telescopes made of several spacecraft to create a mirror larger than what is practical to launch in one piece.
But this isn't an engine that will allow a satellite to stay in orbit without fuel. They still need a traditional engine with propellant for everything besides adjusting the distance between nearby satellites.
> What harm comes from a corporation moving its servers out of the U.S.?
Economic harm to companies providing hosting in the US. Which are generally large companies with lobbyists that can affect US politics.
> Vote the fuckers out that approved this nonsense and reform the system back to what its mandate is/was supposed to be!
That would be lovely, but doesn't work for people who run servers in the US, but aren't US citizens. The only way we have to push the US government around is indirectly like this.