I just assumed that they were lumping corporate losses and corporate store profits to make the overall loss look smaller.
This is also assuming that their corporate stores are actually profitable if examined separately from the company as a whole. I don't know if that's actually true or not.
Read their Edgar 10-Q filings: it's not true; the stores are unprofitable when examined on their own, but it is the operational costs of the store vs. the operational profits which counts as ROI on the investment, whether it be operating capitol, inventory, relative cost of flooring, opportunity cost relative to putting the capital to use elsewhere, channel aging, which makes closing them desirable to corporate.
My argument is that if there is a difference between the stores being closed and those being kept open, then it's a correctable difference for the stores being closed, or they might as well just follow Blockbuster into closure of all their corporate stores.
They do not appear to have anything in mind, other than a short term write-off on the closure costs vs. their taxes, and a reduction in operating expenses, and whatever they get from sale of the real estate under the stores being closed. In other words, this is a short term pump for the stock prior to a dump before it goes in the crapper over the long term. Blockbuster did this a couple of times as a leadup to the closure of the rest of their corporate stores.
Ironically, it's pretty clear that Radio Shack is salvageable, just as Blockbuster was, at one point, salvageable.
The other company currently in this crapper is Staples, and I could see some fundamental process model changes that might save them as well, but I'd be a hell of a lot less confident of my own ability to do the necessary work than either the Blockbuster or Radio Shack cases. Staples is probably a long shot, even if they get someone competent at business process engineering in charge, and give her or him carte blanche to try and fix things.