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Comment Re:Firewall/Router blocking settings? (Score 4, Interesting) 211

I put this in my tomato "Scripts" section. Basically grabbed all of the dig output for and, cnames, and authorities for them.

Possibly excessive. I'm ok with that. YMMV.

iptables -I FORWARD -d -j DROP
iptables -I FORWARD -d -j DROP
iptables -I FORWARD -d -j DROP
iptables -I FORWARD -d -j DROP
iptables -I FORWARD -d -j DROP
iptables -I FORWARD -d -j DROP
iptables -I FORWARD -d -j DROP

Comment Re:Avoid INTERCAL (Score 1) 427

Avoid INTERCAL job postings at all costs.

So, you mean the fact that I wrote a c-intercal parser that used obscure opcodes to actually perform the interweave and or and xor isn't a good thing to put on my resume?

Also, my favorite obscure language is LIRL, and that has NOTHING AT ALL TO DO WITH ME BEING THE AUTHOR... rather, it's an interesting concept of, "what if Perl raped LISP and LISP was forced by the republican state government to carry that baby to term?"

The answer is: implied parentheses. To be clear, the language is absolutely context sensitive...

Comment Re:Actually, the common saying... (Score 1) 337

I ended up booting into DOS directly for most of these reasons.

Oddly, I barely even use 95... went straight from 3.x to 98. Where I still booted into DOS to do my gaming.

Ah... back in the day... I had to tetris my drivers to make sure I had enough conventional and XMS memory for the game I wanted to play... BOTH WAYS!

Comment Re:Sorry, but Apple still deserves most of the cre (Score 2) 337

Eject a disk by moving it from my desktop to the trash with all the files I want to delete? Makes sense.

Well, to understand this, you have to recall that early Macs had to be able to run off of a single floppy drive. Users might buy a hard drive or a second floppy drive (or if they had a dual-floppy SE, a third floppy drive for some reason) but it couldn't be relied on. Yet they still had to be able to tolerate having the OS disc ejected at times.

So there was a distinction between physically ejecting a disc while keeping it mounted (which was represented onscreen by a greyed out disc icon) so that you could copy to it, and both physically ejecting _and_ dismounting a disc.

The formal way that you were supposed to do this was by using menu commands. The Eject command was for eject-but-keep-mounted while the generally ignored Put Away command was for eject-and-dismount. It was also possible to use Put Away on an already greyed out, ejected-but-mounted disc icon.

User testing showed that this was inconvenient, and one of the OS developers eventually created a shortcut for the Put Away command, which was to drag a disc icon to the trash. It wound up being so popular that it shipped.

Apparently there had been some thought at the time about changing the Trash icon into some sort of Eject icon in the case of ejecting a disc, but apparently this was felt to be confusing or too difficult, so it wasn't done. In OS X the idea was revisited, and now the Trash icon does turn into a standard Eject icon when you're dragging a disc.

In any case, in real life, whatever confusion dragging disc icons to the trash might have caused, everyone got over it basically immediately.

Switching tiled applications makes the one menu bar change? Sure. It's not like moving the cursor half the screen for each click is a waste of time.

It's not; since there's nothing above the menubar, you can just slam the mouse up. It turns out to be faster and easier than having multiple menu bars. The Mac and Lisa groups did consider per-window menubars, but having tested the idea, it was rejected. For example, here's some polaroids of a screen from 1980 showing a Lisa with a menu attached to the bottom of a window: Later that year, the menu had moved to the top of the windows: And early the next year, it finally settled at the top of the screen:

Comment Re:No, not at all (Score 1) 112

They actually "gave" me a 5gHz wifi router (not sure how that part helps, the phone doesn't do 5gHz wifi) to use wifi calling. It's helped a bit, but I had to disable MMS entirely, otherwise every time my mother sent me a stupid cat picture, my phone would drop its wifi connection and I'd miss calls.

Really freakin' annoying.

Comment Re:No, not at all (Score 1) 112

Lastly, T-Mobile is rolling out 700MHz lower A-block spectrum (literally the lowest frequency commercially available for cell service)

When and where?

I genuinely want to know. I switched from Sprint to TMo a little while back and the biggest problem is that it gets literally no signal (we're talking battery dead in two hours from the constant searching) inside my girlfriend's apartment. I'm happy with the change otherwise, but that's a big problem (and funky wifi behavior on the phone makes that option less than helpful as a solution)

Comment Re:Half the story (Score 1) 213

For example, if you were to open a fast food shop and call it Walt Disney's Fries Company, the Walt Disney cartoon and theme park company may try to fight this, but they wouldn't stand much of a chance.

Ha, no. They would destroy you so utterly that even brave men would only whisper about you when safe behind locked doors, and as for the store itself, it would be smitten so hard that nothing but twisted weeds would ever grow on that spot again. You might want to read up on trademark dilution.

Comment Re:Half the story (Score 2) 213

It depends.

There's really no such thing as a copyright on a character; there's just copyrights on works, which characters may be part of. Also, where more than one work is at issue, note that the copyright for derivative works only applies to new material added in the derivative work; it doesn't protect the pre-existing material at all.

Not all characters are defined well-enough to be protectable by the copyright to begin with. The degree of characterization matters. A character that's nothing more than a chessman could get reused pretty freely. An extremely well-defined character probably couldn't be. This is like the difference between a butler that did it, but about whom nothing else is told in the book, and a well-defined butler (well, valet, technically) like Jeeves, where we know a lot about him (preferred foods, what he reads, his club, things he knows about, etc.)

So assuming a protectable character, the issue basically boils down to whether the first work in which that character appeared is in the public domain. If it is, then the character -- as he was defined in the public domain material -- is fair game. Otherwise, you'd just be making a derivative of a copyrighted work, which is infringing. Remember, character attributes that first appear in works that are still copyrighted are not available.

As for a trademark, it would unavoidably be lost in this scenario. A trademark can only exist where it serves to indicate that goods bearing the mark originate from a particular source. Since copyright law would allow anyone to make copies or new works which included the mark, and since in the event of conflicts, copyright law trumps trademark law (many people in this discussion have noted the Supreme Court's opinion in Dastar on this point), the mark could no longer indicate that copies shared a common source, and so it would become an unprotected generic mark. If that were not so, the trademark would act like a copyright, which would be unconstitutional.

Comment Re:Half the story (Score 1) 213

Just because the story is in the public domain, that doesn't mean you have the ability to use the trademarks.

Actually, it's usually not a problem. Here's the Supreme Court, weighing in in Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 US 23 (2003). The thing to know about the case is, there was a tv series based on a book; the book was copyrighted, but the tv series' copyright hadn't been renewed (back when that was a thing), so it had entered the public domain. Dastar made copies of the public domain tv show and sold them. Meanwhile, Fox got the tv rights to the book, then made copies of the tv show and sold them. Fox sued on trademark grounds (specifically section 43 of the Lanham Act).

It could be argued, perhaps, that the reality of purchaser concern is different for what might be called a communicative product -- one that is valued not primarily for its physical qualities, such as a hammer, but for the intellectual content that it conveys, such as a book or, as here, a video. The purchaser of a novel is interested not merely, if at all, in the identity of the producer of the physical tome (the publisher), but also, and indeed primarily, in the identity of the creator of the story it conveys (the author). And the author, of course, has at least as much interest in avoiding passing off (or reverse passing off) of his creation as does the publisher. For such a communicative product (the argument goes) "origin of goods" in 43(a) must be deemed to include not merely the producer of the physical item (the publishing house Farrar, Straus and Giroux, or the video producer Dastar) but also the creator of the content that the physical item conveys (the author Tom Wolfe, or -- assertedly -- respondents).

The problem with this argument according special treatment to communicative products is that it causes the Lanham Act to conflict with the law of copyright, which addresses that subject specifically. The right to copy, and to copy without attribution, once a copyright has expired, like "the right to make [an article whose patent has expired]including the right to make it in precisely the shape it carried when patented-passes to the public." Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U. S. 225, 230 (1964); see also Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U. S. 111, 121-122 (1938). "In general, unless an intellectual property right such as a patent or copyright protects an item, it will be subject to copying." TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U. S. 23, 29 (2001). The rights of a patentee or copyright holder are part of a "carefully crafted bargain," Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U. S. 141, 150-151 (1989), under which, once the patent or copyright monopoly has expired, the public may use the invention or work at will and without attribution. Thus, in construing the Lanham Act, we have been "careful to caution against misuse or over-extension" of trademark and related protections into areas traditionally occupied by patent or copyright. TrafFix, 532 U. S., at 29. "The Lanham Act," we have said, "does not exist to reward manufacturers for their innovation in creating a particular device; that is the purpose of the patent law and its period of exclusivity." Id., at 34. Federal trademark law "has no necessary relation to invention or discovery," Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U. S. 82, 94 (1879), but rather, by preventing competitors from copying "a source-identifying mark," "reduce[s] the customer's costs of shopping and making purchasing decisions," and "helps assure a producer that it (and not an imitating competitor) will reap the financial, reputation-related rewards associated with a desirable product," Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 514 U. S. 159, 163-164 (1995) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Assuming for the sake of argument that Dastar's representation of itself as the "Producer" of its videos amounted to a representation that it originated the creative work conveyed by the videos, allowing a cause of action under 43(a) for that representation would create a species of mutant copyright law that limits the public's "federal right to 'copy and to use'" expired copyrights, Bonito Boats, supra, at 165.

When Congress has wished to create such an addition to the law of copyright, it has done so with much more specificity than the Lanham Act's ambiguous use of "origin." The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, 603(a), 104 Stat. 5128, provides that the author of an artistic work "shall have the right ... to claim authorship of that work." 17 U. S. C. 106A(a)(1)(A). That express right of attribution is carefully limited and focused: It attaches only to specified "work[s] of visual art," 101, is personal to the artist, 106A(b) and (e), and endures only for "the life of the author," 106A(d)(1). Recognizing in 43(a) a cause of action for misrepresentation of authorship of noncopyrighted works (visual or otherwise) would render these limitations superfluous. A statutory interpretation that renders another statute superfluous is of course to be avoided. E. g., Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Service, Inc., 486 U. S. 825, 837, and n. 11 (1988).

[The Court found that the Lanham Act did not prevent Dastar from selling copies of the public domain video, and then said:]

To hold otherwise would be akin to finding that 43(a) created a species of perpetual patent and copyright, which Congress may not do. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U. S. 186, 208 (2003).

Software production is assumed to be a line function, but it is run like a staff function. -- Paul Licker