Comment: Simple mistake, simple correction (Score 3, Informative) 86
From the PDF, the implementation mistake is to give the attacker feedback on whether the tried key is correct after the first half of authentication (phase M4), and then after the complete authentication (phase M6). Since the PIN is only 8 digits, and the last one is a checksum, the problem is reduced to guessing 1 number in 10000, and then 1 in 1000.
The document states that there are few possible mitigations for the problem. However, it skips the obvious one: do not notify authentication success/failure until the response to the M6 message. This would restore the 1 in 10,000,000 guessing complexity of the PIN code, without changing the protocol. It should even be a new issue tested by the compliance suite the vendors need to pass to get the WPS certification.