Yet he appears to know for sure there is such a thing as being frightened.
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You might want to have a look at the downfall of atheistic communism, the rise of paganism in europe and the rise of christianity in asia.
Empirically as in by measuring.
We as in the form and matter that make up us.
How as in "how do atoms move about in the void".
Define as in making clear what specifically is meant and what is not meant.
The meaning of my questions are to show that there is no scientific way to do show the existence of emergence scientifically/empirically.
The term emergence is not a scientifically viable term and appears mostly to be a magical word used by those that have not read enough philosophy of science.
How do we empirically separate a message from a non message? A property of intelligence from one of non-intelligence?
Turing completeness is already in the computer that the game of life is run on (nothing new arises), the game of life rules only hinder the potentiality for turing completeness less then other parts of the simulation.
Other then that, the very concept of Turing completeness is only an interpretation that is given to a physical system, one can interpret the atoms in a sandwich to be Turing complete if one wants to.
>"On the other hand, if you could just build an exact physical simulator, you could create a virtual fertilized ovum copying a real one atom by atom, then see how it divides and ends up creating a human brain. "
This assumes among other things:
1. That every physical action/reaction in a human is calculatable
2. That such a simulation is not intractibly hard to calculate (protein folding comes to mind)
3. That a calculation, if it exists, is knowable.
4. That calculating a simulation is the same thing as building something in reality (simulating a digestive system does not actually mean that food gets digested)
n-body problems, navier stokes equations etc are not exactly easily calculatable, what makes you think there are no such things in a human? Not to mention trying to calculate quantum phenomena since we are talking of particle simulations.
How would we (empirically) come to the conclusion that these last two examples are emergent?
"I think that reasoning must be subordinate to empiricism".
Thats fine. How do we empirically determine if two apples on a table are the result of a calculation or if they are simply breakfast?
"I reject the notion that the concepts in our heads have reality outside that system"
That is not empirical, that is very anti-empirical. Since on your view that a concept is simply a calculation of a certain type any subjectivity that would arrive would be epiphenomenal since it would not be able to influence the calculation back.
We should reject epiphenomenalism because it is true that me writing about me having the experience of a red curtain in my visual field has something todo with me now seeing a red curtain. We should reject eliminativism since it is self refuting (it is simply the belief that there are no beliefs).
There have been a great many different coherent challenges to the idea that the mind is a computational in nature, among them are the ones I wrote. The idea results inescapably (really, as in there is no escape from it) in ether epiphenomenalism or eliminativism, even the epiphenomenal one results in eliminativism on such things as unity of mind, agency and original intentionality.
Here is another:
1. Physics is computational.
2. Syntax is not derivable from computation (via the argument from multiple realizability).
3. Syntax is therefore not computational.
This has the implication that a piece of software does not have a set nature, the software is only what it is interpreted to be by a conscious agent that hold original intentionality.
There is no such thing as "a computation" in itself, something is only a computation of it is interpreted to be such. Two apples on a table could be the result of the computation 1+1, or they could simply be breakfast.
There have however not been any coherent defenses of the idea that the mind would be computational.
What is an emergent property? Do these emergent properties have the ability of influencing back the properties that they emerged out of?
>"what else could it be that fits with modern science?"
The normal function of the matter of the brain plus the form of the brain of course.
Equating it to a certain kind of computation opens up the can of worms that contains the problems of epiphenomenalism, eliminativism, intentionality and multiple realizability among others.