There most certainly is a "good or bad" - your own assertion that every government in the world is corrupt supports that, in fact. I have no idea why you went on the anti-US rant there, but whatever.
The issue to discuss is the difficult position that Mozilla finds itself in now: an intentional and self-imposed obligation to act when cert authorities are compromised coupled with the unintended consequence of now having to decide if a Sovereign nation, acting legally within its own jurisdiction, constitutes a "compromised" cert auth. But it's their own damn fault for putting themselves in the situation where they presume to act on behalf of their userbase despite the userbase not all having identical use cases for their software.
I think their best course of action is for Mozilla to implement some sort of "greylist" that they can turn on something like a red SSL banner (instead of green) indicating a potentially compromised cert or key authority. That banner could then be turned on and off by the user if they desire, without the effect of cutting off legitimately issued SSL certs in the process. Nobody is cut off, but Mozilla feels better about warning end users of the "problem" that they feel obligated to act on. No harm except for the butthurt that some finite number of users might feel about "imperialists forcing morality" or whatever other rot they can conjure up.