The security difference between chip-and-signature and chip-and-PIN matters in only one case, and that is if your physical card is stolen from your wallet. Skimmers, data breaches, shoulder-surfing, all the hacking attacks won't yield the secret key inside the chip, preventing it from being counterfeited. If you don't like the security of your chip-and-signature card because you're afraid your card might be stolen, ask your bank to issue you a chip-and-PIN card instead. If your bank won't, there are plenty of other banks who will, and who will be grateful for your business.
Visa and the retailers originally figured U.S. customers would prefer chip-and-signature because it makes selling things "easy". But that's a pretty stupid attitude, because lots of people (including you and me) are wary about identity theft. Customers need to complain to their banks so that they learn we'd rather have PINs than signatures.
Overall credit card security will still remain terrible for a long time to come because static mag stripes still exist, and online card-not-present transactions still use static authentication data like CVV2 codes. What really needs to happen to actually improve security is that mag stripes and static numbers like CVV2 need to be flat-out outlawed. The recent "liability shift" is the opening salvo in the conversion, but we're probably still a decade away from actual security.