We already have things like User Account Control that prompt for explicit authorization for potentially detrimental actions. Perhaps systems like SCCM should have an option to require authorization from two people (like turning two keys to launch a nuke) for operations such as wiping out hundreds of computers.
This would not prevent a rogue administrator from wreaking havoc, but it might eliminate the "accident" defense.
I press F1 for help like a naive fool. It helpfully informed me that the setting configures L3 Mode to either mode 5 or mode 7.
This reminds me of the "help" feature in every system BIOS I've ever worked with.
Cook responded that there are many things Apple does because they are right and just, and that a return on investment (ROI) was not the primary consideration on such issues.
Isn't it the law that directors of a public company have a fiduciary duty to make a profit for their investors? Regardless of whether it's morally right or wrong, it seems to me that Cook is admitting here to a breach of his fiduciary duty.
I don't see what the big mystery is here. Misdirected (non-spam) e-mails should be sent back to the sender, as has long been done with physical mail.
I routinely reply to such e-mails with something along the lines of...
"It appears that you have e-mailed me by mistake. I am not the person addressed in this e-mail."
The sender can then track down the correct recipient or not, but at least they're aware it didn't reach the person intended. It's the considerate thing to do.