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I wasn't intending to insult you by calling you ignorant, I was informing you of your ignorance concerning nuclear war and you took it personally for some reason. Are you a former FBM skipper, are you a former SAC bomber pilot, a former EAM processor? How would you have even gained knowledge of the basics of nuclear war?
Here's the tl;dr:
1) The Russians are not worried about a Chinese attack because PRC SRF does not provide the PRC with offensive nuclear capabilities.
2) The maintenance of a counter-value or counter-force deterrent capability is irrelevant to my position that the PRC does not maintain an offensive capability.
3) Orbital rocket programs absolutely do not provide all development information necessary to build and deploy an offensive nuclear program, which requires incredibly high accuracy and reliability, neither of which are expected outcomes of orbital programs.
4) If you accept that the Chinese force might only be for deterrence, then you implicitly accept that it is not offensive. Offensive means there exist a manner or scenario in which force employment can largely prevent the employment of adversary weapons.
The only nuclear states which can be considered to deploy offensive nuclear weapons systems are those which are capable of decapitating a nuclear state, destroying post-attack command and control systems, and then detecting, tracking, and targeting remaining survivable assets on the trans-SIOP battlefield. There are two actors which have developed and maintain this capability: the Russians and the Americans. All other states maintain deterrent forces only. The UK and France should definitely be considered as potential offensive actors as part of NATO nuclear weapons employment, but it must also be considered that the UK and France have taken significant actions in reducing their deployed warhead counts and capabilities.
You can keep arguing that China is seeking to develop or has an offensive capability, but you simply have NO IDEA what you are talking about.
China is spending their money on more cost-effective forms of deterrence, such as ASBM's, EW, littoral combat platforms, etc.
China's nuclear force is the smallest of any nuclear weapons state. It does not maintain warheads mated to delivery vehicles.
Your ignorance surrounding the analog between pinpoint-precision MIRV/MARV'd solid-fueled stellar-guided advanced ICBM's and orbital rockets is pretty impressive, but analyzing your statements regarding Chinese rocket capability is absurd given that you don't even address the most important issue regarding the potential for offensive use of the Chinese strategic rocket force: THEY DON'T HAVE REMOTELY ENOUGH launchers. If you can't decapitate and then neutralize the US's strategic defence forces, then how you can you utilize your nuclear forces to prevent annihilating counter-battery? The answer is that you can't.
The only adversarial rocket force capable of even targeting all necessary US non-survivable assets is the Russian SRF. Period.
The blast zone is limited by energy deposited into the atmosphere surrounding the device following the chemical reactions which remove the transparency of the air surrounding the weapon, and former weapon materials.
Those weapons have to be decommissioned at some point anyways, therefore if you engage in policies which dictate any maintenance fees be incurred, it is more expensive to keep them. This is obvious on its face, and arguing with this point can only be incredibly ignorant or disingenuous.
Most of the cost of maintaining nuclear weapons has nothing to do with military payroll, but costs incurred by in the maintenance of peripheral force structures necessary to support the force in the pre- and post-SIOP environment. The US strategic defense system is the most expensive and reliable engineered construct devised by man. DOD carves out a very large chunk of the nuclear pie, but it is not the majority, and the bulk of it goes to support forces which are single-purpose nuclear war fighters. So in the event force reductions made certain squadrons redundant, most of those jobs would go away.
Can you city any mathematical proof which states that it is safer for you and your greatest enemy to horde innumerable cataclysmic weapons? I suspect you can't, and you can name-drop conservative think tanks till you are blue in the face, but that doesn't change the fact that those studies chiefly concern weapons employment and using mathematics to ensure that the use of constrained resources such as warheads are optimal.
Also, neither the Brookings Institute nor the Santa Fe Institute did any foundational work on MAD, only retrospective analysis, which, in the context of the fact that billions of dollars of recurring contracts are wrapped up in the enterprise, is hardly surprising considering the amount of money laying around to throw to those willing to write for the purpose of supporting the current budget.
You proceed with a laundry list of useless strawmen that has nothing to do with the benefits of nuclear force reductions. What in the world does closing Gitmo have to do with the logic of nuclear force reductions?
Nuclear weapons materials fuel almost half of all reactors in the United States, whether it is Plutonium-based MOX or HEU going into naval reactors.
Commercial power reactors, in fact, start with a low-enriched Uranium fuel load, and convert a significant portion of the 238U into Plutonium, which is then fissioned and the energy converted. BWR fuel cycle leverages this more than PWR, but both would be completely uneconomical without the existence of this conversion. Also, for this reason, commercial reactors can, and have, been fueled with ex-weapon plutonium and uranium.
The plutonium that RTG's use is NOT the same plutonium as in weapons.
We'll need to find a good way to preserve that tenth of a child though.
How far does a cruise missile, in the maximum, need to travel?
Halfway around the world.
Seems rather silly to use a phrase which has a clearly understood meaning to only refer to a subset of the events it describes.