Actually, they refute your logical conclusion by showing that its based on a false premise. Additionally, unlike your numbers, mine are based in reality. You have no real numbers period.
Your numbers a real, but not meaningful to the conversation at hand. We know the numbers with our current incentives, but not the numbers in their absence. We can conclude that the USPTO is not completely ruled by those numbers, but we can't conclusively say whether or not they are influenced by them. I never claimed that my numbers were real. I just used them to illustrate how your numbers could be correct and the premise still be true.
Begging the question. I disagree that they're even "incentives", and my actual numbers show that they do not appear to be, since if anything, the USPTO has a greater incentive to reject applications and collect fees for RCEs and appeals.
Actually, that's pretty complicated math. You have to weigh the chances that an applicant will go for an RCE/appeal against the money lost by those who don't submit those. They also involve quite a bit more manpower than a rubber stamp for maintenance, so they might not be as profitable There is a complex risk and dynamics at play here, and humans are, generally speaking, pretty bad at gambling. That's actually a significant part of why patent trolls exist, despite a large number of even the most successful ones not making money. However, approving patents over denying them is a fairly simple game with a pretty reliable turnout.
You apparently have no idea what you're talking about. Maintenance fees have nothing to do with continuation applications. You are combining two things because you've heard the words in connection with patents and assume they must be related, even though you have no real clue what they mean.
No, I was using 'continuation as a way to explain that they simply collect money and stamp a form to not kill the patent. The patent's legal monoply would continue to exist My apologies on that one, IANAL, so sometimes I use common vernacular words without recalling that the term I used has a more specific legal definition.
Amendments aren't charged a fee unless you add claims without canceling other claims. The USPTO doesn't simply get more money by virtue of initially rejecting an application. You really are just tossing out statements with no idea whether they're correct or not.
I will attribute this to not intimately knowing the ins and outs of what fees are paid when. AFAIK, you have to file an amendment after an additional rejection, and there are listings of amendment fees on the fees page of the USPTO.
It's not unreasonable to draw suspicion on this practice, because the actual costs of maintenance are basically nothing. $7,500 for rubber stamping a continuation? That's quite fishy, and seems like it would be difficult to justify.
Also, your argument about initial rejections is based on poor reasoning in addition to not considering baseline measures. An initial rejection means that they get a little bit more for an amendment. The most profitable path might be to be milk out the application for as long as you can without facing a risk of an extension.
Yes, but the conclusion that the USPTO makes the majority of their fees post-grant relies on the premise that the majority of these patents have maintenance fees paid.
No, if only one in a hundred meets the maintenance fees, it's around a 10% increase in income from maintenance fees. It doesn't really matter how low it is, because there is no incentive for not paying maintenance
And, as you note, that relies on a premise that a majority are "commonplace" that are used to "ambush" people. However, the premise is false [patentlyo.com].
No, it doesn't. Even if there is a very low incidence of patents being used in ambushes, they can still be used to harm a large portion of the industry for billions of dollars.
furthermore, the evidence points to your conclusion being wrong. From here [uspto.gov], the allowance rate is 49.2% including RCEs, or 68.5% not including them, depending on whether you consider an RCE to be a new application or not (for our purposes, discussing fees, it's somewhat irrelevant). If the USPTO had such great incentives to allow these cases, wouldn't that be 90% or higher?
Not at all. They have to at least pretend to do their job. Let's say that absent economic incentives, the allowance rate would be 5%. In that case, 49.2% is almost ten times the rate and the USPTO is incredibly broken. They can be doing a horrible job due to perverse incentives without being 100% cronies. It's the same thing with police departments and their perverse incentives. They have incentives to write bullshit tickets and seize everything that they can, but cops do spent a lot of their time doing things other than that.
You also don't seem to be understanding the criticism. The USPTO gets paid as much or more for accepting a patent than they do for rejecting it. Now, not all patents will be taken to full term, but more than zero of them will be. Therefore, the USPTO has incentives to approve patents.